Since the establishment of the European emissions trading system (EU ETS), industrial installations exposed to the risk of carbon leakage have received free emission allowances for part of their greenhouse gas emissions. The EU ETS Directive provides for this percentage to be progressively reduced over the years in such a way that the EU ETS still provides a carbon price signal for decarbonisation and protects against the risk of carbon leakage. The EU has adopted a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) to replace the existing system of free allocation. The CBAM aims to ensure that imported goods are subject to the same carbon costs as those produced within the EU. However, the CBAM is still being phased in, and it does not cover all sectors exposed to the risk of carbon leakage.The European Commission will propose a revision of the EU ETS in July 2026. The revision would re-define the role of the EU ETS post-2030, reinforcing it as an instrument that supports decarbonisation and industrial competitiveness. There are multiple issues at stake, but free allocation is expected to play a pivotal role in the discussion. Beforehand, the adoption of the Benchmark Regulation – the implementing act setting the revised values for free allocation of emission allowances – will establish the amount of free allocation to be granted in 2026-2030 to the sectors and subsectors in the EU ETS that are exposed to the genuine risk of carbon leakage. A broader revision of Directive 2003/87/EC on the EU ETS will begin afterwards, with a Commission proposal looking, among other things, at the role of carbon leakage in the EU ETS post-2030. This briefing provides an overview of the existing legislative framework and concepts related to free allocation in the existing EU ETS, and presents the views expressed by some Member States and stakeholders. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The SDGs are 17 interconnected and indivisible goals, each with a series of specific targets, agreed by the United Nations in 2015 and to be attained by 2030. Both developed and developing countries committed to the SDGs, which address the multiple causes and consequences of environmental depletion and social inequalities. The European Union has been a leader in drafting the SDGs; it is also a frontrunner in mainstreaming the SDGs in all its policies. This topical digest features the main EPRS publications linked to the SDGs that will be the focus of the 2026 United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), namely: 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), 9 (Industry Innovation and Infrastructure), 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), and 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). These and other analyses are available on the European Parliament's Think Tank pages. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Justice, Civil Liberties and Institutional Affairs at the request of the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), provides a legal assessment of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive (IPRED), with particular regard to the European Commission’s Follow-up Study on the Application of the Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Final report, March 2025, published 2026 [Follow-up Study]). Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains how the European Parliament contributes to the EU’s support for democracy around the world, including through election observation, parliamentary capacity-building, mediation, dialogue, support for human rights defenders and cooperation with partner parliaments. It also outlines the EU policy framework, financial instruments and external action tools that underpin this democracy support. Finally, it describes the role of the European Parliament in this area. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the history, procedure and future perspectives of the EU’s enlargement policy. Accession negotiations and chapters have been opened with Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and Türkiye. North Macedonia opened accession negotiations in 2022, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2024. Kosovo submitted its application for EU membership in 2022. In 2023, the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine and to grant candidate country status to Georgia (5.5.6 and 5.5.7). Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans – a region comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – and the accession process. It outlines the objectives of promoting stability, cooperation and economic development, the main instruments such as the Stabilisation and Association Process and pre-accession assistance, and the current status of each country’s progress towards EU membership. It also explains how the European Parliament contributes to the enlargement process through its consent powers, resolutions and parliamentary diplomacy. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the European Union’s relations with the United States and Canada, which are grounded in a long shared history. All three are members of the G7, an informal intergovernmental forum that brings together major advanced economies to discuss economic and political issues. In addressing complex global challenges, including trade tensions, the EU prioritises dialogue and cooperation with both the United States and Canada. Key areas of engagement include foreign policy, security and defence, and trade and economic policy. The EU is committed to maintaining and strengthening transatlantic relations while adapting them to evolving global challenges. This approach aims to ensure stability and resilience and to uphold the international rules-based order. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the European Union’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, a region of 33 countries linked to the EU by deep political, economic and cultural ties. It covers the main institutional frameworks for dialogue – from region-wide summits and parliamentary assemblies to bilateral agreements with individual countries – and describes the EU’s trade and cooperation agreements with sub-regions and individual states. It also sets out the European Parliament’s role in shaping and monitoring the bi-regional strategic partnership. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Hybrid threats against the EU have increased significantly in both frequency and sophistication, creating complex challenges for European security, democratic institutions and societal resilience. Malicious state and non-state actors combine political, economic, cyber, information and military tools to exploit vulnerabilities, undermine public trust and destabilise societies, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict. The EU and its Member States have gradually transformed their understanding of hybrid threats into concrete policies, operational capabilities and coordinated response mechanisms. The EU approach combines preventive, protective and reactive measures, including intelligence cooperation, protection of critical infrastructure, sanctions regimes, resilience building and strategic communication. Recent incidents involving cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns and EU airspace violations have further accelerated the development of EU-level instruments designed to detect, deter and respond to these malign activities. As security challenges increasingly overlap across civilian and military domains, the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aim to ensure complementarity between the EU's regulatory and civilian tools and NATO's defence and military capabilities through improving coordination and enhancing situational awareness. The European Parliament emphasises that hybrid threats, mainly from Russia, China and Belarus, represent an escalating security challenge for the EU, and calls for a comprehensive EU response, stronger EU–NATO coordination, enhanced resilience and civil preparedness, targeted countermeasures, and closer cooperation with partner countries. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This Briefing critically analyses the new EU Anti-Racism Strategy 2026-2030 (the Strategy) which was launched by the European Commission in January 2026. The Briefing situates the Strategy within the landscape of the existing EU anti-racism infrastructure including the primary and secondary legislation, case law, and other policy initiatives and efforts to combat racism, including the Strategy’s precursor, the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025 (the Plan). The Briefing shows that the EU’s anti-racism infrastructure, especially the Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, commonly known as the ‘Racial Equality Directive’, is robust in principle. Yet, it is underutilised and ultimately ineffective. The low rates of litigation under the Racial Equality Directive at the CJEU are evidence of its underutilisation. The high rates of existing levels of racism across EU Member States, such as recorded in successive FRA reports, evidence its ineffectiveness. It is against this backdrop that the Strategy, and previously the Plan, were adopted. The Plan was meant to be a ‘step up’ in the EU’s fight against racism. The immediate impetus for the adoption of the Plan came from the global Black Lives Matter protests following George Floyd’s death in the US. The Plan sought to address racism comprehensively and at all levels including individual, structural, and the EU’s internal – institutional – level. While the Plan covered much ground, it prioritised coverage and scale over precision and ambition. That is, the Plan lacked a precise normative framework of both racism and anti-racism; and at the same time lacked ambition by failing to identify benchmarks for improvement against which the impact of anti-racism measures could be tested. The Strategy which succeeds the Plan marks not only a semantic, but a more deliberate and determined, shift in the Commission’s approach to anti-racism. In particular, the Strategy is defined by three normative shifts: the adoption of an economic rationale for anti-racism; the shift in focus towards structural racism; and the centring of participation and partnerships in the fight against racism. These shifts are accompanied by a range of measures reinforcing the need to strengthen monitoring, enforcement, and implementation of law and policy against racism in the EU. Together, both the normative and operational aspects of the Strategy may be considered more ambitious than the Plan. Yet, the Strategy leaves significant gaps, both normatively and operationally. The success of the Strategy will depend not on how well it is executed but whether it is able to surmount the challenges posed by these gaps. These include: (i) the development of a working definition of structural racism which exceeds belief, ideology, and animus; (ii) the coordination of EU anti-racism measures across all forms of racism, all forms of discrimination, and all other issues facing the EU; (iii) the development of a common approach to intersectionality which defines and operationalises the concept at the same time; (iv) the development of a legal framework for addressing the alarming rise of xenophobia and xenophobic discrimination; (v) the prioritisation of the voices of racially disadvantaged individuals and groups; (vi) the adoption of the Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive; and (vii) the formulation of more ambitious and comprehensive programmatic approach to positive action measures for addressing racial disadvantage. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Ireland holds the Presidency of the Council of the EU as of 1 July 2026, following Cyprus and preceding Lithuania. Ireland’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, at 99.8 thousand PPS, represents 237 % of the EU’s total GDP per capita, while its gross national income (GNI), at 67 thousand PPS, is just two thirds of GDP. Ireland’s GDP decreased by 12.1 % in first quarter 2026. Ireland’s trade in services with the world is much more significant than its trade in goods. Ireland is in the top five EU Member States on research and innovation. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament known as the Oireachtas. The Irish Parliament consists of the President of Ireland (Head of State) and two Houses: Dáil Éireann (House of Representatives) and Seanad Éireann (the Senate). The President is directly elected but mainly has a ceremonial role. They can convene a meeting of either House of the Oireachtas in order to solve a dispute or address a national emergency, and can dissolve the Dáil to facilitate a general election (on the advice of the head of government who must have a majority in the Dáil). They can also refer a bill to the Supreme Court for a judgment on its compliance with the Constitution. This briefing is part of an EPRS series on national parliaments and EU affairs. It offers an overview of the way the EU Member States' national parliaments are structured and how they process, scrutinise and engage with EU legislation. It also refers to relevant publications by national parliaments. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This document provides background information for the Members participating in the mission to the 19th session of the Conference of States Parties to the CRPD, New York, from 9 to 11 June 2026. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Ireland assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1 July, and will stay in office until 31 December 2026. The country took over from Cyprus and will hand the baton to Lithuania. Ireland is the first member of a new presidency trio, along with Lithuania and Greece. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

In March 2013, the European Commission proposed to revise the air passenger rights framework, addressing both identified shortcomings and relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the EU. After a lengthy legislative procedure, including blockage by the Council, the co-legislators reached agreement on 16 June 2026 following political conciliation. The agreement is due to be discussed at third reading during the July 2026 part-session. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This paper presents the aggregated results of a survey conducted among Members of the Monetary Policy Expert Panel (MPEP) ahead of the June 2026 Monetary Dialogue with ECB President Christine Lagarde. The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the survey respondents and should not be attributed to the European Parliament or its services. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing assesses the unexploited potential of Directive 2011/24/EU on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare over the period 2015-2026 and proposes targeted reforms. The analysis focuses on National Contact Points (NCP), prior authorisation, reimbursement, telemedicine, e-prescriptions, European Reference Networks (ERN) and patients’ rights. It finds that the Directive remains legally significant but underused: patient mobility is limited and does not endanger national healthcare systems, yet patients still face fragmented information, complex procedures for prior authorisation and reimbursement, weak interoperability, uneven ERN integration into the national healthcare systems and poor awareness of their rights under EU law. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This paper analyses the European Union’s (EU) evolving engagement with the Sahel region, with particular attention to the Alliance of Sahelian States – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Drawing on interviews with EU officials and external experts, as well as academic and policy literature, this paper examines three interrelated dimensions. Firstly, it reviews the EU’s past approaches to the region since 2011, highlighting how shifting strategic logics, strong Member State influence and limited responsiveness to local political dynamics have shaped EU engagement. Secondly, it assesses the current political and security context in the Sahel. This is characterised by military rule, worsening jihadist violence and a strategic realignment towards non-Western partners, such as Russia, Türkiye and Gulf states, all aspects which influenced the partial rupture with the EU. Finally, it analyses the EU’s recently adopted renewed approach to the Sahel and the challenges of re-engaging in a volatile and competitive geopolitical environment. The paper concludes with policy options for a more pragmatic and differentiated EU engagement in the region, emphasising the need for flexible policies, connecting with the populations and lowered ambitions. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study examines cross-border cooperation arrangements for fisheries management in the Western Waters, with particular focus on the Iberian sardine and the Bay of Biscay anchovy fisheries. It analyses the development of the cooperation processes, the evolution of the management measures under the long-term management plans and the multi-level governance structures supporting joint decision-making. The findings highlight the critical role of scientific advice, active stakeholder participation and coordinated management measures in strengthening sustainable governance of shared fish stocks. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study investigates cross-border cooperation in Baltic Sea fisheries management under the common fisheries policy, with a particular focus on the Baltic Sea Fisheries Forum (BALTFISH) and the Baltic Sea Advisory Council (BSAC). The analysis shows that while cooperation functions well at a procedural level, it operates below its full potential. Unlocking this potential is essential for the recovery of Baltic Sea stocks and for delivering on the CFP objectives. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study investigates cross-border cooperation in Baltic Sea fisheries management under the common fisheries policy, with a particular focus on the Baltic Sea Fisheries Forum (BALTFISH) and the Baltic Sea Advisory Council (BSAC). The analysis shows that while cooperation functions well at a procedural level, it operates below its full potential. Unlocking this potential is essential for the recovery of Baltic Sea stocks and for delivering on the CFP objectives. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study provides an overview of cross-border cooperation in Mediterranean fisheries management, focusing on the actions taken by the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM). The study examines in particular the process of introducing joint fisheries restricted areas in the Adriatic Sea, which serve as models of successful bilateral cooperation in a regional framework. The findings highlight the key contribution of the stakeholder engagement to the achievement of EU biodiversity targets through agreed and coordinated actions towards sustainability. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study provides an overview of cross-border cooperation in Mediterranean fisheries management, focusing on the actions taken by the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM). The study examines in particular the process of introducing joint fisheries restricted areas in the Adriatic Sea, which serve as models of successful bilateral cooperation in a regional framework. The findings highlight the key contribution of the stakeholder engagement to the achievement of EU biodiversity targets through agreed and coordinated actions towards sustainability. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The NATO Summit, taking place on 7-8 July 2026, will be hosted by Türkiye at Ankara's Beştepe Presidential Compound. This marks the second time that Türkiye hosts a NATO Summit, following Istanbul in 2004. The summit is expected to be a key moment for demonstrating Allied unity amid evolving geopolitical dynamics in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, and calls for Europe to assume a stronger role in its security. Agenda items will likely include defence planning, spending targets, burden-sharing, and support for Ukraine. The summit will consist of a formal leaders' meeting and a parallel defence industry forum. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Migrant smugglers play a pivotal role in irregular border crossings into the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK). The UK has experienced a significant rise in small boat crossings across the English Channel since 2020, prompting the British government to develop measures to address this new form of irregular migration. However, the UK's withdrawal from the EU (Brexit) in 2020 has complicated efforts to manage these crossings. The UK no longer has access to EU migration and asylum databases nor can it return asylum seekers to other EU countries without mutual agreement. While the EU has seen a decline in asylum applications between 2023 and 2025, the UK has not experienced a comparable decrease. The increase in small boat arrivals is attributed to several factors, including Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, heightened border controls, and the commercialisation of the small boat route. These crossings have become the primary recorded method of irregular entry since 2020, accounting for 89 % of detected arrivals by 2025. This has sparked intense public and political debate and prompted calls for stricter measures. The UK government has introduced various measures to combat migrant smuggling, ranging from closer cooperation with some of the most affected EU countries, in particular France and Belgium, to funding for enhanced border controls and law enforcement cooperation. It has also launched initiatives such as the controversial Rwanda scheme. However, the effectiveness of these measures remains questionable, with critics arguing that they do not address the root causes of migration and may even exacerbate the risks for migrants. The situation highlights the complex challenges of managing irregular migration in the post-Brexit era while seeking comprehensive and humane solutions that address both the immediate and underlying causes, including through access to more legal pathways into the EU and the UK. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Labelling is intended to help consumers make informed choices about the food and beverages they consume. In the EU, food information is primarily governed by Regulation (EU) No 1169/2011. Yet alcoholic beverages remain partly exempt from standard labelling requirements, despite alcohol being linked to more than 200 health conditions and causing 656 deaths daily across the EU, which also has some of the world's highest consumption levels, with 77 % of adults consuming alcohol. Alcohol is also a major factor in injuries, road deaths, and premature mortality. Despite these risks, EU labelling rules remain limited. Ingredient lists and full nutrition declarations are mandatory only for wine. Other alcoholic beverages – above 1.2 % alcohol – are exempt. Some information, such as alcohol strength and certain allergens, must be displayed, but broader transparency is often voluntary or provided digitally. Recent reforms for wine require ingredient and nutrition information, partly via QR codes, signalling a shift toward greater disclosure. The World Health Organization advocates mandatory, standardised health warnings, including cancer risk information, to improve consumer awareness and reduce harmful consumption. Evidence suggests such labels can influence behaviour, though impacts vary depending on design and context. Calorie labelling is generally supported by consumers but shows mixed effects on purchasing and consumption. National approaches differ, with only a few EU countries mandating health warnings. Ireland is set to become the first country in the EU to require cancer warnings on labels from September 2028. Industry-led self-regulation has improved information availability, particularly for beer and spirits, but remains inconsistent. Overall, clearer labelling – combined with broader policy measures – can play a meaningful role in reducing alcohol-related harm, but stronger, harmonised EU action is still needed. This is an update of a briefing originally published in May 2025. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU has had a profound impact on fisheries relations in the North-East Atlantic. One of the most significant changes is the gradual transfer of EU fishing rights to the UK. This transfer is outlined in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, which spanned the five years from 2021 to 2025, and is considered to represent 25 % of the value of the former EU27 landings from UK waters. We compare the fishing opportunities available to the EU in 2025 and 2026 — the first two years in which the transfer of fishing quotas was fully completed — with the theoretical quotas that would apply if the transfer of quotas had not taken place. In terms of volume, the pelagic species of herring and mackerel are most affected. In terms of value, demersal species, such as sole and Norway lobster, account for significant EU losses. As each Member State has a specific share of each stock, the loss of quota affects them to varying degrees. The transfer affects 13 Member States, but just seven bear almost the entire burden. A special case is north-east Atlantic mackerel, which is shared with several third countries. Since Brexit, the EU is no longer part of a quota-sharing agreement for this species. The sum of the fishing quotas set by all parties exceeds the scientifically recommended level, which is causing the stock to decline. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The World Health Organization (WHO) has had a central role in numerous health advances, including eradicating smallpox, driving the near‑eradication of polio, expanding childhood immunisation worldwide, and leading responses to global health threats such as HIV/AIDS and COVID‑19. Despite this, the United Nations (UN) specialised agency has faced persistent challenges, shortcomings and criticisms over decades. The agency has been limited by volatile, insufficient and distorted funding. Its complex governance and limited authority, compounded by political pressure, also compromise the agency's ability to carry out its mandate effectively. In addition, misinformation and disinformation have been obstructing the WHO's action. To address its systemic weaknesses and increase its capacity to overcome evolving challenges, the WHO launched its Transformation Agenda – an ambitious organisational change plan – in 2017. Although the WHO has successfully implemented many actions under its Transformation Agenda, owing to persistent structural weaknesses and newly arising challenges, the agency is still at a critical juncture. The second half of the 2020s is especially difficult for the agency. Following the United States' (US) withdrawal from the WHO, which was initiated in January 2025 and precipitated a sudden US$1.3 billion shortfall, 25 % staff reductions, loss of expertise and programme suspensions, historical vulnerabilities are now amplified to unprecedented levels. Moreover, declining investments in development assistance, including its health component, further intensify the financial pressure. The EU and the WHO enjoy a long-lasting strategic partnership. The EU supports the WHO's Transformation Agenda and contributes to a wide range of WHO programmes, focusing on areas such as UHC, strengthening health systems worldwide, health security, antimicrobial resistance, and enhancing laboratory capacities in Africa. Through its resolutions, the European Parliament has repeatedly expressed its strong support for the agency and called on the Commission and the EU Member States to comply with different WHO measures, initiatives and guidelines. Parliament supports the EU in seeking official observer status at the WHO. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The EU’s Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation (MiCAR) establishes a broad but residual framework for crypto-assets not already covered by existing EU financial legislation, combining rules for stablecoins with a wider regime for crypto-asset service providers. By contrast, the US GENIUS Act focuses specifically on payment stablecoins, establishing rules on issuance, reserve backing and supervision within the existing US regulatory structure. This briefing compares both frameworks, examining their approaches to classification, supervision, AML/CFT and regulatory coordination, while also considering selected implications for financial stability and monetary sovereignty. It argues that the main difference between the two models lies less in their treatment of stablecoins themselves than in how they organise the relationship between digital assets, existing financial law and supervisory structures. More generally, the comparison illustrates how digital asset regulation is progressively moving from experimentation towards integration into existing financial and regulatory systems. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Global health threats are becoming more frequent and severe. As the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted, they can quickly turn into emergencies, heavily impact human health, and paralyse economic, cultural and societal activities globally. Therefore, health security is a global challenge.In this context, and in the light of lessons learnt from the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU has substantially strengthened its toolbox to prevent, prepare for and respond to health threats. Its toolbox consists of legislative measures – in particular, the Regulation on the prevention, preparedness and response to serious cross-border health threats, the EU Health Emergency Regulation, reinforced roles for the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA), and the setting up of the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA). Other tools in the EU health security toolbox include the Union Civil Protection Mechanism; humanitarian assistance in emergencies; research and development in the area of health security; capacity building in the partner countries under the Global Gateway; participation in the Global Health Security Initiative; and co-crafting of international instruments on health security. Moreover, EU action on health security is guided by a number of policy documents. The most recent European Commission communication on reinforcing global health resilience amidst geopolitical change, adopted in May 2026, sets out priority areas through which the EU should contribute to scaling up global prevention, preparedness and response to health threats and to addressing resilience gaps in health systems. Despite significant improvements in health security at the national, regional, EU and global levels, several challenges remain, including limited financing for public and global health and their health security component; the ongoing fragmentation of the global health architecture; and health-related misinformation and disinformation. The European Parliament is a strong supporter of both the internal and external dimensions of EU health policy. It treats the health security component as a key area for strengthening EU action. Through its resolutions, Parliament has expressed its views on the current and future EU action on health security. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Ukraine, competitiveness and global economic challenges, the EU's next budget and the situation in the Middle East were the main discussion points at the 18‑19 June 2026 meeting of the European Council. On Ukraine, EU Heads of State or Government adopted joint conclusions of all 27 Member States for the first time since March 2025, and stressed their determination to increase pressure on Russia – signalling it with the agreement to roll over the sanctions for 12 rather than the previous six months. This was coupled with a marked welcome for the opening of the first negotiation cluster for Ukraine and Moldova, and a sense of new momentum on enlargement, also for the countries of the Western Balkans. Regarding competitiveness and global economic imbalances, EU leaders requested the Commission sharpen the EU's trade defence tool box and possibly complement it with new instruments, thereby pursuing a path of diversification and de-risking of the EU's trade relationships. The discussion on the next multiannual financial framework was seen as a step towards an agreement by the end of 2026, with the incoming Irish Presidency being called on to present a revised negotiation box for the October meeting; in parallel, further work will be carried out on options for new own resources. Regarding the situation in the Middle East, the European Council welcomed the memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran, but expressed serious concern about the situation in Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank. Other topics mentioned in the conclusions were Ebola, Armenia, upholding international law, and Islands and coastal communities. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the rules governing the financing, management and monitoring of the European Union’s common agricultural policy (CAP) under the CAP Horizontal Regulation. It outlines the evolution of the legal framework for the 2023-2027 CAP, including changes linked to the new delivery model and the shift from compliance-based to performance-based implementation. It also explains the roles of the main governance bodies, the systems for financial management, controls and penalties, and the rules on financial discipline and the agricultural reserve. Finally, it summarises the role of the European Parliament in shaping the regulation. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the Cohesion Fund, which was set up in 1994 and provides funding for environmental and trans-European network projects in the EU countries that have a gross national income per capita of less than 90% of the EU average. The fact sheet outlines the legal framework for the Cohesion Fund, the Fund’s objectives, the countries eligible for the Fund, and the budget and financial rules. It also describes the role the European Parliament plays as regards the Cohesion Fund. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the role played by social dialogue in the EU. It is a fundamental component of the European social model. It empowers representatives of management and labour (‘the social partners’) to contribute actively, including through agreements, to designing European social and employment policy. The fact sheet covers the legal framework, objectives and achievements of social dialogue in the EU, and the role played by the European Parliament in advancing it. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Food security is crucial for human existence and health. It guarantees development and peaceful livelihoods, and stabilises societies. Factors impacting food security, their triggers, and consequences are affected by inter-related political, economic, social, geopolitical, and environmental dimensions. This makes agri-food systems – food production, processing, marketing and consumption – important elements of societies and international relations. With over 20 % of the EU’s population at risk of poverty or social exclusion and 8.5 % unable to afford a meal with meat, chicken or fish (or equivalent) at least every second day in 2025, it is essential to understand EU agri-food systems and the multidimensionality of EU food security. Examining how food security can be leveraged to combat inequality and socio-economic instability, thereby improving the well-being of EU citizens and residents, is as important as evaluating the macroeconomic and state level dimensions of the EU’s agri-food industry. The analysis of its environmental impact and vulnerability to climate shocks provides further important insights into the agricultural potential and resilience of the EU. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP