Article 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) establishes the right of mobile EU citizens – i.e. those residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals – to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and municipal elections in the Member State of residence under the same conditions as nationals of that Member State. In two closely linked judgments, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that this included mobile EU citizens' right to join political parties in the Member State of their residence. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Natural hazards, armed conflicts, human-induced or amplified disasters, and often, complex crises – a combination of these may result in humanitarian emergencies. Meeting complex humanitarian needs, especially in resource-scarce environments, requires intervention beyond national capacities. Therefore, broader humanitarian action is essential to save lives, preserve the health and dignity of victims, assist recovery, and improve prevention, preparedness and resilience. This action encompasses humanitarian assistance, its financing, advocacy, policy and legal frameworks, coordination, monitoring and evaluation efforts. The main international humanitarian efforts are run by the United Nations, facilitating resource mobilisation, coordination and consistency of humanitarian action. However, regional and bilateral actions are equally important, especially given that, due to growing humanitarian needs and scarce financial resources, the humanitarian system is facing a severe funding crisis, compromising the delivery of assistance. The EU is an important humanitarian donor and actor, with its toolbox consisting of humanitarian assistance, both through financing and operational means; international advocacy for more coordinated, efficient and prominent humanitarian assistance and increased resource mobilisation; support for the respect of international humanitarian law; and policy measures, most notably humanitarian exceptions to sanctions. Since the creation of its humanitarian office in 1992, the EU has provided needs-based humanitarian assistance to more than 110 countries and territories, in line with the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence and with a focus on gender-, age- and environment-sensitive approaches, among other things. The European Parliament is significantly involved in the EU's humanitarian action. As a co-legislator and a budgetary authority, as well as through its resolutions, diplomacy, outreach and numerous other activities, the Parliament shapes EU humanitarian policy, decides on the financing, and brings important issues into the spotlight. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Sweden aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2045 (see trajectory in Figure 1) and to further reduce its emissions in sectors covered by the Effort-sharing Regulation. In 2023, Sweden accounted for 0.16 % of the EU's net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. It achieved a net emissions reduction of 72.6 % from 2005 to 2023, well above the EU average reduction of 30.5 %. In the same period, the country reduced emissions covered by the EU emissions trading system by 26.5 %. Sweden's land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector has consistently performed as a large carbon sink. In August 2023, Sweden updated its recovery and resilience plan and included a REPowerEU chapter. The plan dedicates 43.6 % of total funding to the green transition. Sweden submitted a draft updated national energy and climate plan (NECP) in July 2023. The European Commission assessed it, making recommendations for the final updated NECP, which Sweden submitted in June 2024 as one of four EU countries to meet the deadline. A 2023 Eurobarometer survey showed that 73 % of Swedes, against a 46 % EU average, find climate change to be one of the four most serious problems facing the world. While 60 % consider tackling climate change a personal responsibility, this task is also seen as the responsibility of national governments (80 %), the EU (74 %), and business and industry (55 %). Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

In 2023, Bulgaria accounted for around 1.2 % of the EU's net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and achieved a net emissions reduction of 22.6 % compared with 2005. The country's total emissions decreased by 27.4 % between 2005 and 2023, while its net carbon removals in the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector declined by 41.3 % (Figure 1). Emissions from sectors covered by the effort-sharing legislation decreased by 3 % since 2005 and were higher than those from sectors under the EU emissions trading system (ETS), which fell by 43.4 %. In 2023, Bulgaria still had the most carbon intensive economy in the EU; the European Commission considers that the country's green transition could be slowed significantly by the lack of long-term climate commitments, heavy dependence on coal, and the high energy intensity of its economy. Bulgaria submitted its draft updated national energy and climate plan (NECP) in February 2024. The Commission assessed it and made recommendations for the final plan, which was due in June 2024. In a 2023 survey, only 22 % of Bulgarians, compared with a 46 % EU average, identified climate change as of the four most serious problems facing the world. Most expect national government (48 %) and/or the EU (39 %) to tackle climate change. Only 17 % find it to be a personal responsibility. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Poland does not have a national climate law or a strategy to become climate-neutral. However, it is bound by the European Climate Law and other EU legislation that obliges Member States to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in some sectors. Poland accounts for 10.7 % of the EU's net GHG emissions, and achieved a net emissions reduction of 9.3 % in the years 2005 to 2023 – significantly lower than the EU average of 30.5 % over the same period (Figure 1). Emissions under the EU emissions trading system (ETS), covering mainly energy-intensive sectors, aviation and maritime transport, decreased by 30 %. Carbon removals in the LULUCF (land use, land-use change and forestry) sectors went down by 28.2 %. In the effort-sharing sectors (domestic transport without aviation, buildings, agriculture, small industry and waste) increased by 9 %. In August 2023, Poland updated its recovery and resilience plan and introduced a REPowerEU chapter. It submitted its draft updated national energy and climate plan (NECP) on 1 March 2024 (only the scenario with existing measures). The European Commission assessed the partially updated plan on 26 April 2024, and deemed the existing measures insufficient to meet the 2030 targets. In a 2023 Eurobarometer survey, 28 % of Poles, compared with a 46 % EU average, identified climate change as one of the four most serious problems facing the world. Almost half expect national government (46 %) and/or the EU (43 %) to tackle climate change, while 17 % find it to be a personal responsibility. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This briefing provides a summary of the recent economic developments in the EU Member States and gives an overview of relevant economic projections forecasted by major international and EU institutions. Annex 1 includes latest GDP data and forecasts for all EU Member States and Annex 2 the latest inflation data and developments. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Belgium aims to reach climate neutrality by 2050 (see trajectory in Figure 1). In 2023, Belgium accounted for 3.5 % of the EU's net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and reduced its net emissions by 29.3 % between 2005 and 2023, just below the EU average reduction of 30.5 % over the same period. Also during that period, the country reduced emissions covered by the EU emissions trading system (ETS) by 46.7 %. Belgium's land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector has consistently performed as a small carbon sink. In July 2023 Belgium updated its recovery and resilience plan and included a REPowerEU chapter. The plan dedicates 51 % of total funding to the green transition. Belgium submitted a draft updated national energy and climate plan (NECP) in December 2023, to be assessed by the European Commission. In October 2024, the Commission launched an infringement procedure against Belgium and 12 other Member States that missed the June 2024 deadline for submitting the final updated NECP. A 2023 Eurobarometer survey showed that 49 % of Belgians, against an EU average of 46 %, find climate change to be one of the four most serious problems facing the world. Most expect the EU (65 %) and/or business and industry (52 %) and national governments (49 %) to tackle climate change, while 40 % find it to be their personal responsibility. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Spain aims to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 (see trajectory in Figure 1). In 2023, Spain accounted for 8.2 % of the EU's net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and achieved a net emissions reduction of 39.3 % in the years 2005 to 2023, above the EU average reduction of 30.5 %. During the same period, the country reduced emissions covered by the EU emissions trading system (ETS) by 57.5 %. Spain's land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector has consistently performed as a carbon sink, despite an increasing number of forest fires. In June 2023, Spain updated its recovery and resilience plan and included a REPowerEU chapter. The plan dedicates 39.9 % of total funding to the green transition. Spain submitted a draft updated national energy and climate plan (NECP) on 13 July 2023. The European Commission assessed it and made recommendations for the final updated NECP, which was published on 26 September 2024. In a 2023 Eurobarometer survey, 48 % of Spaniards, compared with an EU average of 46 %, consider climate change to be one of the four most serious problems facing the world. Most expect the EU (56 %), national governments (56 %) and business and industry (54 %) to tackle climate change, while 36 % find it to be a personal responsibility. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This handbook provides an illustrated overview of the main marine and freshwater species relevant to the EU fisheries and aquaculture sector. For each species, the handbook shows its main biological characteristics, whether it is caught, farmed or both, and by which Member States, along with some significant EU conservation measures. In addition, it indicates the name of the species in Danish, German, Spanish, French, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese and Swedish. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

On 1 June 2023, the European Commission presented a legislative package to modernise and reinforce maritime rules on safety and pollution prevention. It contains proposals to revise five legal acts, including the Port State Control Directive (PSCD). The aim is to update them to bring them into line with the requirements of the International Maritime Organization and the regional organisation for port state control, set up under the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The proposal refers to the inspection of foreign ships in national ports, to verify that the ships' condition complies with international regulations, including for crews. The PSCD would be extended to cover additional international rules such as new conventions on ballast water and removal of wrecks, and updated rules under the Paris MoU. It would give more importance to ships' environmental performance in determining their risk profile, and boost Member States' capacity to detect and address cases of non-compliance with standards and rules on safety, environmental protection and pollution prevention. The scope would be extended to fishing vessels. The European Parliament's Committee on Transport and Tourism (TRAN) adopted its report on 7 December 2023. On 27 February 2024, Parliament and Council reached a provisional agreement, which TRAN endorsed on 20 March 2024. On 10 April 2024, Parliament adopted the provisional agreement in plenary, concluding its first reading. On 18 November 2024, Council adopted Parliament's first-reading position. The final act was signed by the Council president and the Parliament president on 27 November 2024. The revised directive was published in the Official Journal of the EU on 16 December 2024 and will enter into force 20 days from this date. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

On 9 December 2022, 20 years after the signature of the EU-Chile Association Agreement in 2002, the EU and Chile reached an agreement in principle on a new EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement, which comprises modernised trade and political and cooperation pillars. Negotiations were launched in November 2017, based on a Council negotiating mandate, which was the first-ever to have been published prior to the start of negotiations. Although the trade pillar had operated smoothly and led to an expansion of bilateral trade in goods and services and investment, Chile and the EU agreed to broaden and deepen it to unlock untapped potential, break new ground and keep pace with new trade and investment patterns in a global competitive environment that has fundamentally changed with the growing global footprint of countries such as China. As the EU-Chile Advanced Framework Agreement (AFA) comprises provisions falling under both the EU's exclusive competence and shared competence with EU Member States, an EU-Chile interim trade agreement (iTA) was copied from the EU-Chile AFA to undergo an EU-only ratification process, while the EU-Chile AFA including its trade pillar will also have to be ratified by all EU Member States in accordance with their constitutional requirements. The former will expire, once the latter has entered into force. The agreements were signed on 13 December2023. On 29 February 2024, Parliament provided its consent to both. On 18 March 2024, the Council endorsed the EU-Chile iTA, which ends the EU-level ratification. Chile finalised the ratification of both agreements on 13 November 2024. Fourth edition. The 'International Agreements in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the process, from initial discussions through to ratification. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Cohesion policy plays a crucial role in promoting economic, social and territorial cohesion among the EU Member States' regions. Despite efforts to reduce regional inequalities, challenges persist. This study identifies three main challenges in addressing regional inequalities. First, there is a lack of coordination and coherence between cohesion policy and other policies. Second, positive impacts of cohesion policy are not distributed evenly across regions. Third, the growing number of instruments leads to increased administrative complexity. A coordinated policy approach could be more effective in tackling regional inequalities. This is explored through four policy scenarios and an assessment of their impacts. Finally, the study investigates the cost of non-Europe, that is, the impact of taking no further action at EU level to reduce regional inequalities. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Ever since the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) became applicable in May 2018, the European Parliament and civil society organisations have been flagging up deficits in its enforcement, and pushing for better implementation. To address the situation, in July 2023 the European Commission tabled a proposal aimed at improving GDPR enforcement. The proposal seeks to support the smooth functioning and timely completion of enforcement procedures in cross-border cases. To this end, the Commission suggests harmonising parties' procedural rights, streamlining and frontloading cooperation among supervisory authorities, and detailing the GDPR's dispute resolution mechanism. Views on the Commission proposal diverge. Digital rights organisations advocate for enhanced complainant rights, an equal say for the lead supervisory authority and the supervisory authorities concerned (CSAs) on the substance of enforcement decisions, a stronger role for the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), new mechanisms to facilitate cross-country enforcement, and stricter deadlines. Industry and allied organisations favour increased transparency for the parties under investigation, a stronger role for the lead supervisory authority and lesser roles for the supervisory authorities concerned and the EDPB. Parliament adopted its first-reading position during its plenary session of 10 April 2024. It insisted on strengthening the role of complainants, CSAs and the EDPB. The Council followed with its position on 18 June 2024, largely going in the same direction as Parliament, but using different regulatory approaches and staying closer to the Commission proposal. Third edition. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages in the legislative procedure. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Austria's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) was updated on 9 November 2023 with the introduction of a REPowerEU chapter. The plan now totals €4 187 million, of which €3 961million are financed through Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) grants. The difference is financed through national resources. To implement the plan, Austria is leveraging further amounts beyond EU support from the national budget. Austria has requested the maximum amount of grants available (non-repayable support); it did not opt for requesting loans (possible until 31 August 2023). The Austrian economy has been in a slowdown since the end of the second quarter of 2022. There has been a lack of expansionary impetus both domestically and abroad, leading to a decline in economic output of 0.8 % in 2023. Economic indicators do not suggest an economic recovery for 2024 either – a moderate upturn in private consumption is unlikely to fully cushion a prolonged recession in industry and construction. Against this backdrop, Austrian gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to stagnate in 2024, according to recent estimates. From 2025, industrial output is expected to rise again slightly, restoring positive GDP growth (+1.5%). In Austria's NRRP, 56 % of EU resources will be allocated to the green transition, and (excluding the REPowerEU chapter) 36 % to the digital transformation – far more than the minimum targets set by the RRF Regulation (37 % and 20 % respectively). The plan includes a significant number of reforms with the potential to support lasting structural changes in other areas, such as the primary healthcare system, less red tape for business, and modernisation of the public administration. By the end of November 2024, Austria had received €1.19 billion: €700 million (net of pre-financing) for the first payment, based on the achievement of 44 milestones and targets, and the rest as pre-financing. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Although origin labelling for food cannot be directly linked to a product's intrinsic quality, consumers are increasingly interested in local food systems and in short supply chains. While the easiest way to convey origin information is through labelling, European Union (EU) law requires the display of such information only for a limited number of food products. EU consumers and consumer groups have long advocated greater transparency on food product origins. In force since December 2014, the EU regulation on the provision of food information to consumers updated and harmonised food labelling requirements, set harmonised rules for the presentation of allergen information and tightened up the rules to prevent misleading practices. The regulation allows EU countries to adopt additional national measures concerning the mandatory labelling of food products, as long as these are justified by reasons specifically defined in the regulation. Indicating the country of origin is currently mandatory for certain food products, such as fresh fruit and vegetables, fishery products, honey, olive oil, eggs, beef and beef products, unprocessed meat of swine, sheep, goat and poultry and the primary ingredient of a food when it differs from the origin given for the product as a whole. In the absence of EU rules, some EU countries have enacted national legislation requiring mandatory origin labelling for certain categories of foods. As part of its 'farm to fork' strategy, adopted in 2020, the Commission intended to revise existing rules to extend the mandatory indication of origin to more categories of food products. However, such a proposal never emerged, and if or when it will be put forward remains unclear. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The UK's withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020 was followed by a period of tense relations, mainly around the issues concerning implementation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. The economic consequences of Brexit started to materialise. In 2023, the new UK government of Rishi Sunak agreed with the EU on the Windsor Framework, designed to find solutions to issues related to the implementation of the Protocol. A period of gradually improving relations ensued. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine made it clear that the EU and UK are facing a common threat and need to coordinate their policies better. Progress has been made in an increasing number of fields, from defence, through trade, research and innovation, to competition policies. With the change of leadership in the UK to a Labour government and the emergence of a new political cycle in the EU for 2024-2029, the reset of EU-UK relations has increasingly been gaining momentum. While the UK has made clear that it will not return to the single market or customs union, the government of Keir Starmer has started to engage diplomatically with the EU, with a reset of the relationship as its priority. Both sides are interested mainly in a security and defence pact, the scope of which remains to be defined. The EU's interests include improving mobility into the UK (including youth mobility), maintaining fisheries access, and ensuring rights of EU citizens in the UK. There are also a number of EU programmes that the UK may be considering joining, to mutual benefit, once financial contributions have been negotiated. The negotiations are set to intensify in early 2025. The re-election of Donald Trump may complicate these negotiations, as it is likely to bring disruption, and its effects remain to be seen. The expert community sees possibilities for stronger cooperation on a range of issues such as climate and energy policies, resilience of supply chains, approximation of laws and building the defence industrial base. The European Parliament has been calling in numerous resolutions for closer cooperation in many areas not covered by the current arrangements. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of China compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2023, while China's GDP growth rate has returned to increase against the previous year, Europe's GDP growth rate continues to decline and stands at 0.6 percent. Both countries' inflation rates are down from the prior year, but Europe's rate remains at 6.3 percent while China's is at 0.2 percent. Over the last decade, trade between the EU and China has generally risen. Nevertheless, EU imports of goods from China saw a significant drop after 2022. The EU continues to be China's primary trade partner, while China ranks as the EU's second-largest partner. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Economic security has become crucial for the EU. Both the Letta Report on the future of the single market and the Draghi Report on the future of European competitiveness emphasise the need to intensify efforts to secure the EU's supply of critical raw materials (CRM). Europe is vulnerable to both coercion and geo-economic fragmentation because of its high dependency on strategic raw materials from countries with which the EU is not strategically aligned. Diversifying imports of strategic raw materials is key to mastering the clean transition of Europe's economy, mitigating supply chain risks and reducing the EU's strategic dependencies. In line with its CRM strategy, the EU is seeking to conclude new partnerships in the context of the EU trade and Global Gateway strategies. However, the EU is not the only actor looking to secure access to CRM supplies. China, for example, is bolstering its global dominance in strategic and emerging technologies, continuously increasing its presence in Latin America (and Africa) in order to secure its supply of strategic raw materials. The region is primarily rich in lithium and copper, which are essential for renewable energy technologies and the production of the lithium-ion batteries used in laptops, smartphones, and hybrid and electric vehicles. Since 2023, Latin America, too, has won the EU's renewed attention, and real steps to enhance cooperation on CRM have been taken. In 2023, the EU signed a memorandum of understanding with Argentina and Chile on sustainable raw materials value chains. In November 2024, an interim trade agreement with Chile was ratified – the first EU trade agreement comprising a specific chapter on energy and raw materials. In December 2024, the EU and Mercosur finally reached a political agreement on the EU–Mercosur partnership agreement. As Mercosur countries, primarily Argentina and Brazil, are major producers of CRM, the agreement could help the EU secure an efficient, reliable and sustainable flow of the raw materials that are critical for the clean transition and for the EU's strategic autonomy more widely. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

To keep up with the constant shifts in labour markets and societies caused by major developments such as globalisation and technological advances, people need to develop their knowledge, skills and competences continuously. A varied and future-oriented skill set unlocks opportunities for individuals, promotes inclusion, social mobility and civic participation, and supplies the economy with the workforce needed for growth and innovation, not least in the context of the green and digital transitions. Offering quality learning opportunities, including upskilling and reskilling, that are accessible to learners of all ages and backgrounds is key to making all this possible. The overall vision and objectives for education and training in the EU encompass lifelong learning that covers all levels and types of learning: formal, non-formal and informal, from early childhood to adulthood. In its 2020 communication on the European education area (EEA), the European Commission identified lifelong learning as an important aspect of education, while in its 2021 resolution on a strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training for 2021 to 2030, the Council highlighted lifelong learning and mobility as a priority area. The new Commission Executive Vice-President for Social Rights and Skills, Quality Jobs and Preparedness, Roxana Mînzatu, is responsible for developing a 'Union of skills', focusing on adult and lifelong learning among other things. The European Parliament has always embraced a holistic view of lifelong learning, arguing that it should promote personal and professional growth, foster social participation and employability, and empower active citizens. Parliament has called repeatedly for quality, inclusive and accessible education for all throughout life, as well as endorsing stronger links between education and skills requirements. Additionally, Parliament has continually insisted on the importance of Erasmus+ as a key tool for education and training. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

In May 2024, former European Parliament President Pat Cox described enlargement as perhaps the 'EU's most powerful, transformative and successful policy tool over the past five decades'. The European Council (EU heads of state or government) has, from the outset, played a central role in the EU's enlargement process, shaping both formal and informal aspects. The Lisbon Treaty formally tasked the institution with defining the eligibility conditions to be applied to the accession process. Each enlargement round has provided the Member States and EU institutions with the opportunity to reflect on the conditions of entry and on the impact on the functioning of the EU institutions. This has resulted in the more refined enlargement policy we have today, with the Copenhagen criteria set by the European Council in 1993 as core principles and, on that basis, a fine-tuned methodology for negotiations, adopted in 2020. This briefing will consider some of the challenges facing EU enlargement, look at the European Council's current role in the process and demonstrate the historical evolution of the European Council's involvement in enlargement. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the AFCO Committee, considers the legal space for an EU Climate and Energy Union. It assesses the major limits at the EU and national level, as well as the question if (informal) Treaty change is possible and necessary to create the space needed. It also assesses if an individual right to clean energy exists, or can and should be legally construed. It pays special attention to the challenge of funding and the role that the emerging principle of solidarity might play. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Drawing attention to migrants' human rights and highlighting their contribution to society, International Migrants' Day is observed every year on 18 December. The day was designated by the United Nations General Assembly on 4 December 2000 in response to growing migration numbers around the world. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The European disability rights strategy for 2021-2030 is due to be updated, since the list of initiatives published in 2021 only goes up to 2025. During its December plenary session, Parliament is expected to hold a debate on the new initiatives the European Commission should commit to for the 2025-2030 period. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Provision of clean drinking water, a vital resource and a public good, is considered a matter of public health. Many Europeans already have access to clean and safe drinking water at an affordable price. However, emerging issues such as water scarcity, droughts and the presence of chemical substances or microplastics in water are crystallising societal and environmental concerns. The European Commission is due to make a statement on the right to clean drinking water in the EU during the Parliament's December 2024 plenary session. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The UNCITRAL Mauritius Convention aims to improve transparency in treaty-based investor-state arbitration. Parliament is due to vote on giving consent to the Council's conclusion of the Mauritius Convention on transparency, on behalf of the EU, which will also allow EU Member States to ratify on their own behalf. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

In December, after a public hearing of the candidates in the Committee on Petitions (PETI), the European Parliament is set to elect the European Ombudsman for the new parliamentary term. Six candidates are running: Teresa Anjinho (Portugal), a former Deputy Portuguese Ombudsman; Emilio De Capitani (Italy), a former European Parliament official; Marino Fardelli (Italy), Ombudsman of the Lazio region; Julia Laffranque (Estonia), a former judge of the European Court of Human Rights; Claudia Mahler (Austria), a human rights expert; and Reinier van Zutphen (Netherlands), Ombudsman of the Netherlands. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Since the start of the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, the EU has provided Ukraine with financial, military and humanitarian support on an unprecedented level, including macro-financial assistance, financial support via the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from its Member States and through the European Peace Facility. Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 provides for a new macro-financial assistance loan for Ukraine and establishes a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism (ULCM). That loan and the ULCM are part of a G7 initiative adopted at the G7 summit in Apulia in June 2024 to support Ukraine with loans of up to US$50 billion (€45 billion). The purpose of the G7 initiative is to provide Ukraine with sufficient and continuous financial support to address the immediate needs inflicted on the country by Russia's ongoing aggression. The ULCM will provide Ukraine with non-repayable financial support to assist it in repaying loans provided by G7 partners. Given the urgent nature of Ukraine's financing needs, the MFA will be available in 2024. According to the annex to the final agreement between G7 finance ministers of 25 October 2024, the EU's share of the G7 loan will be €18.115 billion. Extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states will be used to repay those loans and the associated interest costs. The ULCM will collect the extraordinary revenues and use them to repay the loans. The European Parliament adopted the proposal on 22 October 2024 and Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 entered into force on 29 October 2024. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

In recent decades, the digital information sphere has become the public space for debate: the place where people access information, and form and express opinions. Over the past 10 years, global information ecosystems have also increasingly become geostrategic battlegrounds. Authoritarian state actors are testing and fine-tuning techniques to manipulate public opinion and foment divisions and tension, to undermine democratic societies and open democracy as a system. At the same time, the geostrategic rivalry overlaps more and more with corporate geopolitics: the digital information sphere has become a contested territory for large corporations competing fiercely to lead the development and roll-out of new technologies – with artificial intelligence (AI) as a game changer in this quest. These innovations come with risks: information manipulation campaigns facilitated by generative AI magnify threats to democratic information ecosystems. Strategic and systemic pressures on the open information environment are set to increase. This makes efforts to uphold universal values in the digital information environment – values such as human rights and, in particular, freedom of expression – even more essential. The increased focus on information integrity by multilateral organisations makes room for coordinating actions to boost the resilience of information ecosystems more broadly, safeguarding human rights. This concept ties in with key parts of the work planned under the future 'European democracy shield'. The broad scope of information integrity covers a number of activities that are already under way in the EU – including measures and legislation launched in recent years – and offers new paths for coalitions and partnerships. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

Corruption is a major challenge for the European Union (EU), with all its Member States affected by the problem to some extent. The scale of the problem, however, is difficult to measure, both in the EU and elsewhere. Surveys on perception of corruption among citizens and experts – such as the Global Corruption Barometer and Eurobarometer surveys – are the principal measurement tools. Since the 1990s, countries around the world have joined forces to address corruption collectively. This has led to the emergence of widely recognised international laws and standards, adopted in particular by the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations. Mechanisms, such as the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), have been developed to monitor implementation of these rules. The EU has gradually adopted laws addressing a range of corruption-related issues. These include a directive on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests, and directives on public procurement, whistleblowers and money-laundering. However, the legal framework thus created remains patchy, the lack of minimum rules on the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of corruption being one important missing element. The EU also developed its own tool for monitoring anti-corruption efforts – the EU anti-corruption report – only to abandon it after the first edition. Recently, corruption-related issues have been addressed almost exclusively within the EU rule of law framework, a development criticised by various stakeholders, including the European Parliament. The latter has adopted numerous resolutions on corruption addressing, among other things, the impact of COVID 19, systemic challenges to the rule of law and deficiencies in the EU's fight against corruption. This briefing updates an earlier one published in 2023, which built on a study by Piotr Bąkowski and Sofija Voronova, published in 2017. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The safe third country (STC) concept is well established in international asylum policies. According to the concept, certain migrants should not be granted protection in the country where they have applied for it. Instead, they may be returned, or transferred, to a country where they could have found, or can find, international protection. Amid ongoing EU-level discussions on safe third country rules, in 2018 the United Nations Refugee Agency developed legal considerations on safe third countries. Within the framework of the body of EU law on asylum, the STC concept is based on the assumption that certain third (i.e. non-EU) countries can be designated as safe for applicants seeking international protection, under specific conditions. The concept builds on cooperation with third countries in a bid to reduce irregular arrivals and increase return rates. It seeks to speed up the processing of the claims of asylum applicants arriving from safe third countries, to prevent overburdening national asylum systems. The recently adopted Asylum Procedure Regulation provides for broader applicability of safe country clauses. This concerns, in particular, four aspects: (i) the safety assessment when applying the STC concept; (ii) interpretation of the 'connection requirement', i.e. the connection between an asylum seeker and a third country, when readmitting an applicant to a designated STC; (iii) the option to designate a third country as safe with territorial limitations or to exclude certain vulnerable groups from such a designation; and (iv) the creation of a common EU list of STCs in addition to national lists. The success of any STC scheme relies on third countries' cooperation, something that can be challenging to obtain. To counter criticisms of burden shifting and to boost the viability of STC schemes, the EU must demonstrate solidarity through burden sharing. Furthermore, many potentially safe third countries lack asylum laws and administrative frameworks. Consequently, they would likely require substantial support from external partners. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The European Union now has its first ever Commissioner dedicated to Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport, Glenn Micallef. He has been specifically tasked by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen with preparing a 'strategy on intergenerational fairness' that takes fully into consideration the impact of today's decisions on future generations, and seeks feedback from all age groups. Micallef says he will 'attach particular importance to instilling a true and lasting culture of participatory democracy that applies to all ages, including senior citizens'. The momentum for this kind of thinking is growing. In September 2024, world leaders convened at the United Nations in New York for a 'Summit of the Future', and committed to fostering intergenerational dialogue and ensuring youth participation in national and international forums. Addressing humanity's most pressing challenges demands the engagement of all generations, as both younger and older people contribute their own unique knowledge, experience, and skills. This briefing delves into the mechanisms already in place in the EU for listening to young people, and explores the incoming Commission's plans for further engaging young people in decision making processes. From now on, for example, every Commissioner must organise an annual youth policy dialogue dealing with his or her area of competence. Additionally, as of 2025, all new initiatives in the Commission's annual work programme that are of significant relevance for young people will undergo a specific 'youth check'. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The rise of digital technologies represents a double-edged sword for women's rights. On the one hand, the digital environment has enabled women to build networks and spread awareness about the abuse they suffer, such as through the #Metoo movement. On the other, it has provided abusers and misogynists with new tools with which they can spread their harmful content on an unprecedented scale. With the development of artificial intelligence, these trends, both positive and negative, are expected to continue. Against this backdrop, it has become clear that digital violence is as harmful as offline violence and needs to be tackled with the full force of the law, as well as through other non-legislative measures. Moreover, the digital content causing the harm – images, messages, etc. – needs to be erased. This is particularly important, as the impact on victims is profound and long-lasting. The European Union has adopted several pieces of legislation that aim to make a difference in this respect. The directive on combating violence against women, to be implemented at the latest by June 2027, sets minimum EU standards for criminalising several serious forms of cyberviolence and enhances the protection of and access to justice for victims. EU legislation on the protection of privacy is also having an impact on cyberviolence. For example, the new Digital Services Act imposes an obligation on big digital platforms in the EU to remove harmful content from their websites. This is instrumental in removing intimate or manipulated images that are disseminated on the internet without the person's consent; almost all such images portray women, according to existing data. Member States use a multiplicity of legal approaches to tackle this issue, combining criminalisation of specific cyber offences with the use of general criminal law. In some Member States, an explicit gender dimension is also included. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This synopsis is the first out of a series of four studies, commissioned for a PECH Committee Workshop on “The future of the EU fishing fleet − First assessment of the EMFAF programming for 2021-27”. The study focuses on EMFAF Article 17 (First acquisition of a fishing vessel), Article 18 (Replacement or modernisation of a main or ancillary engine) and Article 19 (Increase of gross tonnage to improve safety, working conditions or energy efficiency”). The synopsis deals with the situation for all 22 coastal EU Member States, while at the same time considering results of three additional case studies on Spain, France and the Netherlands. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

The European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) provides for public co-funding to support the modernisation of the fishing fleet during the current funding period (2021-2027). Funding opportunities are subject to specific conditions framed by the EMFAF Regulation as regards the first acquisition of a fishing vessel (Article 17), replacement or modernisation of a main or ancillary engine (Article 18) and increase of gross tonnage to improve safety, working conditions or energy efficiency (Article 19). Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP

This study reviews the implementation of the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) in the Netherlands, as regards the first acquisition of a fishing vessel, the replacement or modernisation of a main or ancillary engine and the increase of gross tonnage to improve safety, working conditions or energy efficiency (Articles 17-19 of the EMFAF Regulation). The study also assesses the future needs of the Dutch fishing fleet and makes proposals for the adjustment of EMFAF for the next budget period. Source : © European Union, 2024 - EP