Russia's war on Ukraine has laid bare the challenges facing the European defence industry as it tries to meet increased demand and ramp up production in the wake of a fundamentally changed security environment in Europe. Europe's defence industry comprises a number of large multinational companies, mid-caps and over 2 000 small and medium-sized enterprises. It faces a multitude of challenges, such as decades of under-investment, fragmentation, insufficient critical raw material and semiconductor supplies, and a lack of manufacturing capability. The EU and its Member States have taken several steps to reinforce the European defence industry, especially since the start of Russia's war on Ukraine. Member States have boosted their defence budgets, with their combined total expected to reach €350 billion a year in 2024. The European Defence Fund is investing in research and capability development projects and has achieved very positive results so far. Permanent structured cooperation also provides the legal framework and binding commitments for progress in collaborative defence. The EU has also broken taboos, by agreeing a joint defence procurement instrument (the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act) and an initiative to build up ammunition production (Act in Support of Ammunition Production). These form part of a three-track proposal to support Ukraine's needs for ammunition (deliver ammunition from existing stocks, jointly procure from industry, and support the ramping up of production). In March 2024, the European Commission proposed the first-ever European defence industrial strategy and a defence industry programme to implement it. Additionally, the European Peace Facility, best known for facilitating lethal weapon supply to Ukraine, is being used to procure defence materiel from Europe's defence industry, further boosting its capacity. The European Chips Act and Critical Raw Materials Act are also expected to benefit the European defence industry by ensuring it has the necessary supplies to tackle the substantially increased demand for its products. These signals have led the industry to take the first steps to increase production capacity. This updates a previous edition, published in 2023. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

In this paper, the ECB monetary policy stance is assessed by comparing the recent tightening cycle (2022-today) with the two preceding ones, which took place in 2000-2001 and in 2006-2008. Interest rates, quantitative indicators and monetary conditions indices (MCIs) are used for this purpose. The main finding is that at the peak of the latest tightening cycle, the ECB monetary policy stance was no more restrictive than it was at the peak of the two preceding ones; actually, probably less. This contrasts with the fact that in the more recent case inflation was higher and more persistent than in the two earlier episodes. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 4 December 2024. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Under Russia's presidency, BRICS (acronym for the founding states – Brazil, Russia, India and China) held its first summit following the group's expansion on 1 January 2024, from 22 to 24 October in Kazan (Russia). With more than 30 delegations, 22 heads of state or government and several representatives of international organisations including United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres attending, the summit was a diplomatic success for Russia: it offered President Vladimir Putin the opportunity to demonstrate to the world that Russia is not isolated. For the first time, a NATO member, Türkiye, attended the summit, and applied to join BRICS. The meeting in Kazan underlined BRICS's ambition to foster relations with the Global South, and its aim of shaping an alternative multipolar world order, particularly in the global financial and trade system. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Following Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU), G7, and allied partners imposed extensive sanctions targeting Russia's economy, in particular the oil sector, in an effort to curb the Kremlin's revenues which finance its war effort. Key measures include an embargo on Russian seaborne oil imports and a price cap on oil and oil products that restricts profits while still allowing sales below a certain price. Enforcement mechanisms prevent Russia from chartering or insuring oil tankers unless they comply with these limits. In response, Russia has sought new markets and established a 'shadow fleet' to evade these restrictions. The terms 'shadow fleet', 'dark fleet' and 'grey fleet' have gained prominence following the imposition of sanctions on Russian energy exports, yet their definitions remain inconsistent among experts, leading to confusion. Analysts increasingly recognise that the broader definition, encompassing all vessels lacking Western insurance and belonging to non-EU/G7+ companies, captures the diverse tactics employed by Russia to circumvent sanctions and highlights the potential risks associated with these operations. To evade sanctions, the Russian 'shadow fleet' makes use of flags of convenience and intricate ownership and management structures while employing a variety of tactics to conceal the origins of its cargo, including: ship-to-ship transfers; automatic identification system blackouts; falsified positions; transmission of false data; and other deceptive or even illegal techniques. In addition to bolstering its war chest, Russia's 'shadow fleet', which consists of a growing number of aging and poorly maintained vessels that operate with minimal regard to the regulations, poses significant environmental, maritime safety, and security risks. As Russia depends increasingly on its 'shadow fleet' to maintain oil exports, the EU and allied nations have implemented measures to counter these evasive tactics. These include imposing targeted sanctions on specific vessels and enhancing international collaboration to disrupt such activities. During a plenary debate in October 2024, Members of the European Parliament called for enhanced maritime surveillance, tighter shipping controls, and expanded sanctions to address the significant environmental and safety threats posed by these vessels. Parliament is expected to vote on a resolution on this issue during its November I 2024 plenary session. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

European Works Councils (EWCs) are bodies that should guarantee employees the right to be consulted on important issues in large multinational companies active in multiple EU countries. However, EWCs have been criticised for being ineffective, on account of unclear definitions, non-dissuasive sanctions and ineffective access to justice. In February 2023, the European Parliament called for legislative action to address the shortcomings identified and strengthen the functioning of EWCs. In response, the European Commission consulted European social partners and put forward a proposal in January 2024 to revise the 2009 directive. The European Parliament's Committee on Employment and Social Affairs voted its report on 3 April 2024. The committee is expected to vote in December 2024 on a mandate for interinstitutional negotiations. Council adopted a general approach on 20 June 2024. Second edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in the EU Treaties. The Free Movement Directive (Directive 2004/38/EC), which sets out the conditions for exercising the right of free movement in the EU, only applies to EU citizens and their family members if they reside in a Member State of which they are not a national. There are, however, cases where this directive is still applicable by analogy through Article 21 TFEU (EU citizenship) in a Member State of nationality. This comes through the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). There are two main categories of persons to whom the directive is applicable by analogy through Article 21 TFEU: (1) returners, meaning EU citizens who have made use of the right of free movement by residing in a Member State of which they do not have the nationality and move (return) to a Member State where they are a national; and (2) mobile dual EU citizens, meaning persons who have the nationality of more than one Member State and who have made use of their right of free movement. This briefing explains how the case law is applicable and sheds light on issues that remain unclear and which can have major repercussions on the interpretation of EU law. It should be read in conjunction with a previous briefing published by EPRS in 2024 which provides an overview of the free movement of EU citizens and their family members. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Media consumption patterns have changed profoundly in recent years, creating challenges for traditional news companies. News media are now faced with digitally native younger generations who often pay more attention to influencers and celebrities than they do to journalists, even when it comes to news. The teaching of media literacy skills is more necessary than ever to help people – especially children and young people – understand the difference between news circulating on social media and news provided by professional media sources. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

On 9 July 2024, the successful maiden flight of the new heavy-lift rocket Ariane 6 reinstated the EU's autonomous access to space. This came after several months of reliance on private United States launchers as a result of the temporary unavailability of an EU rocket. In recent years, the space sector has witnessed the conjunction of three trends. First, the space economy has grown globally, also because of competitive private actors. Second, as a consequence, space is now increasingly congested, with ever more space objects floating in orbit. Third, space has become a contested domain. With 80 countries having at least one satellite registered, space operations can now be instrumentalised: for instance, in 2021, Russia conducted an illegal anti satellite strike. In her political guidelines for 2024-2029, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, refers to space as an enabler of EU competitiveness, to be supported through investment. The guidelines mention space as a key domain for EU open strategic autonomy, to be enhanced through further cooperation by an EU–NATO partnership. Furthermore, Mario Draghi's September 2024 report on the future of European competitiveness stresses that, despite owning world-class space infrastructure and services, the EU is under-investing in space compared with its global competitors, and is lacking a unified legal framework on space. Ursula von der Leyen's mission letter to Andrius Kubilius, nominated on 17 September 2024 as Commissioner-designate for Defence and Space, names a set of initiatives to unleash a space contribution to EU competitiveness. It includes, in particular, the task of preparing a proposal for an EU space law to ensure a common EU playing field in space while ensuring security, safety, and sustainability. The letter also sets the task of fostering a strong and innovative space sector with a view to achieving several objectives, including maintaining the EU's autonomous access to space, curating EU spatial infrastructure, and enhancing the use of space data and services. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

By the 2030s, quantum computers might compromise traditional cryptography, putting digital infrastructure at high risk in the European Union (EU) and around the world. Specifically, it is expected that quantum computers' unique capabilities will allow them to solve complex mathematical problems, such as breaking the traditional cryptographic systems used universally. The confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of sensitive data – including health, financial, security and defence information – will be exposed to threats from any actor possessing a sufficiently powerful quantum computer. There is a pressing need for the EU to start preparing its digital assets to face this risk. Post-quantum cryptography (which uses classical computer properties) and quantum cryptography (which uses quantum mechanical properties) are the two types of critical technology able to protect digital infrastructure from quantum computer attacks. Robust post-quantum cryptography algorithms have been identified, but swift and efficient implementation is crucial before malicious actors exploit the power of quantum computers. Experts stress the need for quantum preparedness to be put in place now, with some of them even warning of a 'quantum cybersecurity Armageddon'. Several countries are adopting strategies to address post-quantum cryptography. The EU is working with Member States and the United States to speed up the transition to post-quantum cryptography, and is also exploring long-term quantum cryptography initiatives. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The free flow of capital within the EU is one of the single market's four fundamental freedoms. However, despite the removal of legal barriers to capital flow, significant technical barriers persist and the EU's capital markets remain fragmented. Defragmentation of the capital markets – also referred to as capital markets union (CMU) or savings and investment union – is essential for the conduct of EU monetary policy, a level playing field among EU companies, and optimal allocation of capital within the EU. The coexistence of diverging rules across Member States creates opacity and uncertainty, deterring EU cross-border investors. This variation is due, among other factors, to differences in interpretation of EU law, inconsistency of decisions, and varying resources employed for supervision. The resulting variation in the application and enforcement of EU laws by the respective Member States' supervisory authorities is considered a major obstacle to completion of CMU. Harmonisation of supervision is one of the objectives of the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA). For the EU institutions, the establishment of an EU-level supervisory authority would be yet more efficient. Some suggest that, as with the single supervision mechanism for EU banking – whereby only 'significant banks' are subject to the EU banking supervisor – the powers of an EU single supervisory authority for capital markets could be limited to prominent players such as securities markets and asset managers. ESMA could fulfil this single supervisory function, subject to changes to its mission and governance. In its previous term, the European Parliament supported the shift of supervisory powers to ESMA. In a March 2024 statement, the Council invited the European Commission to examine the targeted strengthening of EU supervisory authorities' role and governance in order to enhance convergence. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

In her political guidelines presented on 18 July 2024, European Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen identified defence as a priority and a key sector in completing the single market. An important part of that effort will be building a 'European Defence Union'. To frame the new approach and to identify defence investment needs, von der Leyen committed that the new Commission would present a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of taking office. Subsequently, the Commissioners designated to take on the High Representative/Vice President portfolio (Kaja Kallas, Estonia) and the portfolio for Defence and Space (Andrius Kubilius, Lithuania) have been tasked with producing the paper. The white paper is expected to predominantly address defence sector capability issues, industrial competitiveness and investment needs. It should also frame the overall approach to EU defence integration, with the aim of strengthening the EU's ability to respond to threats, particularly in the context of Russia's continuing aggression in Ukraine, combined with evolving geopolitical challenges to the south and increased military capabilities of other global actors. Among other things, the white paper should outline the path towards key initiatives such as a European air shield to bolster air defence across the continent and expanded cyber-defence capabilities; closer EU-NATO cooperation; more efficient EU Member State defence spending; the reduction of external dependencies in defence procurement; and increased intra-EU collaboration in industrial, innovation, procurement and production issues. Experts widely agree that a key challenge to address is how to increase financing for the defence industry with, inter alia, the provision of incentives for investors and the creation of economies of scale; a clear assessment of the EU's defence needs; and coordination among the many EU defence initiatives proposed in recent years. The European Parliament first called for an EU white paper on security and defence as early as 2016. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The European Union (EU) is committed to ensuring its budget delivers maximum value for citizens by focusing on results and performance. In 2018, as part of the shift towards performance-based budgeting, the EU revised the rules applicable to the general budget and introduced the possibility of financing that is not linked to cost (FNLC) in addition to the traditional ways of financing based on incurred costs (Article 125 of EU Regulation 2018/1046). Under this method, payments are based on results achieved, and are made if a beneficiary fulfils predefined conditions linked to progress in implementing or achieving the objectives of a project or programme. The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) – the EU's ground-breaking instrument created to support the Member States' post-pandemic economic recovery – is a key example of how this delivery method is applied. For the first time, disbursements to the Member States depend on achieving pre-defined milestones and targets relating to the implementation of reform and investment measures. Since the creation of the RRF, the EU has set up similar instruments in other policy areas. The Ukraine Facility (UF) and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans (WBF), both launched in 2024, share some key features with the RRF delivery method. Along with the application of the FNLC principle for payments, other common features include the prominent role of the reform measures, using scoreboards to monitor implementation, and setting up special forums, known as 'dialogues', for the exchange of information and views with the European Parliament. Examining in detail this innovative way of funding as it applies to the three facilities helps to shed light on an emerging, performance-based modus operandi that is already being discussed as a possible blueprint for other spending tools under the post-2027 EU budget. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for a resilient healthcare system but also for quick access to inventions and technologies in challenging situations. To address this need, in April 2023 the Commission submitted a proposal for a regulation on compulsory licensing for crisis management. The aim is to secure the rapid deployment of patent-protected inventions in times of crisis or emergency, without eroding patent protection as an incentive to innovate. The proposal lays down rules and procedures for granting Union compulsory licences and supervising the law's implementation. Views on the proposal diverge. Civil society organisations support broad application of the compulsory licensing scheme, whereas industry organisations advocate narrow application. Opinions differ on: (i) the need for legislative intervention; (ii) the events justifying the use of compulsory licences; (iii) whether compulsory licensing should be conditional on failed prior negotiations for voluntary licences; (iv) whether the disclosure of know-how or trade secrets is warranted under certain circumstances; (v) at what level remuneration and sanctions should be capped; vi) how advisory bodies should be composed; and vii) what role potential licensees should play in initiating and engaging in the compulsory licensing procedure. On 13 March 2024, Parliament voted its first-reading position ahead of future trilogue negotiations. Parliament insists on empowering the Commission to mandate the disclosure of relevant trade secrets and know-how, and on significantly strengthening the position of rights-holders. In its position of 26 June 2024, the Council recommends a more industry-oriented approach. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Credible ECB monetary policy requires that the revised EU economic governance framework be tightly enforced from its start. Net primary expenditures as key control variable allow predictable monetary policy focused on stabilisation. However, widespread debt reduction pushing spending growth below potential GDP growth may prompt more accommodative ECB policy. Moreover, potentially cumulating changes in public spending-to-GDP ratios need close monitoring. Finally, the criteria for TPI may increase pressure to be lenient on enforcement of the fiscal rules. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 4 December 2024. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This document provides an overview of all country-specific recommendations for 2024 as proposed by the Commission on 19 June 2024 and agreed by the Council on 16 July 2024. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This paper provides an overview of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s lending to Ukraine, particularly focusing on the IMF response to the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine since February 2022, given the challenging macroeconomic circumstances. If further analyses the key elements of the IMF’ Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme for Ukraine, including the evolution of core assumptions, risks, fiscal sustainability and conditionality. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The three reports by Draghi, Letta and Noyer remind policy makers that capital markets channelling savings into investments is key to competitiveness and economic growth. The recommendations of these reports could give new impetus to the long-standing flagship policy of the Capital Markets Union (CMU). In this briefing we show how securitisation, supervision, market infrastructure and savings/pensions schemes are identified as priorities in all three reports, however with different conclusions. We also discuss all other CMU recommendations in the reports. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This briefing presents a summary of 3 studies prepared by academic expert panel for the Banking Union on the occasion of 10 years of parliamentary scrutiny over key authorities within the Banking Union, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Board (SRB). It also presents proposals for enhancing the accountability framework governing these authorities. These studies were requested by the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

An effective return policy to remove from the EU third-country nationals who do not have the right to stay on EU territory requires common rules and procedures in the EU Member States. These must be implemented in accordance with fundamental rights obligations and with the principle of non refoulement. A robust framework for cooperation with third countries that are willing to accept returnees is also necessary Efforts to increase the number of returns have been a feature of EU migration policy for the past 20 years. Since the 2015 peak in arrivals of asylum-seekers and irregular migrants, the EU and its Member States have stepped up efforts to build a more efficient return policy. Broad changes have been made to the internal and external dimensions of EU return policy, including strengthening the EU legislative framework for return and putting operational and practical tools in place. However, the return of third-country nationals remains a challenge, as only about one in three people who are ordered to leave the EU are effectively returned to a third country. The limited effectiveness of return policy is due to several challenges that the EU and Member States face when carrying out return procedures. Those challenges relate to difficulties in implementing return procedures in the Member States (internal dimension) and a lack of cooperation on readmission by third countries (external dimension). The European Parliament has previously stressed the need to improve the effectiveness of the EU's return policy, insisting on full compliance with fundamental and procedural rights. It has also stressed the importance of concluding formal readmission agreements with third countries, coupled with EU parliamentary scrutiny and judicial oversight. This is an update of a briefing published in January 2024. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This study provides details of the current situation and future trends in the EU concerning aspects related to skills demands, skills shortages, and skills mismatches. It takes into consideration the transformative role of the digital and green transitions and the labour market shifts determined by demographic changes. The analysis comprises a presentation of the various EU skills initiatives, assessing their impact, complementarity and gaps. And formulates a set of recommendations to address gaps identified in the EU skills policy. This document was provided by Fondazione Giacomo Brodolini to the Policy Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies at the request of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL). Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Shortly after having been elected Japan's Prime Minister in September 2024, Ishiba Shigeru called elections to the house of representatives (the lower house) to be held on 27 October. The vote will follow an intensive 12-day electoral campaign, against a backdrop of scandals involving members of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), rising consumer prices, staple food shortages and security concerns over regional tensions. While this may weaken the LDP's majority, a divided opposition might find it hard to take over the reins, held by the LDP almost uninterruptedly since its foundation in 1955. Under the leadership of Ishiba's predecessor, Kishida Fumio, a former foreign affairs minister, Japan continued to place itself as a key player in international diplomacy, with a renewed emphasis on multilateralism. This gained Ishiba the praise and respect of United States (US) President Joe Biden, in particular for successfully adopting major changes to Japan's defence policy, maintaining global attention on Ukraine and exerting pressure on Russia while holding the G7 presidency, and contributing to a new era in the Japan-South Korea-US relationship. On the domestic front, however, the Kishida administration was unable to deliver the changes promised. The European Union (EU) and Japan have been strategic partners since 2003. Bilateral relations are based on two milestone agreements signed in July 2018: the Economic Partnership Agreement and the Strategic Partnership Agreement. EU-Japan cooperation includes a Green Alliance, a Connectivity Partnership and a Digital Partnership. The two parties have also been deepening their cooperation on security and defence. The European Parliament has previously emphasised the EU's interest in deepening and broadening the EU-Japan partnership, not only bilaterally but also in multilateral contexts. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Military operations and missions, and civilian missions, are an essential component of the EU's common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and, in particular, of its common security and defence policy (CSDP). In an extremely volatile security and geopolitical environment, both at its eastern and southern borders and further afield, the EU has always sought, when launching its operations and missions abroad, to help countries and regions in crisis to restore peace, security and development. This is in the interests of their own citizens and residents as well as those of their neighbours, and is also in conformity with EU values and interests. There are currently 23 CFSP missions and operations ongoing, one of which was launched by the Council 20 years ago. Half of the military operations and missions (5 out of 10), and a quarter of the civilian missions (4 out of 16) were launched during the European Parliament's ninth term (2019 2024). The Council also launched a new hybrid type of civilian-military mission during this period, the EU security and defence initiative for countries in the Gulf of Guinea – to address the effective or potential withdrawal of EU operations and missions from Niger and Mali. The funding of missions and operations, and selection of leaders, differs between military operations and missions and civilian missions. Military operations with an 'executive' mandate allowing the use of force are in a separate category from military training missions whose mandate is not executive. The Treaty ban on using the EU budget to fund CFSP and CSDP activities having security or defence implications has meanwhile resulted in a highly complex funding architecture for these EU operations and missions. Operation and mission staff include international staff from participating Member States and some non-EU States, in addition to local staff from the deployment countries. Women are notably absent in the highest command positions of the military operations and missions, and very few have been appointed as heads of civilian missions. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Precise figures about the numbers of illegal firearms in the European Union (EU) are lacking, but several indicators point to their widespread availability and accessibility. According to the Small Arms Survey, over half of the estimated total number of firearms held by civilians in the EU in 2017 were unlicensed. While most of these citizens had no criminal intentions, their illicit firearms could be used for self-harm or domestic violence, or end up in the hands of criminals or terrorists. Most criminals and terrorists have more sophisticated ways to get hold of illicit firearms. They can be trafficked from source countries, diverted from legal supply chains, illegally manufactured or assembled in the EU, converted from legally available weapons, or sourced on the internet. Firearms seizures suggest that the EU illicit firearms market is made up mostly of shotguns, pistols and rifles, with converted or convertible weapons also appearing frequently. Illicit firearms trafficking is driven by criminal demand, with organised crime groups that engage in firearms trafficking also involved in other forms of criminality. The EU considers illicit firearms a key crime threat precisely because they are used in many crimes and terrorist attacks. Even people who lack extensive criminal connections can access illicit firearms due to increased online trafficking and the availability of easy-to-convert weapons. The EU is actively involved in addressing the threat posed by illegal firearms by means of legislative and policy measures, and provides operational assistance to the Member States in the fight against firearms trafficking. The EU is also active in the international fight against firearms trafficking, working closely with the United Nations (UN) in its work to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and engaging in the UN's global firearms programme. Although the export of arms remains a national competence, the EU has defined common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment and works actively with third countries that are viewed as source or transit countries for illicit firearms. This is an update of a briefing by Ann Neville, published in 2022. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

In nominal terms, Poland is the third biggest beneficiary of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), after Italy and Spain. EU support for implementing Poland's amended national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) – Krajowy Plan Odbudowy – amounts to €59.8 billion, and includes €25.3 billion in grants and €34.5 billion in loans. The amount is €24.5 billion (+69 %) higher than the one initially approved, and takes into account a 2022 update of the maximum financial contribution, additional loans requested by Poland, and the non-repayable allocation for REPowerEU made available in 2023. RRF support per capita for Poland totals €1 584 (up from €935 initially). Poland's NRRP has twice been amended, on 8 December 2023 to add the REPowerEU chapter, and on 16 July 2024 to adjust the timeline and scope of selected measures. The NRRP includes 54 reforms and 57 investments, and is strongly focused on the green transition and changes in energy production and consumption. The biggest components are dedicated to REPowerEU (41 % of the total allocation) and green energy and energy intensity reduction (26 %). Other priority areas include economic competitiveness, healthcare, well-functioning public institutions and the judiciary. On 28 December 2023, Poland received €5 billion in pre-financing for the REPowerEU chapter. After the satisfactory fulfilment of 37 milestones and one target, including the commitments concerning the reforms of the judicial system ('super milestones'), and improvements of the audit and control systems, Poland received the first achievements-based payment on 15 April 2024 (€6.3 billion). On 13 September, Poland submitted payment requests for the second and third instalments, amounting to €9.4 billion and linked to achieving 38 milestones and three targets. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on RRF implementation, and scrutinises the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

In July 2023, the European Commission tabled a package of proposals aimed at greening freight transport. One of these proposals focuses on improving the use of rail infrastructure capacity. The proposed text suggests changes to the rules governing the planning and allocation of railway infrastructure capacity, which are currently outlined in Directive 2012/34/EU and Regulation (EU) No 913/2010. The goal of the changes is to enhance the management of rail infrastructure capacity and traffic so as to improve service quality, optimise railway network usage, increase traffic capacity and enhance the transport sector's contribution to decarbonisation. In the European Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN), which appointed Tilly Metz (Greens/EFA, Luxembourg) as rapporteur. The TRAN committee adopted its report on 4 March 2024. Parliament adopted its first-reading position during its March 2024 plenary session. Following the European elections, the TRAN committee voted on 7 October 2024 to start interinstitutional negotiations. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

On 1 March 2023, as part of the road safety package, the European Commission published a legislative proposal to help ensure EU-wide application of driving disqualifications. The proposal calls for increased cooperation, harmonisation of legislation, simplification of information exchange, capacity building, and improved public awareness efforts. In order to prevent impunity due to a lack of legislation, the proposal sets out rules to allow better EU-wide enforcement of driver disqualification decisions when drivers commit major traffic offences outside their own country. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) is responsible for the file (rapporteur: Matteo Ricci, S&D, Italy). The TRAN committee adopted its report on 29 November 2023. On 6 February, the Parliament voted in plenary on its first-reading position on the file. On 7 October the TRAN committee voted to start trilogue negotiations. Fourth edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Since the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) entered into force in 2018, the European Commission has published two reports on its application. The second report stresses the need for consistent interpretation and enforcement of the GDPR, highlighting ongoing challenges such as divergent national interpretations, difficulties in cooperation among regulatory bodies, and obstacles faced by organisations in achieving compliance. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Georgia will hold parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024, for the first time under a fully proportional election system. The results of this vote will be highly consequential, potentially determining Georgia's EU and North-Atlantic integration trajectory for years to come. The election campaign environment has become increasingly tense and polarised. The party in government since 2012, Georgian Dream, led by party founder and billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, has described the elections as a choice between 'peace and war'. Meanwhile, the opposition has framed them as a choice between the democratic West and authoritarian Russia. Opinion polls give contradictory results, but those considered more reliable forecast that none of the parties will be able to form a government on its own and that a coalition will be necessary. Georgia was granted EU candidate status on 14 December 2023, on the condition that the country made progress in nine key areas. Since then, however, the ruling party has introduced a number of legislative acts considered contrary to EU values and obstructing the continuation of accession negotiations. Recent amendments to Georgia's electoral laws have been criticised by both international and local organisations. In the coming weeks, the Commission is expected to adopt the 2024 enlargement package, assessing progress made by candidate countries, including Georgia. The elections will be monitored closely by domestic and international observers, including a long term election observation mission from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), joined by a delegation of Members of the European Parliament. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Over the past decade, corridors have occupied an increasingly important place in international connectivity initiatives. They take several forms, ranging from 'simpler' transport corridors to more complex economic corridors. For them to be successful, several conditions need to be in place, both relative to the participating countries and to the wider regions they connect. Once operational, they can bring various benefits to participating countries, both economic and societal. India has had a two-pronged policy in recent years. On the one hand, it is investing increasingly in national infrastructure projects, such as the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor. On the other, it is part of several major international infrastructure projects. Three such projects that stand out are the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the International North-South Transport Corridor and the more recent India-Middle East-Europe Corridor. According to experts, India's approach towards international connectivity appears to be driven more by geostrategic sensitivities than purely economic considerations. Broadly, Delhi chooses to participate in projects that help to increase its regional and global footprint. It also takes into consideration the fact that Asia is a region with several nuclear powers, rising nationalism and the absence of a security structure. Its choices are further conditioned by Chinese initiatives in the region, US policy towards China, and developments following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the conflict between Israel and Hamas. The EU and India have long-standing diplomatic ties. In recent years, owing to both rising trade volumes and geopolitical considerations, they have increased their cooperation further. Aspects of this cooperation are the revival of negotiations on a free trade agreement, the launch of a Trade and Technology Council and the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC). Once completed, these three initiatives could bring significant synergies to the parties involved. IMEC is facing several challenges, however, both logistical and geopolitical, that could delay its implementation. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Often considered the 'cornerstone' of European integration, the single market now serves 449 million consumers and 31 million active companies, most of which are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It has delivered substantial economic benefits, ranging between 8 % and 9 % of European Union gross domestic product (GDP). Trade between Member States has risen steadily over the years, and today accounts for an estimated 56 million European jobs. The EU is among the largest trading blocs in the world, representing 15 % of world GDP, compared with the United States at 16 % and China at 19 %. The single market's attractiveness for foreign businesses also serves as an important geopolitical tool, enhancing the EU's influence amid geopolitical shifts. Recent shocks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have revealed not only the single market's vulnerability in crises, but also the extent to which the EU's competitiveness relies on a well-functioning single market, ensuring unhindered access to the goods, services, and strategic inputs EU supply chains need. Although the single market has generally been a success, recent analyses, including those put forward by Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi in 2024, clearly demonstrate that it remains highly fragmented, limiting EU companies' ability to scale up and compete internationally, and preventing EU citizens from reaping the full benefits. For instance, 60 % of the barriers companies face today are of the same type as were already reported 20 years ago. The two reports converge on many points, not least on the need to take rapid action to deepen the single market. Advancing the single market requires action in multiple policy fields, its digital dimension gaining increasing importance in recent years. Ultimately, a well-functioning single market, fit for the green and digital transitions, new technological developments and changing geopolitical realities can be seen as central to the EU's industrial policy. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

During the October II plenary session, Parliament is expected to amend the Council's position on the draft EU budget for 2025. The Committee on Budgets (BUDG) voted to reverse all of the reductions the Council has made to the Commission's draft and proposes considerable increases in the 2025 budget for Parliament's priorities: investments tailored to improving people's lives, and boosting the Union's competitiveness and sustainability. It would set 2025 commitments at almost €201 billion and payments at €153.5 billion, and proposes to finance the NGEU borrowing costs without cutting into expenditure on flagship programmes. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This compendium brings together a set of briefings prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) to guide Members of the European Parliament through the parliamentary hearings of Commissioners-designate in early November 2024. These public confirmation hearings form the backdrop to Parliament's confirmation vote on the College of Commissioners put forward by Ursula von der Leyen, following her re-election as Commission President by the European Parliament in July 2024. In addition to an overview of the process, setting its historical and political context, this volume contains a briefing on each of the Commissioners-designate and their portfolios. Each of these briefings highlights some of the key issues and recent developments in the portfolio, as well as looking back on Parliament's activity in the area in the last parliamentary term. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Animal diseases can result in heavy livestock losses and economic costs, and potentially threaten human health. Through the 'One Health' approach and the EU4Health programme, the European Commission wants to link animal, human and soil health, biodiversity, climate, sustainable use of pesticides, and disease surveillance and prevention, to ensure prompt action in future health emergencies. The topic is scheduled for question time with the Commission during the October II plenary session. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Under the EU Treaties, Member States have to consider their economic and employment policies as a common concern, and coordinate their action within the Council. The Council adopts employment guidelines that must be reflected in the Member States' employment policies and reform programmes. Before adopting these guidelines, Parliament is consulted on the draft, but the Council is not bound by Parliament's opinion. During the October II plenary session, Parliament is due to adopt an opinion on this year's employment guidelines, based on the report from the Employment and Social Affairs Committee. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Copper is a relatively common element with a variety of suppliers, and that should typically mean a stable market. However, the copper market has recently been showing unusual instability. New EU legislation, though not always directly related, seems to be having a significant impact on copper prices. This is the case for the Chips Act and the Critical Raw Materials Act – designed to make EU industry more resilient by improving strategic autonomy – but also for laws concerning energy, artificial intelligence and digitalisation. New factors, including looming shortages in strategic raw materials – such as copper – may strongly influence political action. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP