This paper examines the impact of US protectionist trade policies on the euro area economy, focusing on macroeconomic and financial repercussions. While direct tariff effects are mitigated by exchange rate adjustments and ECB policies, broader risks arise from global trade disruptions and financial contagion. Increased risk premia on US bonds elevate European financing costs, posing fiscal challenges. We highlight the importance of trade diversification, innovation incentives, and prudent monetary policy to mitigate economic vulnerabilities and sustain long-term growth. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 20 March 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The euro area experienced an unprecedented surge of inflation in 2021 and 2022 followed by a decline in 2023 and 2024. The ECB raised policy rates too late. Simple rules would have prescribed an earlier response. The policy easing since summer 2024, however, is quite in line with such rules. This experience provides a number of lessons that could lead to improvements in the policy strategy that is currently under review. The current level of policy rates appears appropriate. However, there are some important upside risks to inflation. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 20 March 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 6 December 2024, the European Union (EU) and the four founding members of Mercosur – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – reached a political agreement on a free trade agreement that would form part of a wider Partnership Agreement including political dialogue and cooperation. The 2024 text of the trade pillar seeks to adjust an earlier political agreement of 28 June 2019 to EU demands for Mercosur to make stronger sustainability commitments, notably in respect to the Paris Agreement, and to Mercosur demands for the EU to grant greater policy space for Mercosur's industrial development. Against the background of growing geo-economic uncertainty and geopolitical tension, the agreement would be a strong signal in favour of multilateralism and against power politics in trade. It would create a strategic alliance between like-minded partners for building sustainable and resilient supply chains, including for the green and digital transitions. It could also allow the EU to regain some economic ground lost to China in the past decade. However, the trade pillar faces strong headwinds, notably for its potential environmental, climate change and food safety impacts. While the agreement enjoys the support of EU industry associations and sub-sectors of EU agriculture with offensive interests, EU farmers' associations with defensive interests have criticised it as an unfair 'cars for cows' deal. After the legal review and translation of the agreement, the Commission will submit to the Council proposals for Council decisions to sign and conclude the whole Agreement, revealing its ratification modalities. Second edition. The 'International Agreements in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the process, from initial discussions through to ratification. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The IA supports the above proposals with a qualitative assessment of legal, social and economic impacts, complemented by quantified estimates of costs and savings of procedural and administrative costs. Impacts on fundamental rights and digitalisation are also assessed, including concerns raised by stakeholders with respect to data protection. The IA follows a clear intervention logic and is based on solid internal and external sources and various stakeholder consultations. It clearly makes an effort to explain the methods and assumptions underlying the analysis, but could have been more coherent, clear and specific, notably when it comes to the transparency and accessibility of the cost estimates and aggregations. The range of options assessed in the IA appears limited, given the preferred option is a combination of two out of the three options considered in addition to the baseline scenario. Impacts on small and medium-sized enterprises and competitiveness are anticipated to be minor and were therefore not further assessed. The simplification and digitalisation of protection measures for vulnerable adults in cross-border situations are at the core of the IA, which expects considerable procedural cost savings for stakeholders, while adjustment costs would be borne by the competent administrations under the preferred option. The legislative proposals appear to follow the IA's preferred option. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The European Electoral Act decrees that the Members of the European Parliament shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation, using the list system or the single transferable vote. There is much leeway for a Member State to turn terms like “proportional representation” or “the list system” into executable rules. As a result, Member States differ considerably as to their electoral provisions. The briefing presents an overview of the vote patterns used by the Member States, of the apportionment methods to convert the votes of a domestic electorate into seats for the competing parties, and of the ways in which the seats of a party are assigned to this party's candidates. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In the 2024 European Parliament elections turnout varied significantly across EU Member States, influenced by institutional factors such as compulsory voting and concurrent elections. Socioeconomic disparities persisted; older, higher-educated, and wealthier citizens were more likely to vote, while economically disadvantaged and unemployed individuals participated less. Gender and age gaps in turnout reaffirmed the importance of role models and political efficacy in mobilization. Vote choice reflected both ideological convictions and protest voting, with established pro-EU parties retaining support while Euroskeptic and far-right parties made gains. The elections confirmed the enduring importance of economic redistribution, European integration, and climate policy as key axes of political contestation. While high-quality representation fosters legitimacy and political engagement, turnout and ideological representation disparities highlight ongoing challenges for democratic inclusivity in the EU. Key recommendations for higher quality of representation include: (1) strengthening political efficacy among women; (2) encouraging youth political engagement; (3) balancing age representation in politics; (4) simplifying electoral processes; (5) strengthening social safety nets to sustain political engagement; (6) addressing political disengagement stemming from economic dissatisfaction; (7) enhancing representation for disadvantaged groups; (8) considering candidate age in party strategies; (9) bridging climate policy divides; and (10) leveraging EU defense cooperation for political consensus. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Hungary is legally bound to reach climate neutrality by 2050 (see trajectory in Figure 1), and aims to achieve a 50 % reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 compared with 1990 levels. Hungary accounted for 1.6 % of the EU's net GHG emissions in 2023, and achieved a net emissions reduction of 32.5 % from 2005 to 2023, slightly more than the EU average reduction of 30.5 % over the same period. Emissions from sectors under the EU emissions trading system (ETS) were more than halved (-55.3 %). For the effort-sharing sectors, Hungary over-achieved its targets for 2020, and expects to deliver on the updated 2030 obligations. In August 2023, Hungary proposed a revision to its recovery and resilience plan, adding a REPowerEU chapter. Hungary submitted a draft updated national energy and climate plan (NECP) in August 2023; the European Commission assessed it and made recommendations for the final updated NECP, which was published in October 2024. In a 2023 survey, a third of Hungarians, compared with an EU average of 46 %, identified climate change to be one of the four most serious problems facing the world. Most expect business and industry (60 %) to tackle climate change, less than half consider it the task of national governments (48 %) or the EU (41 %), while only 18 % find it to be a personal responsibility. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This study first analyses the existing European security architecture, as it has emerged since World War II. It does so from an organisational perspective, looking at NATO, the OCSE and EU defence policy, as well as from a series of national country perspectives, trying to find underlying motives for national defence policies. After looking at recent policy responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the pivotal years since 2022, five scenarios for a possible future European security architecture are presented and explored. These scenarios look in particular at the level of agency of EU Member States and the EU as a whole, also referred to as EU strategic autonomy, and the relationship between the EU and NATO. They also take into consideration the possible outcome of the war in Ukraine, EU-Russia relations and US foreign and defence policy. The scenarios were tested in interviews with 15 security experts. Conclusive remarks and policy considerations indicate markers for future policy actions. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

ATAG to the study - Using an own, newly elaborated functional definition of mobility poverty, this study first estimates mobility poverty in the nine EU outermost regions and assesses its effects on their transport and tourism sectors. It then reviews the Fit for 55 transport-related legislation and analyses its implications for these remote territories. It also outlines the main EU, national and regional measures tackling the adverse effects of both mobility poverty and the new climate legislation, and finally concludes with policy recommendations. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Since the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding on regulatory cooperation, the European Union and the United Kingdom have organised three meetings for dialogue and cooperation on financial services regulation. The meetings focus on macroeconomic developments, banking and anti-money laundering, capital markets, and digital and sustainable finance. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In a context of high uncertainty on the future of European security, EU leaders held a special European Council meeting on 6 March 2025 to discuss common action aimed at enhancing Europe's sovereignty in the field of defence as well as to reiterate their unwavering support to Ukraine in light of the latest developments. The EU-27 took significant steps to accelerate defence preparedness, agreeing in particular on new instruments to finance defence investment at multiple levels. Regarding Ukraine, considering Hungary's refusal to agree to joint conclusions, a separate statement, 'firmly supported' by 26 of the 27 Heads of State or Government, was published, emphasising a series of principles with regard to possible peace negotiations. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In response to the difficulties and challenges faced by EU farmers in recent years, the Commission put forward a proposal to amend some of the rules on the common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (CMO), so as to reinforce the position of farmers in the food supply chain. The proposed amendments enhance the existing provisions on contracts involving farmers, reinforce the bargaining power of producer organisations, simplify their recognition, and establish an incentive framework for voluntary schemes and social sustainability initiatives benefiting farmers. The proposal was published, and is being advanced, together with the proposal for a new regulation on cross-border cooperation in the enforcement of the directive on unfair trading practices (UTP), which is part of the same efforts to improve the position of farmers. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Germany was originally entitled to a maximum financial contribution of €25.6 billion in grants from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the unprecedented EU response to the crisis triggered by the coronavirus pandemic. The national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) for Germany does not include requests for loans. Following the latest amendment of the German NRRP in July 2024, which added a REPowerEU chapter, the EU resources devoted to the plan reached €30.3 billion. This amount corresponds to 4 % of the entire RRF and to 0.9 % of Germany's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP). For most of the measures, additional funding will also come from national sources. There is a strong focus on the green transition. Measures relating to climate protection – including key actions on mobility and housing – were projected to receive 42 % of the allocation in the initial version of the plan. The modified NRRP increases this level of ambition to 49.5 % of the updated allocation. It also shows a strong digital ambition, devoting 47.5 % of the allocation (excluding REPowerEU) to digital measures across various sectors ranging from industry to education, social policy and healthcare, and public administration. Germany has so far received €19.75 billion from the RRF in the form of pre-financing and two result-based payments covering three instalments. The remaining 34.9 %, or €10.55 billion, will be paid in two other instalments once Germany has satisfactorily fulfilled the related milestones and targets identified in relation to RRF implementation. The European Parliament, which was a major advocate of creating a common EU recovery instrument, participates in interinstitutional cooperation and discussions on its implementation and scrutinises the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This briefing provides a summary of the recent economic developments in the EU Member States and gives an overview of relevant economic projections forecasted by major international and EU institutions. Annex 1 includes latest GDP data and forecasts for all EU Member States and Annex 2 the latest inflation data and developments. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Batteries, widely used in the transport and energy sectors, are central to the global energy system. They will be key to the EU's clean energy transition, industrial future and strategic autonomy. Boosting the industrial base for battery production is therefore a key task for the EU. While the EU battery sector enjoys strong support for its research and development activities, it also faces significant challenges such as dependencies on third countries and high energy and labour costs. Developing battery recycling or implementing more sustainable value chains could help address some of these challenges. However, significant threats, such as competition from countries with lower environmental standards, may hinder progress and require strategic action. Projections around battery manufacturing in the EU remain highly uncertain. Many reports claim that the EU is on track to meet its future battery needs, yet also highlight significant risks that could prevent this from happening. Factors such as rising energy and labour costs, incentives offered by third countries, slower-than-expected market developments, or difficult access to critical raw materials, could undermine the sector's competitiveness. Mastering the complexities of battery manufacturing technologies remains another major challenge. Delays or cancellations of gigafactory projects have already been announced across Europe. The recent collapse of Northvolt, once hailed as Europe's flagship home-grown battery manufacturer, has raised serious concerns about the future of batteries 'made in Europe'. The EU has long recognised batteries as one of its strategic technological sectors. To make its battery supply chains secure, resilient and sustainable, the EU uses three approaches. First, it seeks to inject strategic impetus into the sector, using its convening power to improve cooperation among stakeholders. Second, it is working on a comprehensive regulatory framework. Third, it provides the sector with funding. The development of the battery sector provides an instructive case study for shaping an effective EU industrial policy. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The European Commission has a near monopoly on legislative initiative in the European Union (EU), with special initiative rights for other institutions applying only in certain specific cases. However, the European Parliament and the Council may invite the Commission to submit legislative proposals. While this 'indirect' initiative right does not create an obligation on the Commission to propose the legislation requested, the Treaty of Lisbon codified the Commission's obligation to provide reasons for any refusal to follow a parliamentary initiative. Against this backdrop, some argue that Parliament could take the Commission to the Court of Justice of the EU if it fails to justify a negative decision. Others see Parliament's increasing participation in overall political planning – particularly through negotiations on the Commission's annual work programme (CWP) – as a further channel for Parliament to increase its influence on EU legislation. It is thus argued that the increased role of Parliament in the legislative procedure should have reduced the need for its Members to make use of legislative initiatives. Notwithstanding that, there is a trend towards greater use of formal parliamentary legislative initiatives to assert greater influence on the political process. In her inaugural address in July 2019 and in her political guidelines, the then newly elected President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, pledged to strengthen the partnership with the European Parliament, inter alia, by responding with a proposal for a legislative act whenever Parliament, acting by a majority of its Members, adopts a resolution requesting that the Commission submit legislative proposals. She added that this commitment would have to fully respect the proportionality, subsidiarity and better law-making principles. President von der Leyen also said that she supported moves towards recognising a right for Parliament of legislative initiative. A similar commitment to strengthen cooperation with Parliament on the exercise of Parliament's indirect right of legislative initiative was expressed by Ursula von der Leyen in her 2024-2029 political guidelines. This briefing is an update of a 2013 briefing by Eva-Maria Poptcheva, and a 2020 briefing by Silvia Kotanidis. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The EU design legislative reform package includes two texts amending Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 (the Community Design Regulation) and, in parallel, recasting Directive 98/71/EC (the Design Directive) to align the design protection system in the EU with the digital age and make it more accessible and efficient for applicants. In terms of digitalisation, the update of the requirements for representing designs will allow applicants to file new digital design types (e.g. by using 3D printing technologies). In terms of efficiency, the reform package aims to make application procedures cheaper and simpler and registration procedures faster, while also ensuring greater predictability and legal certainty for stakeholders looking for design protection in the EU. Within the European Parliament, the files were assigned to the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), with Gilles Lebreton (ID, France) as rapporteur. The EU design legislative reform package was published in the EU's Official Journal on 18 November 2024; the two texts entered into force 20 days after their publication in the Official Journal. The Community Design Regulation will apply from 1 May 2025 (with a few articles applying from 1 July 2026), whereas Member States will have to transpose the Design Directive into their national legal systems by 9 December 2027. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Road safety has improved significantly in the EU, with the number of road fatalities falling by more than 60 % in the last 20 years. However, improvements in road safety fell short of the EU goals of decreasing the number of road deaths by 50 % between 2001 and 2010, and by an additional 50 % between 2011 and 2020. Directive (EU) 2015/413 facilitating cross-border exchange of information on road safety-related traffic offences – the Cross-border Enforcement (CBE) Directive – is one of the pillars of the policy framework to improve road safety in the EU. It aims to help improve road safety by tackling the relative impunity of non-resident drivers. The revision, announced in the European Commission's sustainable and smart mobility strategy in 2020, seeks to address key shortcomings in existing rules. According to Commission estimates, 40 % of cross-border offences are committed with impunity, either because the offender is not identified or because the fine is not enforced. The Commission tabled its proposal to revise the CBE Directive on 1 March 2023 as part of the road safety package. In the European Parliament, the file was assigned to the Committee on Transport and Tourism (rapporteur: Kosma Złotowski, ECR, Poland). Following interinstitutional negotiations, the Parliament and Council negotiators reached a provisional agreement on the final wording of the text on 12 March 2024. The Parliament approved the agreed text on 24 April 2024. The Council adopted the new rules on 16 December 2024 and the final act was published in the Official Journal of the EU on 30 December 2024. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Irregular migration is hard to define and to measure. Several EU datasets provide indications of a range of aspects of irregular migration, such as attempted irregular crossings of EU external borders, detected irregular stays, loss of regular status and removals of irregular migrants. However, these datasets are often incomplete, inconsistent, and insufficient to capture the complex issues of irregular migration and return. Despite its shortcomings, data on irregular migration is highly consequential for EU policy making and contributes to the ongoing politicisation of migration in the EU. For example, the widely shared figures showing increasing numbers of people crossing into the EU irregularly, and scores of irregular migrants unwilling or unable to return to their country of origin, fuel a narrative of a long-standing migration crisis in the EU. Such figures also trigger renewed efforts to reinforce EU measures seeking to deter, criminalise, and return irregular migrants. By identifying relevant EU datasets on irregular migration and return and discussing key gaps and limitations, it can be concluded that the available data provide only a partial and sometimes misleading picture of irregular migration in the EU. New official data sources, expected to be available in the future, may alleviate some of the existing issues. However, these need to be complemented with additional indicators and approaches that focus on other important dimensions of migration and return policies, such as compliance with fundamental rights, efficiency, and policy coherence. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In recent years, the European Union has faced a significant number of asylum applications, with over 513 000 applications received in the first half of 2024 alone. Women and girls make up a substantial proportion of asylum seekers, with one in three asylum-seekers being female. In international law, the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention is the main instrument regulating asylum. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Istanbul Convention provide a framework for protecting the rights of women who seek protection. The EU has developed a common European asylum system that has gradually incorporated gender-sensitive elements in legal texts such as the Qualification Directive, the Asylum Procedures Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive. These directives offer special protection to vulnerable individuals, including women and children. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has played a crucial role in advancing a gender-sensitive approach in EU asylum law, acknowledging the specific experiences and circumstances of women and other vulnerable individuals seeking protection in the EU. The CJEU has recognised gender-based violence as a form of persecution and grounds for asylum or subsidiary protection. It has also acknowledged the importance of considering the individual circumstances and experiences of asylum seekers, particularly women and girls, who may face persecution or harm owing to their adherence to certain values or lifestyles. This aligns with a more gender-sensitive approach in EU asylum law and policy in recent years. Nevertheless continued progress is needed to address the human rights challenges faced by women and girls in asylum procedures. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Evolving from informal police cooperation in the 1970s to a fully fledged European Union (EU) agency, Europol has seen its mandate continuously strengthened in recent years. In 2016, the agency was given a new legal basis (Regulation (EU) 2016/794), which strengthened Europol's data management and protection rules and provided for enhanced scrutiny: (i) political scrutiny – by a new parliamentary oversight body made up of representatives of the European Parliament and Member States' national parliaments; and (ii) scrutiny of its data processing operations – by the European Data Protection Supervisor. Furthermore, the regulation reformed the framework for Europol's cooperation with partners such as third countries and international organisations, which also allowed for a strengthened role for the European Commission and the European Parliament. In 2022, on the basis of Regulation (EU) 2022/991, Europol was given new powers to cooperate directly with private parties, process large and complex datasets and take on a larger role in research and innovation. In 2023, the Commission proposed further changes to Europol's mandate that would strengthen its role in fighting migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. Europol's mandate is to support actions by EU Member States' law enforcement authorities and ensure their cooperation for the purpose of preventing and combating serious crime affecting two or more Member States, terrorism, and forms of crime that affect a common interest covered by a Union policy. The agency is empowered to tackle more than 30 forms of serious crime and related criminal offences, including terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, human trafficking, sexual abuse and exploitation, and trafficking in arms and ammunition. To fulfil its objectives, Europol carries out a series of tasks, including the core activities of acting as the EU's criminal information exchange hub and providing operational support and expertise to Member States' criminal investigations. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The European Union counts representative democracy as one of its foundational tenets. In that regard, the mandate of a directly elected Member of the European Parliament plays a crucial role. A Member's mandate includes an immunity status, protecting Members' independence to exercise their mandate freely. This legal status can prevent legal action, measures or even criminal investigation against the Member suspected of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, this parliamentary immunity is not an individual entitlement putting Members beyond the reach of the legal system, but rather an institutional privilege of the Parliament. Members' parliamentary immunity is not however fully harmonised under EU law, which refers some aspects of parliamentary immunity to the Member States. The diverse national understanding of parliamentary immunity can significantly influence, among other things, when and how a Member's mandate might end. More specifically, national legal variations can affect criminal proceedings against a Member that, if leading to a conviction, represent the most obvious reason for the involuntary end of a Member's parliamentary mandate (termination of mandate) in many Member States. In addition to differing levels of parliamentary immunity, there are differences in the reasons allowed nationally for ending national parliamentary mandates. Since EU law permits Member States to apply their own reasons when terminating a Member's mandate, national laws come into play once again. To analyse this complex web of legal settings applying to the end of a Member's mandate and resulting from the combination of EU law and diverse national rules potentially applicable to Members by analogy, this briefing draws upon national responses to a survey carried out for the European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The 'datafication' of everyday life and data scandals have made the protection of personal information an increasingly important social, legal and political matter for the EU. In recent years, awareness of data rights has grown considerably. The right to privacy and the right to protection of personal data are both enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and in the EU Treaties. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 gave the Charter the same legal value as the Treaties and abolished the pillar structure, providing a stronger basis for a more effective and comprehensive EU data protection regime. In 2012, the European Commission launched an ambitious reform to modernise the EU data protection framework. In 2016, the European Parliament and the Council, as co-legislators, adopted the EU's most prominent data protection legislation yet – the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) – and the Law Enforcement Directive. The framework overhaul also included adopting an updated Regulation on Data Protection in the EU institutions and reforming the e-Privacy Directive. The European Parliament played a key role in these reforms, both as co-legislator and author of own initiative reports and resolutions, seeking to guarantee a high level of data protection for EU citizens. The European Court of Justice plays a crucial role in developing the EU data protection framework through case law. In the coming years, challenges in the area of data protection will include rectifying GDPR enforcement deficits, balancing the compliance and data needs of emerging technologies, granting data access for security purposes without excessively compromising privacy and data protection, and mitigating compliance burdens for small and medium-sized enterprises. This is a further updated edition of a briefing originally written in 2020 by Sofija Voronova and updated in 2023. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Ukraine, migration, and the economy were uppermost on the agenda of the European Council in 2023 as EU leaders sought to maximise support for the victim of Russia's military aggression, cope with a rising number of refugees and asylum seekers and halt the EU's declining global competitiveness. Towards the end of the year, events in Gaza preoccupied EU leaders as Israel responded forcefully to the horrendous terrorist attack by Hamas on 7 October. EU leaders met seven times in 2023, including via videoconference on 17 October, as events in Gaza unfolded. Two of the meetings, in February and March, lasted only one day, not the planned two days. The relatively fewer and shorter meetings of the European Council in 2023 hints at the institution's greater efficiency rather than declining importance. The European Council was fully engaged throughout 2023 in tackling a host of critical issues and planning a new Strategic Agenda, despite the increasing obstructionism of one of its members. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Clean technologies are at the forefront of the EU's ambition to pursue both decarbonisation and industrial competitiveness. The global clean tech market is expected to triple by 2035, covering sectors such as solar, wind, batteries, heat pumps and electrolysers for the production of hydrogen. While the roll-out of clean technologies is increasing in the EU, its global market share is falling and manufacturing is lagging behind. This is due to a combination of factors, such as high energy prices, import dependency on raw materials and key components, skills shortages and fierce international competition, fuelled by robust public support policies adopted by the EU's main global competitors, such as China and the United States. The EU has already taken some steps to boost manufacturing of clean technologies. The Net-Zero Industry Act of June 2024 seeks to enhance the manufacturing capacity of strategic net-zero technologies by streamlining administrative procedures, boosting investment and improving skills. It sets a target for domestic manufacturing capacity of strategic net-zero technologies to reach 40 % of EU annual deployment needs by 2030 and 15 % of global production by 2040. The Critical Raw Materials Act of April 2024 addresses the issue of import dependencies by seeking to diversify supplies and boost domestic capacity in mining, processing and recycling of critical raw materials. However, some challenges remain for EU clean tech. These include ensuring adequate private and public funding, swiftly implementing the recently adopted legislative framework and reinforcing a favourable regulatory environment for investment. The Clean Industrial Deal to be announced in February 2025 by the new European Commission, together with the Competitiveness Fund under the future multiannual EU budget, are expected to provide an additional boost to clean technologies in Europe. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The human rights situation is worsening in Belarus, with a continued climate of oppression in the country. Meanwhile, presidential 'elections' are due to take place on 26 January 2025. The democratic forces of Belarus call this vote a 'self-reappointment of Lukashenka' and urge the international community not to recognise it. The European Parliament will hold a debate on the situation and possible actions with the High Representative /Vice-President of the Commission, Kaja Kallas, during the January plenary session. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

During its January session, Parliament is due to debate a Commission statement on the 16th Conference of the Parties (COP 16) to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). This conference concluded in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 13 December 2024, following two weeks of negotiations. A significant outcome of the conference was the commitment to support financially land restoration and drought resilience initiatives. However, it failed to establish a legally binding global framework to tackle drought. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Insolvency laws are the rules governing the legal proceedings applicable to companies unable to repay debts as they fall due. The convergence of non-financial companies' insolvency laws across the Member States is high on the EU's policy agenda: the two reports requested from former Italian prime ministers Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi both emphasised the importance of the convergence of insolvency laws for the defragmentation and proper functioning of EU capital markets. This would help unlock capital and support both the EU's green and digital transitions and its competitiveness in general. In 2019, the EU adopted a directive to harmonise the preventive restructuring framework. The European Parliament and the Council are currently debating a European Commission proposal on the harmonisation of certain aspects of insolvency regimes. Theoretical and empirical economic literature has provided substantial evidence suggesting that insolvency regimes impact the conduct of business, in particular access to equity and debt, and their respective costs. The insolvency regime is an implicit component of the contract between a company and its financiers, and determines the chance of recovery of credits in the event of company failure. Converging corporate insolvency rules would also increase the predictability of returns on cross-border financing, enhancing volumes while decreasing costs. The European Parliament and the Council have expressed support for harmonising insolvency laws with a view to completing the savings and investment union and boosting the financing of the EU's economy. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Migrant smuggling is a key activity for criminal networks operating in the EU, sustained by continued demand for facilitation services. Geopolitical and socioeconomic instability worldwide, as well as climate change, are expected to keep driving migratory movements. Migrant smuggling is a high-profit, low-risk business, and the criminal groups involved are increasingly sophisticated, professional and violent. Many of those who willingly pay smugglers to help them cross borders do so at great personal risk. Parliament will discuss the links between organised crime and migrant smuggling during its January plenary session. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The EU's population is ageing and set to decline. The shrinking working-age population poses risks in terms of greater labour shortages, increased pressure on public budgets, worsened territorial disparities and depopulation. These can negatively impact EU competitiveness, slow down the green and digital transitions and undermine social cohesion. While managing the demographic transition is the responsibility of Member States, it has also become one of the biggest challenges the EU is facing today. The Commission is due to make a statement on addressing demographic challenges during the January plenary session. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

For the European Union to compete globally while continuing to ensure progress in environmental, social and fundamental rights, more strategic and collective action is imperative. In a world where some leading global businesses have a market capitalisation of more than €3 trillion, an integrated economic, financial and fiscal policy framework is needed to encourage innovation and growth, including for successful SMEs. As the recent Letta and Draghi reports highlight, this requires clear political priorities, enough budgetary means, lower public spending waste rates at Member State level and crucially a transnational pro-innovation perspective. As a result, EU businesses could harness the full potential of the single market and economic and monetary union and challenge competitors in fast-growing and future-oriented economic activities such as digital and clean energy production. This agenda, although largely elusive at this point, could bring substantial economic benefit. This study finds that, compared to a situation where Member States act alone, a coordinated approach at EU level could bring an additional 0.9 % of GDP in 2035. A more ambitious integrated approach could be even more positive, with a benefit estimated at 2.6 % of additional GDP in 2035. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Dark patterns are deceptive techniques used by online platforms to manipulate users' behaviour, often without their knowledge or consent. The EU regulatory framework against dark patterns is fragmented and lacks a unified legal definition. This can lead to legal uncertainty and inconsistent enforcement. Stakeholders and academics are calling for clearer definitions, stronger safeguards, and more effective enforcement of existing laws. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The three reports by Draghi, Letta and Noyer remind policy makers that capital markets channelling savings into investments is key to competitiveness and economic growth. The recommendations of these reports could give new impetus to the long-standing flagship policy of CMU. In this briefing we show how securitisation, supervision, market infrastructure and savings/pensions schemes are identified as priorities in all three reports, however with different conclusions. We also discuss all other CMU recommendations in the reports. The paper has been updated in order to include the commitments made by the new Commission towards Parliament in letters and Committee hearings. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Commitments made at the confirmation hearings of the Commissioners-designate 2024-2029 Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The Baltic has several unique features, comprising a mixture of saline and fresh water and a shallow depth, enabling a broad variety of habitats. Its fish species are rather limited in number, with the bulk of fish stocks spread among cod, herring and sprat. The sea's characteristics make it particularly vulnerable to environmental changes and many habitats and species of the Baltic Sea are not in good condition. The environmental deterioration is caused by several factors, including excessive nutrient input, pollution, climate change, invasive species and over-exploitation. The worrying situation of the Baltic Sea habitats is leading to a dramatic decline in some commercial fish stocks, with fisheries losing economic and cultural importance. A range of promising measures for specific fish species have been taken at EU level, the results of which could however be jeopardised if habitats cannot be restored. Parliament has previously expressed concern about the state of the Baltic Sea over many years, and has played an important role in adopting measures to alleviate the situation. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP