Commissioner Dombrovskis has been invited to an Economic Dialogue, following the 15 December 2025 Economic Dialogue on the launch of the 2026 European Semester Cycle, which covered the key elements of the Commission’s package, including the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure, the Joint Employment Report, the Euro Area policy recommendations and ongoing efforts to strengthen the EU’s global competitiveness. This briefing first takes stock of the latest economic developments, including the impact of the conflict in the Middle East, notably through higher energy prices and their implications for the EU economy. It then provides an update on recent developments on EU fiscal surveillance, focusing on the state of play and implementation of the medium-term fiscal-structural plans (MTFSPs), draft budgetary plans for 2026, and the broader implementation of the revised economic governance framework. Finally, it covers latest developments related to the simplification package, forthcoming changes to the methodology of Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs), and key findings from the Debt Sustainability Monitor. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Access to affordable, adequate and energy-efficient housing has become one of the EU's most pressing socio-economic challenges. Rising house prices and rents, limited affordable supply and regional disparities have intensified housing insecurity, especially for low-income households and young people. Although housing policy remains primarily a national competence, it has gained prominence on the EU agenda in response to concerns about affordability, social exclusion and energy poverty. In December 2025, the European Commission published an affordable housing plan aimed at boosting housing supply, mobilising investment, simplifying permits, and targeting young people and the homeless to facilitate access to affordable housing. Additionally, the Commission provides guidance to Member States on housing issues through the European Pillar of Social Rights and the European Semester. The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the main instrument of Next Generation EU, plays a significant role in supporting housing-related reforms and investments through Member States' national recovery and resilience plans (NRRPs); it supports 50 housing-related investments and 21 reforms. Housing-related investments are also supported by traditional EU funding instruments under the multiannual financial framework (MFF), including cohesion policy funds and InvestEU. The NRRPs cover a wide range of relevant investment and reform measures, including areas such as social and affordable housing supply, energy renovation, urban regeneration and regulatory reforms. An analysis of the 10 plans with the largest share of measures supporting affordability and availability of housing show the different approaches Member States have taken within the RRF framework. The European Parliament has called for access to decent and affordable housing to be recognised as a fundamental right and put forward a set of recommendations prepared by its Special Committee on the Housing Crisis. Overall, the EU's evolving approach aims to enhance coordination between Member States, increase funding mobilisation and provide clearer policy guidance to tackle the housing crisis. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

In 2026, disbursements from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) could amount to some €180 billion in the best‑case scenario, more than twice the level of 2025. This support could help EU Member States mitigate the challenges they face in an increasingly uncertain global outlook. However, they need to make efforts to ensure full implementation of their national recovery and resilience plans and absorption of RRF resources, since the deadline to meet investment and reform objectives is 31 August 2026. Meanwhile, the military escalation in the Middle East is weighing on growth prospects and higher energy prices are adding new pressure on inflation. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This workshop assessed recent developments in human rights and accountability across Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in the context of the 4th EU–CELAC summit (Santa Marta, 9 November 2025). Bringing together EU policymakers, regional human rights representatives, academics and civil society actors, the discussion examined the structural challenges affecting democratic governance and the institutional mechanisms available to address them. Participants highlighted the coexistence of democratic backsliding, organised criminal violence, institutional fragility and shrinking civic space with enduring commitments to international human rights law and multilateral cooperation. Particular attention was given to the region’s complex “accountability mosaic”, comprising international and regional judicial bodies, national human rights institutions, transitional justice mechanisms and protection frameworks for human rights defenders. While these mechanisms have produced meaningful advances, their effectiveness remains uneven and vulnerable to political, economic and security pressures. The workshop also explored the human rights implications of transnational organised crime, climate-related vulnerabilities and trade-based cooperation frameworks, emphasising the need for policy coherence, sustained multilateral engagement and capacity-building. Overall, the discussion underscored that EU–LAC relations are grounded in shared normative principles but require more systematic operationalisation through political dialogue, cooperative instruments and support for regional and domestic accountability structures. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study provides country-specific data and analysis on the potential impacts of the proposed revision of the EU Tobacco Taxation Directive (TTD). Using the Tobacco Excise Tax Simulation Model, it focuses on nine Member States. Simulations of higher minimum excise rates for cigarettes, roll-your-own tobacco, heated tobacco products and e-cigarettes indicate higher prices, narrower price gaps between countries, reduced consumption, higher revenues and declines in premature mortality. These findings support timely and undiluted implementation of the proposed revision of the TTD. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

European Council President António Costa declared 2026 'the year of European competitiveness', emphasising the significance that the European Council places on the topic. Given the current geopolitical context, Costa put substantial efforts into maintaining the EU leaders' focus on this agenda point. Despite predictions that competitiveness would be sidelined, the European Council followed up on the discussions at the informal competitiveness retreat at Alden Biesen on 12 February, launching a 'One Europe, One Market' agenda to be implemented in the next two years. Two other crucial points were on the table. First, the enactment of the €90 billion loan to Ukraine, on which EU leaders did not convince Hungary to lift its veto on a required implementation law. This time around, leaders did not shy away from speaking bluntly, calling Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's behaviour 'disloyal', or even 'a betrayal'. For the sixth time in a row, a separate text was adopted on Ukraine, with the firm support of 25 EU leaders. The second central point was the escalating situation in the Middle East, on which EU leaders displayed unity in condemning Iran's indiscriminate military strikes against countries in the region and in rejecting US President Donald Trump's demands – and threats regarding the future of NATO – to help unblock the Strait of Hormuz. The European Council also discussed – albeit briefly – security and defence, migration, European democratic resilience, the protection of children online, the EU's eastern border regions and the situation at the Dniester river. Back-to-back with the European Council, EU leaders met for a Euro summit in inclusive format to discuss the euro-area economy in light of the war in the Middle East. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study provides country-specific data and analysis on the potential impacts of the proposed revision of the EU Tobacco Taxation Directive (TTD). Using the Tobacco Excise Tax Simulation Model, it focuses on nine Member States. Simulations of higher minimum excise rates for cigarettes, roll-your-own tobacco, heated tobacco products and e-cigarettes indicate higher prices, narrower price gaps between countries, reduced consumption, higher revenues and declines in premature mortality. These findings support timely and undiluted implementation of the proposed revision of the TTD. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Organic production in the EU is governed by Regulation (EU) 2018/848. Following the Court of Justice's judgment of 4 October 2024 in Case C 240/23 Herbaria Kräuterparadies II, which stated that imported products recognised under equivalence arrangements cannot use the EU organic logo, the Commission has proposed adjustments to improve clarity for consumers and prevent trade disruptions. The proposal would revise the labelling rules for imports from equivalent third countries, allowing the EU organic logo to be used only when additional EU requirements are met. It would also simplify requirements for cleaning and disinfection products, raise the thresholds for exempting small sellers of unpacked organic products, ease the conditions for groups of operators, and extend equivalence recognitions to trade partners to prevent trade disruption. Further changes would address quail production rules, withdrawal periods for veterinary medicines, outdoor access for poultry and limits on poultry house size. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The inclusion of a rebalancing mechanism into EU preferential trade agreements is a comparatively recent development. So far, only two such mechanisms have been introduced. A first rebalancing mechanism was incorporated into the EU–United Kingdom (UK) Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). It is designed to allow either party to take unilateral rebalancing measures (e.g. suspension of preferential tariffs) if, after the UK's withdrawal from the EU, 'significant divergences' from the principle of 'a level playing field for open and fair competition and sustainable development' were to emerge that have 'material impacts' on bilateral trade or investment. The mechanism does not apply to all provisions of the TCA. The TCA's mechanism has to date remained untested. A second rebalancing mechanism was introduced into the EU–Mercosur Partnership Agreement (EMPA) and the EU–Mercosur interim trade agreement (iTA). The mechanism applies to the trade pillar contained in both the EMPA and the iTA and is modelled on the World Trade Organization's rarely used non-violation complaint mechanism. Similar mechanisms exist in a number of regional preferential trade agreements, to most of which the United States is a party. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The March II plenary session of the European Parliament focused on major geopolitical and economic issues. Members held debates on statements from the Council and the Commission, on energy security and affordability, the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 19 March 2026, and the human rights situation in Iran. The Parliament also addressed the European Citizens' Initiative calling for a ban on conversion practices in the European Union, as well as holding debates on legislative proposals for deposit protection and early intervention measures in the banking sector and to implement the European Union–United States trade deal. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The objective of this briefing is to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of EU financial support to Ukraine, in light of the ongoing debate on the need for continued financial assistance in the short and medium term. It assesses Ukraine’s short- and medium-term financing needs, provides an overview of the past, current and planned EU instruments and funding volumes. It takes stock of the position and future liabilities of the EU budget due to the aid provided. It also provides an overview of the state of play regarding frozen Russian assets and their potential use, including budgetary and legal considerations. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing is prepared in view of the public hearing with the Chair of the Financial Stability Board (FSB), Andrew Bailey, scheduled for 9 April 2026 in the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Ce document s’intègre dans une série d’études qui, avec une perspective de droit comparé, visent à faire une présentation de la liberté de pensée, de conscience et de religion dans différents ordres juridiques. Après avoir expliqué le droit positif et la jurisprudence d’application, le contenu, les limites et la possible évolution de cette liberté sont examinés. La présente étude a pour objet le cas de l’Union européenne. Cette liberté est garantie par l’article 10 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne et par nombreuses dispositions de droit primaire. Avant le Traité d’Amsterdam de 1997 et la directive 2000/78/CE du 27 novembre 2000, il n’y a eu que peu d’arrêts de la CJUE pertinents pour la liberté de pensée, de conscience et de religion, mais ils sont importants : l’arrêt Van Duyn c. Home Office, lié à la libre circulation des travailleurs et l’arrêt Vivien Prais, concernant l'égalité des chances des candidats de toutes les religions devant l'accès aux institutions de l’Union européenne. Par la suite, la jurisprudence s’est développée avec nombre d’arrêts concernent l’interprétation et l’application de la directive 2000/78/CE, et un nombre plus réduit concernant d’autres actes de droit dérivé, en particulier en ce qui concerne la liberté de religion. La jurisprudence précise notamment les limitations pouvant être apportées au port visible de signes politiques, philosophiques ou religieux et en particulier du foulard islamique, ainsi que la limite des discriminations sur l’emploi dues à l’appartenance religieuse ou à l’attitude de bonne foi ou de loyauté envers une éthique et les situations justifiant le droit d’asile ou la protection subsidiaire pour des ressortissants de pays tiers immigrant dans des États membres. La protection de cette liberté peut être considérée dans l’ensemble comme effective mais il ne faut pas oublier qu’elle ne s’applique que dans le champ des compétences de l’Union. Il y a cependant place pour des améliorations, notamment pour faire face aux défis présents et futurs. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing provides additional economic background ahead of the public hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on 8 April 2026. It complements EPRS briefings (here and here) on the recent Commission proposal on pensions of 20 November 2025, as well as on the revised regulatory framework for insurers (Solvency II) which will apply as of 30 January 2027. All initiatives aim to contribute to achieving the objectives of the Savings and Investment Union (SIU) by giving additional latitude to institutional investors on how to channel more “patient” long-term funding to growth and scale-up companies, including via investments in venture and private capital funds. The European Council conclusions of 19 March called on co-legislators to conclude negotiations on supplementary pensions by the end of the year. The current briefing provides (i) general information on the magnitudes involved; (ii) enabling conditions to be kept in mind also based on the Danish experience; (ii) a discussion of the transmission channel that has been identified between supplementary pensions and the stock market; (iv) as a form of summing up the topic a basic check list for policy makers who aim to boost domestic capital markets using this channel. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Newborn screening is an established preventive healthcare practice that enables the detection and treatment of health conditions at an early stage. It could reduce the risk of 'diagnostic odyssey' often experienced by persons affected by rare diseases, which in Europe are defined as health conditions that affect less than 1 in 2 000 persons. This briefing presents the findings of a desk review of publicly available sources on newborn screening practices in the EU and the United States (US), which serves as a benchmark. The research finds that these practices vary widely in the EU, which raises concerns regarding equal access to healthcare and the promotion of health outcomes. In total, 87 different rare conditions are covered in national newborn blood screening (NBS) panels (including those conditions in pilot programmes) across the EU. However, only two rare health conditions – congenital hypothyroidism and phenylketonuria (PKU) – are included in all national NBS panels. Other notable differences between Member States include the sample collection window, which ranges from 24 to 144 hours after birth. The draft legislative-initiative report calling for an EU rare disease action plan (2025/2130(INL)), being discussed in the European Parliament's Committee on Public Health, calls for stronger measures to harmonise and promote NBS in the EU. A February 2026 EPRS study finds that stronger EU action on newborn screening – as part of an overall EU rare disease action plan, as called for by the European Parliament – could boost access to health care and social inclusion, promote better health outcomes, lower healthcare costs and promote health sector innovation and competitiveness. This briefing presents further evidence to support this claim. First, the diffusion of newborn screening for spinal muscular atrophy (SMA) was faster in the US, where SMA is included in federal guidelines, than in the EU, where there are presently no such guidelines. Some research has found that earlier diagnosis of SMA is associated with better health outcomes and lower health care costs. Second, the rate of infant mortality is lower in EU Member States that cover more health conditions in their NBS panels. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study explores the competitiveness gap faced by the EU’s seafood sector. Five case studies illustrate how high input costs and relatively low productivity mean that imports, now supply over 80% of the EU’s consumption of fisheries and aquaculture products (FAPs). The policy recommendations provided aim to help secure a more self-sufficient, sustainable, and resilient seafood system. This document was prepared at the request of the Committee on Fisheries (PECH). Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing provides background information for the mission of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) to India on 16-20 February 2026. The mission will allow Members to assess the implementation of the EU Gender Action Plan III (GAP III) in India and evaluate how EU external action supports gender equality and women’s empowerment in a key strategic partner country and Indo-Pacific actor. It also offers an opportunity to engage with key national stakeholders, including representatives from government institutions, EU Delegation officials, civil society organisations, think tanks, and private-sector actors as well as social enterprises implementing gender-inclusive initiatives. The briefing first provides an overview of India’s political, social, and economic context. It then outlines EU-India relations, their strategic partnership, and the recently concluded Free Trade Agreement. Chapter three introduces the European Gender Action Plan III. Chapter four examines the current state of gender equality in India. Chapter five highlights the contribution of EU action in India. Finally, the briefing offers concluding remarks. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The European Union's competitiveness and prosperity depends on an optimal allocation of resources, particularly savings, within the single market, yet EU capital markets remain fragmented. EU rules are mostly set out through directives, leaving Member States' supervisory authorities latitude in their interpretation and application of the rules. Therefore, although rules are enacted at EU level, the resulting uneven supervisory environment is considered a major cause of fragmentation of EU capital markets. EU-level supervision and regulation thus constitute instruments to 'de-fragment' – i.e. 'integrate' – the EU's capital markets. On 4 December 2025, the European Commission issued a package of three proposals to address this situation (the 'market integration package'), as part of its savings and investments union strategy. The proposal to amend three directives – entitled the 'master directive' by the Commission – would primarily aim to enhance and facilitate the supervision of fund management firms operating in several Member States. It would also transfer current provisions in the Directive on markets in financial instruments (MiFID) to the Regulation on markets in financial instruments (MiFIR) in order to ensure their consistent application among Member States. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

ISSUES AT STAKE: • Every year around €2.5 trillion, roughly 15 % of the combined GDP of the EU's 27 Member States, is spent on public procurement. The perceived failure of current EU public procurement rules to deliver on the economic potential of this part of the economy lead to a need for review. Findings show competition in public procurement did not increase from 2011 to 2021, a period which comprises the last review of the rules, which date to 2014. Successful public procurement could be leveraged to provide investment in the EU economy, thus playing its part in the drive to improve its competitiveness as a whole and the strategic autonomy of the Union. • The review will be expected to simplify the current rules. The notion of 'simplification' has two potential aspects, namely removal of complexity present in the procurement framework legislation itself, and simplification of the interaction between that framework and sectoral legislation. • The previous revision of the EU's public procurement rules strengthened the power of public authorities to award contracts on non-price criteria. To increase the take-up of procurement on such strategic bases, it will be necessary to improve the legal framework to give greater clarity as to the conditions for such awards. • One aspect of the strategic approach to procurement which has gained significant political traction recently is the encouragement of procurement of goods and services made in the EU – the 'European preference'. This is fully in line with recent efforts to develop the EU's autonomy in strategically important sectors. Complex interrelationships exist between these drivers. Some are in inherent contradiction, while others are necessarily complementary. For example, development of non-price award criteria by means of increased legal certainty implies developing additional, more detailed legal rules. This is prima facie opposed to the simplification agenda, if simplification is to be understood just as reducing the number of rules. Similarly, any 'European preference' will need legal delineation, which, depending on how it is executed, may run counter to any notion of simplification. Developing secure legal criteria for non-price awards will impact positively on the competitiveness gain from EU public procurement, if those rules cater for increased innovative tenders. While an EU preference could support local industries, it could also limit contracting authorities' (CAs) choice of international tenderer, with a possible negative impact on competitiveness. Resolving these trade-offs will be at the heart of the political deal to be struck on this reform. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study maps EU allocations and instruments supporting natural disaster prevention, preparedness, response and recovery under the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and compares them with the European Commission’s proposals for the 2028–2034 MFF. It highlights key structural and budgetary differences, including changes affecting climate and biodiversity mainstreaming, and identifies limits to comparability. The study provides Members of the European Parliament with a clear analytical basis for scrutiny of the post-2027 EU budget. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Four years after the inception of the EU Global Gateway strategy and one year after Commissioner Jozef Síkela was tasked with scaling it up, the European Parliament's AFET and DEVE committees have examined its implementation, assessing its development impacts and its economic and geostrategic dimensions. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

During the March II plenary session, the European Parliament is due to vote on a package of proposals amending the bank crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework. The amendments aim to refine the framework so as to further deepen harmonisation and reduce the use of taxpayer funding to rescue failed banks. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

During its March II part-session, the European Parliament is expected to vote its negotiating position on the Digital Omnibus on AI – a set of amendments to the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act. The proposal seeks to address specific implementation issues identified since the AI Act's adoption and to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden. The Council has agreed its general approach to the file. Once Parliament officially adopts its position, the EU co-legislators can launch trilogue negotiations. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Treating wastewater to remove harmful components prior to discharge into the environment is essential to protect human health and preserve water resources. On 26 March, Parliament will discuss the implementation of EU legislation, updated in 2024 to bring it into line with the EU's climate neutrality, circularity and zero pollution ambitions. The extended producer responsibility scheme (EPR) introduced by the recast directive to cover the costs of advanced treatment for micro-pollutant removal will be at the core of the debate. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

European Union Member States have a shared responsibility to give protection to asylum-seekers, to ensure they receive fair treatment and their cases are examined according to uniform standards. The common European asylum system (CEAS) establishes common standards for Member State procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection. A critical aspect of a common approach to international protection is the application of the 'safe country of origin' concept. In the context of refugees, the term 'safe country of origin' (SCO) has been used to refer to countries whose citizens should not, in theory, be granted international protection, since those countries are widely regarded as safe. The concept can refer to the automatic exclusion from refugee status of nationals originating from SCOs, or it can raise a presumption of safety that those nationals must rebut. Several international and regional human rights bodies have either raised concerns about the use of the SCO concept or proposed appropriate safeguards to ensure that the fundamental rights of persons in genuine need of international protection, but who originate from SCOs, are respected. At EU level, the concept has gradually developed as part of the CEAS, culminating in the adoption of the provisions on the common EU list of SCOs. Many Member States have already established national SCO lists. With the new asylum legislation, transposition of the SCO concept will be mandatory for all Member States, which will also be able to retain or introduce national SCO lists other than those designated at EU level. This is an update of a 2025 EPRS briefing. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This IA accompanies three proposals designed to support the establishment of the savings and investment union, as well as the EU's efforts to deepen capital market integration, strengthen supervision and foster innovation. Overall, the IA is meaningful, but could have been shorter, in line with the Better Regulation Guidelines. The IA identifies three problems and two drivers. While the consequences are well-defined across the different stakeholder groups, the scale and scope of the problem remain difficult to assess due to the limited quantification provided. The principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are respected. The IA defines one general objective, which it breaks down into three specific objectives, but does not provide operational objectives. The European Commission has presented two policy packages: one for reducing barriers to cross-border operations and innovation and another for addressing supervisory divergence. Each package includes two policy options. These options are based on previous research and stakeholder consultation; however, the choice of options is quite limited, even though the IA specifies which options were discarded at an early stage and why. The IA only assesses the economic impact of the proposed legislation, omitting impacts on citizens. It would have been relevant to include a wider range of impacts such as territorial or digital effects. Additionally, the costs and benefits are mainly discussed qualitatively. The IA includes an SME test and a competitiveness check. The Commission consulted a broad range of stakeholders and included their views in the IA. In addition, the IA uses robust data sources, provides a clear monitoring plan and is transparent about its limitations. The IA openly knowledges that it did not address all the Regulatory Scrutiny Board's comments, due to time and data constraints. Finally, the legislative proposals are aligned with the IA. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

European political parties ('europarties') emerged in the 1970s, preceding the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 granted them legal recognition; however, it was only in 2004 that EU law defined their status, set establishment criteria, and provided independent funding. The most recent regulatory change in 2025 emphasised protecting EU values, strengthening safeguards against foreign interference, and updating transparency and financing requirements. Europarties' influence depends on balancing European and national interests. Ongoing deliberations seek to enhance europarties' resilience, and their independence from national politics, reflecting the broader debate on the balance of power between Member States and EU institutions. This search for equilibrium continues to drive significant academic and political discussion. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The purpose of this study is to enhance the evidence base on how organised crime groups (OCGs) have evolved into transnational geopolitical actors, to evaluate the suitability of international legal frameworks for holding them accountable, and to offer policy recommendations to strengthen this accountability. The study finds that international law fails to adequately define or reflect the transformation of OCGs into geopolitical actors. Instead, it relies on outdated conceptions of criminal hierarchies, which confine organised crime to the transnational rather than international legal domain . International law is therefore restricted in its ability to categorise these groups as legal entities, even where their actions resemble crimes against humanity in their intent and scale . This definitional oversight has practical consequences: EU external action efforts generate relatively little information on geopolitical threats tied to OCGs, and the international criminal, humanitarian, and human rights infrastructure is unable to directly confront the actions of these groups. The study calls for the redefinition of OCGs as part of a new Directive, as well as practical measures to refine criminal justice mechanisms, improve cross-border cooperation, update EU external action threat assessments and support existing international legal frameworks to more effectively account for the geopolitical behaviours and impacts of OCGs. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Against the backdrop of a rising U.S. federal deficit and increasing geoeconomic tensions, understanding who holds U.S. debt instruments could have important policy implications, including for the EU. This briefing provides an overview of the size and ownership structure of U.S. public debt and assesses the extent of Europe’s exposure. It further considers whether such exposure could translate into potential political leverage. The first part of the briefing outlines recent developments in the evolution of U.S. public debt, including its size, trajectory, and changing composition. The second part analyses EU Member States’ exposure to U.S. Treasury instruments. It further discusses the implications and limits of potential political leverage arising from Europe’s significant holdings of U.S. assets, highlighting the dominant role of private investors and the constraints on coordinated policy action. Finally, it considers how a possible gradual portfolio adjustment, including a gradual reduced accumulation of U.S. assets, and stronger home bias, could shape future financial flows, and how initiatives such as the Savings and Investment Union (SIU) may support a greater reallocation of European savings toward euro-denominated assets. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study examines the WTO’s economic and legal value for the European Union and draws policy implications for the European Parliament ahead of MC14. Economically, it shows how MFN non‑discrimination and bound tariffs reduce transaction costs and uncertainty for EU exporters – especially SMEs – and warns that a two‑tier system of bilateral ‘deals’ would fragment markets and penalise EU high‑value trade. It reviews recent quantitative evidence on the welfare and export gains from GATT/WTO Membership and assesses early findings on the Trade Facilitation Agreement, noting that trade‑cost reductions abroad can benefit EU firms via supply chains. Legally, it maps how WTO disciplines shape EU legislation and how EU FTAs both embed WTO rules (‘WTO‑plus‘) and pioneer ‘extra‑WTO‘ and sustainability provisions. It also tests the available policy space to design ‘buy European‘ procurement measures consistently with WTO/GPA commitments. On reform, the study analyses pragmatic pathways for integrating new plurilaterals, improving disciplines on State interventions (including transparency), addressing non‑market practices (subsidies and public bodies), refining Special and differential treatment (SDT), and restoring a functioning dispute settlement system. Key recommendations urge Parliament to champion WTO stability, support integration of plurilaterals, help broaden participation in the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA), and ensure credible use of EU enforcement tools against ‘appeal into the void‘ tactics. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Erasmus for All is a pilot initiative implemented by the European University Foundation in cooperation with participating higher education institutions and funded under the Erasmus+ programme. The initiative explored whether city-based top-ups to Erasmus+ student mobility grants could improve affordability in high-cost destinations. The pilot’s outcomes indicate that additional support can reduce perceived financial pressure during mobility in higher-cost cities. However, it does not address the main barriers to equal access to mobility, notably upfront costs, liquidity constraints and institutional and administrative pressures. There is no evidence that the approach influences students’ destination choices or the overall distribution of mobility. As the pilot allocates resources based on destination characteristics and adds administrative complexity without means to process these, it should be seen as an affordability adjustment rather than a solution to unequal participation. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The Strategic Compass, adopted by the 27 EU Member States in March 2022 – only weeks after the onset of Russia's unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine – emphasised the need for robust partnerships in order for the EU to be able to achieve its objectives in the area of security and defence. Alongside 'acting' (operations), 'securing' (resilience) and 'investing', 'partnering' is one of the four main pillars of the Compass. The document itself outlines specific targets and deadlines against which to measure progress in this area. While the EU has partnered with other security and defence actors (essentially states and international organisations) in the past, a new model of tailored security and defence partnership was launched shortly after the Compass was adopted, as a framework for enhanced partnership. To date, the EU has signed nine such partnerships – with (by date of signature) Moldova, Norway, Japan, South Korea, North Macedonia, Albania, the United Kingdom, Canada and India – and more are envisaged. While the partnerships vary in content, depending on the assessed mutual interests of the EU and each individual partner, around 10 areas of cooperation are common to all nine. The European Parliament has highlighted the significance of the Strategic Compass's partnership dimension and, in particular, the value of security and defence dialogues with partners from the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership, as well as with key partners in strategic maritime areas such as the Southern Neighbourhood and the Indo-Pacific. Parliament has also underlined that cooperation with countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Georgia, Western Balkan countries, Japan, Australia and certain African countries serves as a key element of the common security and defence policy. In 2023, it called for deeper military and defence cooperation with Japan and South Korea, and for closer cooperation with partners in Latin America and the Caribbean. This briefing updates an earlier one from January 2025, drafted by Elena Lazarou with Panagiotis Politis Lamprou. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The world has changed since the European Union adopted its first economic security strategy in 2023. An increasingly confrontational geopolitical environment and the possibility of coercive behaviour from both China and the United States require a longer term strategy to reduce dependencies as well as a short-term ability to react swiftly to threats. On 3 December 2025, the European Commission adopted its new communication on economic security aiming to switch up a gear, from finding ad-hoc responses to crises based on risk identification, to proactive risk anticipation and mitigation. This new approach also focuses on providing clarity on the strategic and coherent use of the many instruments already available in the EU toolbox. Aiming for a safer and more resilient EU economy, the Commission's communication proposes ways to protect and develop strategic industries and reduce the EU's vulnerabilities to coercion and other disruption. To build a solid knowledge base for informed decision-making and common understanding of risks and responses, the approach seeks to strengthen data gathering, analysis and overall economic security policy governance, with increased public and private stakeholder participation. To boost coherence, the Commission wants to adapt existing policy tools to deployment with a clear aim of managing economic security risks, taking possible impacts across policies into account. The Commission will seek to close existing security gaps with new instruments, such as the revised Blocking Statute. The communication met with mixed reactions from the expert community, with both praise for taking the much needed step in the right direction, as well as criticism for its insufficient response to the stark challenges facing the EU. The European Parliament is preparing its opinion on the role of trade in strengthening the EU's economic security, to be adopted in the coming months. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP