This briefing has been prepared for the public hearing with the Chair of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), Claudia Buch, scheduled for 27 March 2025 in the ECON Committee. The previous hearing took place on 18 November 2024. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The energy system is a cornerstone of the United States (US) economy and competitiveness. The country's energy mix in 2022 was well-diversified, consisting of two thirds natural gas and oil, with the rest almost equal proportions of coal, nuclear and renewables. By using its vast reserves in fossil fuels and applying new extraction technologies, the US has managed to increase its fossil fuel production significantly over the past 10 years and, since 2019, it has become a net energy exporter for the first time in decades. US fossil fuel exports have increased further since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, at a time when the EU has looked to close the gap created by its ending imports from Russia. The US is also the world's largest producer of nuclear power, accounting for about 30 % of worldwide generation of nuclear electricity. During the Biden administration, the EU and the US were close allies and shared values on energy and the importance of energy transition. In this context, they cooperated through several channels and forums. At the same time, however, their initiatives (the Inflation Reduction Act in the US, the European Green Deal in the EU) showed that, while the goal (decarbonisation and generation of energy from renewable sources) remained the same, the visions and means to achieve them differed between the US and the EU. This created the conditions for both cooperation and rivalry. Since then, the new Trump administration has shown that it intends to conduct a more aggressive, fossil fuel-based energy policy. This could reduce cooperation and create tensions in energy relations between the partners, as was the case during President Trump's previous term. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This note describes the treaty provisions and appointment procedure for ECA members at EU level. In addition, it provides information on the national nomination procedure for the ECA member in Romania and the country’s candidate. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Every child has rights and deserves protection. It is estimated that around 2.5 million children in the European Union come into contact with the justice system every year. This can be a very stressful and even harmful experience for a child, who may participate in criminal proceedings as either a victim, a witness or a perpetrator. Children can also be parties to civil proceedings such as divorce, custody or adoption procedures, as well as administrative procedures, for example those related to nationality or migration. Because of children's especially vulnerable position, the EU and international organisations such as the United Nations and the Council of Europe are pushing to develop justice systems that are child friendly. Child-friendly justice systems guarantee respect for and implementation of children's rights to the highest possible degree and take account of the maturity of the child and the circumstances of the case. Since the roles children can play in such proceedings and the nature of the proceedings themselves can vary, children may face different issues. However, some rights and needs are universal. For example, children need to be respected and protected. They also have a right to be heard, either directly or through a representative; to be informed and communicated with in a language that they understand; and to receive a speedy response. The Barnahus model is an example of good practice for dealing with children in the justice system, especially child victims, as it provides the child with a coordinated and effective response. Legislation and policy in the EU has addressed the issue, and more work is underway. For example, the work on the recast of the Victims' Rights Directive may provide even more rights to child victims. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The six countries that make up the region known as the Western Balkans differ in terms of size, population, economy, energy mix and energy import dependency. At the same time, they share common elements because of their geographical proximity, and – in some cases – common policies adopted in the past. An example is their ageing infrastructure dating back to the 1970s, which was damaged during the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Another common element (except for Albania) is their reliance on solid fossil fuels (mainly coal), and their dependency on imports of fossil fuels. The EU is the leading trade partner for the countries of the Western Balkans and an important investor in the region. In addition, it is the largest provider of financial assistance to the region, supporting the six countries' development and reforms, as well as its transition towards sustainable energy, with financial and technical assistance. The EU provides assistance through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, the Western Balkans Investment Framework and the European Investment Bank. While the EU has an important role in the region, Russia and China are major players, too. Russia has been active for decades in the Western Balkans, while China has started engaging more recently. Their strategy also differs, with Russia more focused on exporting its fossil fuels to the region, and China investing through its Belt and Road Initiative. Nonetheless, such involvement creates dependencies, which could hamper these countries' integration into the EU – from both a political and an energy/economic perspective – as well as the functioning of the EU itself. In this context, experts have noted what steps the EU and the countries in the region could take to lessen these dependencies, while enhancing the Western Balkan countries' energy security and helping them take the necessary steps towards the green transition. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Ukraine is the second largest country on the European continent after Russia. Its oil, coal and gas reserves, as well as its geostrategic position, ensured its important role in energy trade, both during the Soviet Union and after its collapse. However, Russia's initial invasion of Ukraine (since 2014), followed by a full-scale war of aggression against the country, have had severe human and economic impacts. In the energy area, for example, Russia's strategy has been to weaponise (e.g. the occupation of Zaporizhzhia nuclear power station) or destroy (hydro and coal-fired power plants, as well as electricity grid substations) energy infrastructure. As a result, Ukraine's electricity generation capacity has been severely limited. Moreover, its choice to be less dependent on Russian energy, and to apply for EU membership, means that, within a short time frame, it must rebuild its energy grid and orient it towards a future with less fossil fuels; all this while being in a war. Energy relations between the EU and Ukraine are multifaceted (e.g. the Energy Community; the memorandum of understanding on energy in 2005, updated in 2016; the association agreement signed in 2014). In future, they are due to be reframed under the institutional arrangements for the enlargement talks (after Ukraine was granted EU candidate status in 2022). Since the Russian invasion in 2022, to help Ukraine cope with the multiple challenges its energy grid has been facing, the EU has used several mechanisms and initiatives, such as successfully synchronising the Ukrainian grid with the Continental European Synchronous Area; the EU civil protection mechanism; the Ukraine Facility; the Ukraine Energy Support Fund; and the European Investment Bank. The outcome of the war is uncertain, and some see recent statements by the new United States administration as a significant setback for Ukraine. Others focus instead on the possibilities for further collaboration between Ukraine and the EU. They bring as examples the country's vast gas reserves and infrastructure both to transport and to store natural gas, nuclear power or green hydrogen, provided that the country engages in the development of relevant infrastructure. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 20 January 2025, President Trump halted all US foreign aid pending a review. By 10 March, 83 % of USAID programmes had been terminated, creating a US$60 billion funding gap that neither Team Europe – the EU and its Member States collectively – nor other donors can fill, amid declining global official development assistance (ODA). This infographic uses OECD Development Assistant Committee (DAC) data on 2023 ODA commitments and disbursements. Commitments are pledged funds reflecting donor priorities, while disbursements show actual transfers, tracked yearly. Since disbursements often span multiple years, annual payments may stem from past commitments. Commitments are recorded in full when made, while disbursements track the timing of aid. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

European Works Councils (EWCs) are bodies that should guarantee employees the right to be consulted on important issues in large multinational companies active in multiple EU countries. However, EWCs have been criticised for being ineffective, on account of unclear definitions, non-dissuasive sanctions and ineffective access to justice. In February 2023, the European Parliament called for legislative action to address the shortcomings identified and strengthen the functioning of EWCs. In response, the European Commission consulted European social partners and put forward a proposal in January 2024 to revise the 2009 directive. The European Parliament's Committee on Employment and Social Affairs voted its report on 3 April 2024 just ahead of the elections. The Council then adopted its general approach on 20 June 2024. On 3 December 2024, the committee decided to enter interinstituional negotiations on the basis of the report, with the mandate confirmed by plenary vote on 19 December. Trilogue negotiations have now started. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In 1947, drawing on the lessons learnt from the global economic damage caused by trade protectionism and tariff wars prior to World War II, 23 countries, including the United States, initiated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as a platform for multilateral negotiations aimed at liberalising and boosting global trade. To this end, GATT members - and since 1995 the members of the then newly created World Trade Organization (WTO) - gradually reduced their import tariffs and tariff quotas, creating a multilateral system of country-specific tariff commitments. These commitments, in conjunction with the general principles for their application, have since constrained WTO members' ability to unilaterally set tariffs higher than what they have committed to. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 7 March 2025, the European Commission published a roadmap for women's rights, to reaffirm the EU's commitment to gender equality, speed up progress in this area, and counteract political movements that contest EU gender equality policies. The roadmap outlines the challenges and benefits of gender equality today, emphasising its political and economic importance. In an annex, a declaration of eight principles for a gender-equal society, inspired by and phrased in the language of human rights, takes a women's rights-centric approach. The roadmap expresses the Commission's commitment to women's rights and invites other EU institutions to adhere to it. The roadmap will serve to guide future EU action and particularly for the new gender equality strategy from 2026, as well as EU external action. To a significant extent, the objectives outlined in the declaration are covered already by EU legislation or non-legislative measures, depending on the extent of the EU's own competences. Since, in some areas, the EU only has limited competences to support and coordinate the action of Member States (such as on health and education), the roadmap emphasises the importance of involving the Member States. The European Parliament held a first debate in plenary on the roadmap on 11 March. In various previous resolutions, the Parliament has expressed support for women's rights and has called on the EU to act against any regression and contestation of gender equality both internally and externally. Various civil society organisations have welcomed the Commission's initiative and called for a recognition of sexual and reproductive rights, as well as an emphasis on intersectional discrimination and vulnerable women, such as disabled women or women with children. The roadmap addresses sexual and reproductive rights, but more as a health issue than a women's rights issue, probably taking into account the EU's limited competences in the area. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In this paper, we propose and analyse four scenarios of a second Trump administration’s economic policy and its impact on Europe, ranging all the way from moderate tariffs to full trade war, a full multilateral breakdown with the US leaving the IMF down to a more cooperative exchange rate realignment agreement. We assess two trade scenarios quantitatively and outline broader policy shocks and their economic consequences. Our findings highlight significant challenges for the ECB, requiring responses to trade disruptions, financial instability, and potential global economic reordering. We offer specific policy recommendations for the ECB to navigate these uncertainties. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 20 March 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

EU Heads of State or Government will hold their first discussion on the post-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) at the European Council meeting on 20-21 March 2025. Since 1988, when an interinstitutional agreement introduced the first binding MFF, the European Council has played a central role in the process leading to its adoption. In 1992, the Lisbon Treaty established a new procedure whereby the MFF would come into being through the adoption of a regulation. The European Council was not assigned a formal legal role in this procedure. Due to national contributions to the EU budget and the allocation of funding being highly sensitive issues, MFF negotiations have largely been considered as Chefsache, with a strong de facto involvement of the European Council, especially during the past two rounds. This briefing, presented in the form of answers to frequently asked questions, outlines the trends that can be identified regarding the European Council's involvement in decision-making on the EU's long-term budget. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This briefing provides a summary of the recent economic developments in EU Member States and gives an overview of relevant economic projections forecasted by major EU and international institutions. Annex 1 includes the latest GDP data and forecasts for all EU Member States. Annex 2 provides the latest inflation data and developments. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Once considered an issue of the past, conscription has increasingly made its way back onto European, EU and global policy agendas in recent years, mainly since Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As EU defence policy has steadily progressed, with new procurement initiatives and defence industry reinforcement, a parallel discussion on the EU's armed forces is evolving in the context of the EU's common security and defence policy (CSDP). Europe's civilian and military preparedness and readiness has also come under the spotlight recently, as highlighted by the report presented in October 2024 by former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö. Opinion polls in some Member States also show growing support for the reintroduction of national service or conscription. Mounting threats to European security, fears of transatlantic disengagement, as well as the position of the new United States administration and potential peace plans for Ukraine involving the presence of European troops, has raised awareness of the need to ready Member States' armed forces for the most extreme military contingencies. The conscription landscape across the EU is diverse. National defence is primarily carried out by professional armed forces, but conscription is becoming increasingly relevant. Some EU countries retained conscription practices beyond the end of the Cold War, while others reintroduced conscription modalities following Russia's 2022 invasion. Peacetime conscription policies differ among Member States in, among other things, the number of conscripts, the length of service, the level of compensation provided, and the size of the reserve forces. The Niinistö report underscored the potential importance of conscription in developing a holistic 'total defence' concept that connects military and civil defence, while promoting a 'whole-of-society' approach to crisis response and preparedness. It also proposes increasing structured exchanges between Member States to identify national service and conscription model best practices, potentially facilitated by the EU. Some experts have highlighted the benefits of implementing conscription, while others are sceptical of poorly trained and ill-equipped conscript armies. The European Parliament has repeatedly underlined the limited number of personnel devoted to CSDP missions and operations, highlighting issues related to force generation. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In this paper, we propose and analyse four scenarios of a second Trump administration’s economic policy and its impact on Europe, ranging all the way from moderate tariffs to full trade war, a full multilateral breakdown with the US leaving the IMF down to a more cooperative exchange rate realignment agreement. We assess two trade scenarios quantitatively and outline broader policy shocks and their economic consequences. Our findings highlight significant challenges for the ECB, requiring responses to trade disruptions, financial instability, and potential global economic reordering. We offer specific policy recommendations for the ECB to navigate these uncertainties. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 20 March 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In this issue... ● US President Trump starts enacting his economic policy agenda and threatens the EU with tariffs. ● Headline inflation falls to 2.4% as underlying indicators ease. ● ECB reduces key policy rate by 25 bps. ● The euro continues to strengthen against the dollar amid growing uncertainty on US’s tariffs. ● The Fed keeps rate unchanged among economic uncertainty while challenges to independence arise. ● ECB reckons new US approach to cryptos and CBDCs strengthens the case for a digital euro. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The LUX Audience Award is the largest audience film award in the European Union, presented by the European Parliament and the European Film Academy, in collaboration with Creative Europe MEDIA and Europa Cinemas. Each year, five films are nominated for the award, all tackling important social and political issues within the EU, while showcasing some of Europe's most exciting filmmakers. Beyond being a film prize, the award strengthens European film distribution, promotes gender equality, and fosters critical discussion at the heart of European democracy. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Were the US to impose large and lasting tariffs on its imports from the EU, the effect on the euro area (EA) would be substantial and far-reaching. We expect the direct impact to be inflationary in the US and contractionary on EA aggregate demand and output. The indirect impact through an appreciation of the dollar (partly already occurred) tends to transfer inflation from the US to Europe. The ECB should be mindful that both deflationary and inflationary influences may ensue, and be ready to adjust monetary policy promptly if necessary to maintain price stability. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 20 March 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This briefing report evaluates the ECB's monetary policy in a context of declining inflation and stagnant growth. Inflation risks have been averted and, after a period of relatively tight policy in 2024, benchmark comparisons indicate that the current interest rate is consistent with the ECB's mandate. The prevailing economic and inflation outlook supports further rate cuts. However, the high level of economic policy uncertainty necessitates cautious adjustments. Moreover, official ECB communications offer valuable signals regarding future policy steps. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 20 March 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The repeated crises of recent years, including the COVID pandemic and the Russian war on Ukraine, have disrupted trade relations in many ways. Competition on global markets has become fiercer and the rules-based multilateral order established after World War II is increasingly challenged. The tariffs imposed by the new United States (US) administration are adding to the uncertainty. Trade in goods and services accounts for 22.4 % of EU GDP – the EU is the world's biggest trading bloc and top trading partner for 80 countries. Trade is thus crucial for the EU's growth and competitiveness. In that context, the development of a robust trade policy, enabling the EU to defend itself effectively against unfair trade practices and to level the playing field, has become a core priority for EU leaders. Consequently, trade – an issue traditionally in the hands of the European Commission – has grown in importance on the European Council agenda in recent years. Developing a bold trade policy is also one of the core elements of the New Competitiveness Deal, which was discussed at the EU leaders' special meeting in April 2024. The importance of EU assertiveness on the global stage to defend its trade interests was underlined in the European Council's 2024-2029 Strategic Agenda, the document setting out the EU's direction for the current 5-year term, as well as in the Budapest Declaration of November 2024. It is in light of recent developments that EU leaders will discuss trade at their 20-21 March meeting in Brussels. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Slovakia aims to reach climate neutrality by 2050 (see trajectory in Figure 1).The country accounted for 1.1 % of the EU's total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2023 and achieved an emissions reduction of 27.3 % from 2005 to 2023, slightly below the EU average reduction of 30.2 % over the same period. Emissions from sectors under the EU emission trading system (ETS) fell by 41.7 %. For the effort-sharing sectors, Slovakia largely over-achieved its targets for 2020. Slovakia's land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector is an important carbon sink, absorbing almost a fifth of the country's emissions. In April 2023, Slovakia proposed a revision to its recovery and resilience plan, adding a REPowerEU chapter. Slovakia submitted a draft updated national energy and climate plan (NECP) in August 2023. The European Commission assessed it and made recommendations for the final NECP, overdue since June 2024. In a 2023 survey, only a quarter of Slovaks (26 %), compared with an EU average of 46 %, identified climate change to be one of the four most serious problems facing the world. Most expect national government (64 %) and/or business and industry (63 %) to tackle climate change, 50 % see it as a task of the EU, while only 26 % find it to be a personal responsibility. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This paper covers possible defence options under the European economic governance framework by reviewing the proposal for a ReArm Europe plan floated by the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen. The paper also analyses flexibilities under the EU budget, EIB and ESM financing while also assessing potential market challenges and public procurement. This paper will be regularly updated. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This paper examines the impact of US protectionist trade policies on the euro area economy, focusing on macroeconomic and financial repercussions. While direct tariff effects are mitigated by exchange rate adjustments and ECB policies, broader risks arise from global trade disruptions and financial contagion. Increased risk premia on US bonds elevate European financing costs, posing fiscal challenges. We highlight the importance of trade diversification, innovation incentives, and prudent monetary policy to mitigate economic vulnerabilities and sustain long-term growth. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 20 March 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The euro area experienced an unprecedented surge of inflation in 2021 and 2022 followed by a decline in 2023 and 2024. The ECB raised policy rates too late. Simple rules would have prescribed an earlier response. The policy easing since summer 2024, however, is quite in line with such rules. This experience provides a number of lessons that could lead to improvements in the policy strategy that is currently under review. The current level of policy rates appears appropriate. However, there are some important upside risks to inflation. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 20 March 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 6 December 2024, the European Union (EU) and the four founding members of Mercosur – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – reached a political agreement on a free trade agreement that would form part of a wider Partnership Agreement including political dialogue and cooperation. The 2024 text of the trade pillar seeks to adjust an earlier political agreement of 28 June 2019 to EU demands for Mercosur to make stronger sustainability commitments, notably in respect to the Paris Agreement, and to Mercosur demands for the EU to grant greater policy space for Mercosur's industrial development. Against the background of growing geo-economic uncertainty and geopolitical tension, the agreement would be a strong signal in favour of multilateralism and against power politics in trade. It would create a strategic alliance between like-minded partners for building sustainable and resilient supply chains, including for the green and digital transitions. It could also allow the EU to regain some economic ground lost to China in the past decade. However, the trade pillar faces strong headwinds, notably for its potential environmental, climate change and food safety impacts. While the agreement enjoys the support of EU industry associations and sub-sectors of EU agriculture with offensive interests, EU farmers' associations with defensive interests have criticised it as an unfair 'cars for cows' deal. After the legal review and translation of the agreement, the Commission will submit to the Council proposals for Council decisions to sign and conclude the whole Agreement, revealing its ratification modalities. Second edition. The 'International Agreements in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the process, from initial discussions through to ratification. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The IA supports the above proposals with a qualitative assessment of legal, social and economic impacts, complemented by quantified estimates of costs and savings of procedural and administrative costs. Impacts on fundamental rights and digitalisation are also assessed, including concerns raised by stakeholders with respect to data protection. The IA follows a clear intervention logic and is based on solid internal and external sources and various stakeholder consultations. It clearly makes an effort to explain the methods and assumptions underlying the analysis, but could have been more coherent, clear and specific, notably when it comes to the transparency and accessibility of the cost estimates and aggregations. The range of options assessed in the IA appears limited, given the preferred option is a combination of two out of the three options considered in addition to the baseline scenario. Impacts on small and medium-sized enterprises and competitiveness are anticipated to be minor and were therefore not further assessed. The simplification and digitalisation of protection measures for vulnerable adults in cross-border situations are at the core of the IA, which expects considerable procedural cost savings for stakeholders, while adjustment costs would be borne by the competent administrations under the preferred option. The legislative proposals appear to follow the IA's preferred option. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The European Electoral Act decrees that the Members of the European Parliament shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation, using the list system or the single transferable vote. There is much leeway for a Member State to turn terms like “proportional representation” or “the list system” into executable rules. As a result, Member States differ considerably as to their electoral provisions. The briefing presents an overview of the vote patterns used by the Member States, of the apportionment methods to convert the votes of a domestic electorate into seats for the competing parties, and of the ways in which the seats of a party are assigned to this party's candidates. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In the 2024 European Parliament elections turnout varied significantly across EU Member States, influenced by institutional factors such as compulsory voting and concurrent elections. Socioeconomic disparities persisted; older, higher-educated, and wealthier citizens were more likely to vote, while economically disadvantaged and unemployed individuals participated less. Gender and age gaps in turnout reaffirmed the importance of role models and political efficacy in mobilization. Vote choice reflected both ideological convictions and protest voting, with established pro-EU parties retaining support while Euroskeptic and far-right parties made gains. The elections confirmed the enduring importance of economic redistribution, European integration, and climate policy as key axes of political contestation. While high-quality representation fosters legitimacy and political engagement, turnout and ideological representation disparities highlight ongoing challenges for democratic inclusivity in the EU. Key recommendations for higher quality of representation include: (1) strengthening political efficacy among women; (2) encouraging youth political engagement; (3) balancing age representation in politics; (4) simplifying electoral processes; (5) strengthening social safety nets to sustain political engagement; (6) addressing political disengagement stemming from economic dissatisfaction; (7) enhancing representation for disadvantaged groups; (8) considering candidate age in party strategies; (9) bridging climate policy divides; and (10) leveraging EU defense cooperation for political consensus. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Hungary is legally bound to reach climate neutrality by 2050 (see trajectory in Figure 1), and aims to achieve a 50 % reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 compared with 1990 levels. Hungary accounted for 1.6 % of the EU's net GHG emissions in 2023, and achieved a net emissions reduction of 32.5 % from 2005 to 2023, slightly more than the EU average reduction of 30.5 % over the same period. Emissions from sectors under the EU emissions trading system (ETS) were more than halved (-55.3 %). For the effort-sharing sectors, Hungary over-achieved its targets for 2020, and expects to deliver on the updated 2030 obligations. In August 2023, Hungary proposed a revision to its recovery and resilience plan, adding a REPowerEU chapter. Hungary submitted a draft updated national energy and climate plan (NECP) in August 2023; the European Commission assessed it and made recommendations for the final updated NECP, which was published in October 2024. In a 2023 survey, a third of Hungarians, compared with an EU average of 46 %, identified climate change to be one of the four most serious problems facing the world. Most expect business and industry (60 %) to tackle climate change, less than half consider it the task of national governments (48 %) or the EU (41 %), while only 18 % find it to be a personal responsibility. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This study first analyses the existing European security architecture, as it has emerged since World War II. It does so from an organisational perspective, looking at NATO, the OCSE and EU defence policy, as well as from a series of national country perspectives, trying to find underlying motives for national defence policies. After looking at recent policy responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the pivotal years since 2022, five scenarios for a possible future European security architecture are presented and explored. These scenarios look in particular at the level of agency of EU Member States and the EU as a whole, also referred to as EU strategic autonomy, and the relationship between the EU and NATO. They also take into consideration the possible outcome of the war in Ukraine, EU-Russia relations and US foreign and defence policy. The scenarios were tested in interviews with 15 security experts. Conclusive remarks and policy considerations indicate markers for future policy actions. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

ATAG to the study - Using an own, newly elaborated functional definition of mobility poverty, this study first estimates mobility poverty in the nine EU outermost regions and assesses its effects on their transport and tourism sectors. It then reviews the Fit for 55 transport-related legislation and analyses its implications for these remote territories. It also outlines the main EU, national and regional measures tackling the adverse effects of both mobility poverty and the new climate legislation, and finally concludes with policy recommendations. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Since the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding on regulatory cooperation, the European Union and the United Kingdom have organised three meetings for dialogue and cooperation on financial services regulation. The meetings focus on macroeconomic developments, banking and anti-money laundering, capital markets, and digital and sustainable finance. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In a context of high uncertainty on the future of European security, EU leaders held a special European Council meeting on 6 March 2025 to discuss common action aimed at enhancing Europe's sovereignty in the field of defence as well as to reiterate their unwavering support to Ukraine in light of the latest developments. The EU-27 took significant steps to accelerate defence preparedness, agreeing in particular on new instruments to finance defence investment at multiple levels. Regarding Ukraine, considering Hungary's refusal to agree to joint conclusions, a separate statement, 'firmly supported' by 26 of the 27 Heads of State or Government, was published, emphasising a series of principles with regard to possible peace negotiations. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In response to the difficulties and challenges faced by EU farmers in recent years, the Commission put forward a proposal to amend some of the rules on the common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (CMO), so as to reinforce the position of farmers in the food supply chain. The proposed amendments enhance the existing provisions on contracts involving farmers, reinforce the bargaining power of producer organisations, simplify their recognition, and establish an incentive framework for voluntary schemes and social sustainability initiatives benefiting farmers. The proposal was published, and is being advanced, together with the proposal for a new regulation on cross-border cooperation in the enforcement of the directive on unfair trading practices (UTP), which is part of the same efforts to improve the position of farmers. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Germany was originally entitled to a maximum financial contribution of €25.6 billion in grants from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the unprecedented EU response to the crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. The national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) for Germany does not include requests for loans. Following the latest amendment of the German NRRP in July 2024, which added a REPowerEU chapter, the EU resources devoted to the plan reached €30.3 billion. This amount corresponds to 4 % of the entire RRF and to 0.9 % of Germany's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP). For most of the measures, additional funding will also come from national sources. There is a strong focus on the green transition. Measures relating to climate protection – including key actions on mobility and housing – were projected to receive 42 % of the allocation in the initial version of the plan. The modified NRRP increases this level of ambition to 49.5 % of the updated allocation. It also shows a strong digital ambition, devoting 47.5 % of the allocation (excluding REPowerEU) to digital measures across various sectors ranging from industry to education, social policy and healthcare, and public administration. Germany has so far received €19.75 billion from the RRF in the form of pre-financing and two result-based payments covering three instalments. The remaining 34.9 %, or €10.55 billion, will be paid in two other instalments once Germany has satisfactorily fulfilled the related milestones and targets identified in relation to RRF implementation. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate of creating a common EU recovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional cooperation and discussions on its implementation and scrutinises the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP