The March meeting is an apparent example of a European Council agenda dictated by external events. The meeting was originally due to focus almost exclusively on competitiveness and follow up on the informal retreat of 12 February 2026 with concrete decisions. However, with Hungary and Slovakia refusing to sign off on the EU loan for Ukraine, as well as the joint US-Israel attack on Iran, the meeting's focus is likely to shift. The main aims will now be to overcome the two-country veto on the Ukraine loan, and to define a common approach to a rapidly evolving situation in the Middle East – notably to prevent escalation, promote a diplomatic path to end the crisis and provide support to partner countries in the region, while addressing the possible impact on global energy security. In that context, the European Council will discuss the Middle East as well as multilateralism with the UN Secretary General, António Guterres. However, despite a probable change of focus, competitiveness will feature prominently in the European Council conclusions and provide a high degree of detail, probably going beyond the EU leaders' role of setting the general priorities. Other topics on the agenda are the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), European security and defence, and migration, which, due to time constraints, are expected to trigger less discussion. Following the European Council meeting, EU leaders will convene for a Euro Summit focusing on the economic situation in the EU, the international role of the euro and the savings and investment union. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing provides background information for the members of the Special committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS) on election infrastructure vulnerabilities to foreign interference and on corresponding countermeasures. The briefing focuses on the criticality of election infrastructure and on safeguarding electoral integrity, also in light of the approach set out in the Commission’s Communication on the European Democracy Shield. Moreover, the paper considers the role of private sector election interference services. The briefing begins with an introduction to the different components of election infrastructure and general information on the conduct of elections. It continues with an overview of the election infrastructure interference threat landscape, taking the findings of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) into account. It then examines recommendations provided by the European Cooperation Network on Elections to mitigate these threats. Next, the briefing presents a section on critical infrastructure legislation and on the measures outlined in the European Democracy Shield to protect election infrastructure. This briefing has been prepared internally by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Justice, Civil Liberties and Institutional Affairs at the request of the EUDS Committee Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Joint procurement of defence equipment by the EU has gained renewed strategic importance in response to the recent deteriorating security environment and persistent fragmentation within the European defence market. Although the European Defence Agency set a 35 % collaborative procurement benchmark back in 2007, cooperation among Member States remains limited. The 2022 coordinated annual review on defence reported that only 18 % of defence investment took place collaboratively, far below agreed targets. While total EU defence expenditure reached €381 billion in 2025, increased spending has not translated into commensurate growth in joint acquisition. EU institutions continue to highlight duplication issues, capability gaps and over-reliance on non EU suppliers. To address these shortcomings, the Union has expanded financial and regulatory instruments. EDIRPA, EDIP and SAFE provide grants and loans to incentivise joint procurement, while the defence readiness roadmap 2030 raises the ambition to 40 % joint procurement by 2027. Targeted adjustments to the Defence Procurement Directive aim to reduce administrative barriers and facilitate multinational contracting. Joint procurement offers potential economies of scale, stronger bargaining leverage, greater industrial predictability and enhanced interoperability. Studies indicate that meeting collaborative benchmarks could generate annual savings of several billion euros. Yet significant constraints persist, including differing threat perceptions by national governments, industrial competition that often runs counter to consolidation, governance complexity and risks of cost overruns in multinational programmes. The European Parliament has consistently supported deeper pooling and interoperability, urging collaborative acquisition to be prioritised in EU instruments while cautioning against incentives that may reinforce national disparities. Sustained progress therefore depends on credible demand aggregation, coherent defence planning and effective coordination across EU and NATO frameworks. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The Statistical Dialogue is a regular exchange between the Director-General of Eurostat and the ECON Committee, enabling its Members to engage on key statistical issues related to EU economic governance. It is based on Regulation (EC) No 223/2009, which enshrines principles of professional independence and accountability, and was reinforced by Regulation (EU) 2015/759, introducing a formal obligation for regular appearances before Parliament. This is the second Statistical Dialogue of the 10th parliamentary term. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing has been prepared for the public hearing with the Chair of the Single Resolution Board (SRB), Dominique Laboureix, scheduled for 18 March 2026 in the ECON Committee. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing has been prepared for the public hearing with the Chair of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), Claudia Buch, scheduled for 18 March 2026 in the ECON Committee. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Denmark's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) corresponds to 0.2 % of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), or 0.5 % of Denmark's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP). Spillover gains from other Member States′ plans are expected to more than double the direct impact of the Danish plan. The third and latest revision of the Danish NRRP was approved by the Council on 8 July 2025. The EU financial contribution totals €1 625.9 million, including RRF grants (€1 429 million), a REPowerEU grant (€130.7 million) and a transfer of part of the Danish allocation under the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to the plan (€66.0 million). Denmark has so far received 78 % of the NRRP resources in the form of pre-financing and four payments; this is well above the current EU average (68.6 %). The final payment will depend on full implementation of the plan. Denmark has delivered 75 % of its milestones and targets, against an EU average of 52 %. The amended plan reinforces green initiatives and seeks to enhance the resilience of the Danish economy and society, devoting 69 % of the plan to the green transition (up from 59 % in the original plan). In its 2025 country report, the European Commission assessed the implementation of the Danish plan as 'well under way'. On 2 March 2026, Denmark submitted a request to modify its plan. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on NRRP implementation and scrutinises the Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fifth edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Europe is one of the world's primary destinations for international migrants. In 2024, the region hosted approximately 94 million migrants, the highest number of any region in the world. The biggest share enter via legal means. The EU is experiencing skills shortages, which is partly because of its ageing population, and migrants could play a role in helping to plug them. The EU shares competence on migration and asylum policies with its Member States; EU legislation plays a significant role in managing legal migration, although its impact varies by type of migration. Nonetheless, data consistently show that most EU legal migration tools are under-used. Blue Cards, an EU initiative to attract highly skilled workers, account for only a fraction of permits issued for employment reasons and few EU countries make significant use of them, which would suggest more work is needed to make them an attractive option. Similarly, the Single Permit, which is a combined work and residency permit, is mostly used by just a handful of EU countries. In recent years, the EU has also launched new initiatives with non-EU countries such as Talent Partnerships and a Talent Pool, but it is too early to say anything about their impact. There is also a directive for seasonal workers, but again only a few EU countries make much use of it. The EU plays an important role when it comes to asylum by setting common standards, clarifying which EU country is responsible for processing an application, and encouraging solidarity. The European Commission has proposed a Return Regulation to make it easer and faster to return non-EU citizens who were unsuccessful in their bid to obtain asylum. It includes the possibility to create return hubs in non-EU countries, which many Member States are interested in. Temporary protection was used for the first time to help Ukrainians after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The impact assessment (IA) identifies four problems relating to slow development and deployment of advanced digital networks in the EU. Relying on the evaluation of the current regulatory framework, the IA discusses the problem drivers, defines specific objectives, and compares and ranks policy options. The objectives are generally well defined. However, the second specific objective refers to closing the high-quality connectivity gap with competing regions without acknowledging that its achievement also depends on developments in those regions. The third specific objective, on increasing pan-European network operation and service provision, is defined in rather generic terms. The policy options seem relevant and sufficiently distinct, although the presentation of the options is not well balanced, with some options discussed in more detail than others. The IA assesses the economic, social and environmental impacts of policy options, although the analysis varies in depth across the problems and options. The costs and benefits for major stakeholders are analysed, including for small and medium-sized enterprises. The preferred options are chosen transparently, and they generally follow the conclusions of the comparative assessments. However, several preferred options could have been justified more effectively. For example, the preferred option for governance has been selected despite ranking second best in the comparison of policy options. Whereas subsidiarity is sufficiently addressed, proportionality is discussed only briefly and selectively. The IA defines a set of indicators and operational objectives to monitor actual impacts. However, some of these indicators are not sufficiently explained, and lack specific targets. The IA makes use of a wealth of data and sources, including feedback from all major stakeholders. The methodology, data and sources are generally explained, although some references are missing or are incomplete. The Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) issued a 'positive with reservations' opinion on the draft IA after initially issuing a negative opinion. The revised draft appears to have addressed the RSB's comments. The proposal appears generally to follow the preferred policy options identified in the IA. One notable addition in the proposal is the creation of a voluntary conciliation mechanism to facilitate dialogue on technical and commercial arrangements, which was not properly addressed in the IA. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study provides an overview of the EU policy instruments, including Cohesion Policy Funds, that are used in natural disaster response and recovery. It assesses their contribution to strengthening resilience to climate change and to meeting disaster-relief and reconstruction needs. The study also examines how the ‘Build Back Better’ approach can be integrated into future Cohesion Policy to ensure that disaster-affected areas are rebuilt in a more resilient and sustainable manner. Recommendations are provided on how Cohesion Policy can be improved to support EU regions in responding to disasters. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On 16 December 2025, the European Commission put forward a proposal for a regulation to simplify the rules governing medical devices in the EU. The proposal forms part of a broader package of measures aimed at improving citizens' health and strengthening the resilience and competitiveness of the health sector. An evaluation of the current EU regulatory framework for medical devices concluded that it has led to unnecessary costs, administrative bottlenecks, regulatory uncertainty for companies, and delays in patient access to medical devices. The proposed revision seeks to address these challenges while ensuring that patient safety remains the highest priority, with faster access to safe and innovative devices. It also aims to reinforce the EU's competitiveness in the medical technology sector, by establishing a more coherent framework enabling companies to better respond to evolving market conditions, technological developments and patient needs. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Since 1 January 2024, the United Kingdom (UK) has been associated to Horizon Europe, with almost 6 000 UK Horizon projects as of 9 January 2026. The legislative proposals for Horizon Europe (2028-2034) and the Euratom training programme (2028-2032) represent a timely opportunity to discuss the future of bilateral EU-UK cooperation in research and innovation, including in the field of nuclear science and technologies. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This digest provides a collection of documents prepared by the academia, think tanks, other EU institutions and bodies, as well as stakeholders that can be useful for Members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets to stay informed about the debate concerning the next Multiannual Financial Framework, starting in 2028. The document is produced monthly by the Budgetary Support Unit of DG BUDG and the European . Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The 2027 annual EU budget will be the last one under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), which covers the period from 2021 to 2027. The European Parliament is contributing to the preparation of next year's budget through a set of guidelines, and the Commission will adopt the draft 2027 budget in early summer. The draft guidelines, as adopted by the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) on 5 March 2026, express Parliament's commitment to deliver for people, the economy and the planet. Parliament is due to vote on its guidelines during its March I plenary session. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This EPRS paper analyses how the European Commission is delivering on the policy agenda set by its President, Ursula von der Leyen, and her College of Commissioners since taking office in December 2024. It provides an initial assessment of the delivery of the agenda's seven priorities as of spring 2026. The von der Leyen II Commission has set seven priorities – different from the six priorities of her first mandate. It has so far announced close to 400 initiatives. Half of these initiatives fall under the first priority, on prosperity and competitiveness; one in eight under the second, on defence and security; and one in 10 under the third, on social fairness. The remaining initiatives fall under the other four priorities. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing provides an overview of the economic, financial, and monetary implications of US tariffs for the EU over the past year, as of the cut-off date of 25 February 2026. Given the high level of uncertainty, the analysis presented assumes a continued implementation of the EU-US framework agreement. The briefing and the analysis presented were prepared prior to the recent U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, and therefore do not take into account any subsequent market volatility or change in the underlying assumptions. This briefing updates a previous one. The first part of the briefing outlines recent developments, including the EU-US trade deal, the 20 February 2026 US Supreme Court ruling on the legality of the imposed tariffs by the US President, and the EU’s countermeasure toolkit. The second part analyses the impact on the EU economy across sectors and Member States, financial markets and monetary policy challenges. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Portugal is set to receive €21.9 billion in grants and loans from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the EU response to the crisis triggered by the COVID 19 pandemic. This amount corresponds to 2.9 % of the entire RRF, or 10.2 % of Portugal's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP), and includes RRF grants (€15.5 billion), RRF loans (€5.6 billion), REPowerEU grants (€0.7 billion) and Portugal's share (€0.1 billion) from the Brexit Adjustment Reserve. This is the result of the latest revision of Portugal's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP), approved in December 2025, which reduced the loan allocation by €0.3 billion. The plan has a strong focus on the country's social, economic and environmental resilience, with measures targeting culture, housing, health, broad social responses, and forest and water management. According to European Commission estimates, Portugal's plan is set to produce direct effects on value added of around €17 billion. Other Member States' NRRPs are expected to add another €2 billion in indirect spillover effects. Measures relating to climate transition, including those on industry decarbonisation and energy efficiency of buildings, account for 37.3 % of the allocation. The contribution to digital objectives represents 22.8 % of the allocation (excluding the REPowerEU chapter), with measures and reforms aimed at public administration and finances, education and businesses. Portugal has so far received €14.9 billion of RRF resources (68.1 % of the plan) in the form of pre-financing and eight grant and loan payments. The total disbursements sit below the EU average of 68.6 %. The European Parliament has been a major supporter of creating a common EU recovery instrument, and takes part in interinstitutional settings to cooperate, discuss and scrutinise implementation of the Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fifth edition. The first two editions were written by Henrique Morgado Simões. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. The author would like to thank Ana Luisa Melo Almeida, policy analyst in the Next Generation EU Monitoring Service, for her research assistance. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The EU has made closing the gender gap in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) a priority in its education, research and employment policies. This answers to legal requirements to pursue gender equality through any EU action, as well as to practical imperatives to address a shortage of specialists that limits the EU's ability to compete in the global technological race. Moreover, existing data show that many young women today have strong maths and science skills but are still largely absent from careers in engineering and information and communications technology (ICT). Research shows that the under-representation of women in STEM has many causes, including: unwelcoming work environments in STEM jobs, family caring responsibilities, and social norms that discourage girls from pursuing these fields. Tackling these issues requires a combined approach including: challenging rigid gender stereotypes, using gender-sensitive teaching methods in schools, encouraging girls to choose STEM careers, and removing barriers to employment. The EU pursues gender equality as a cross-cutting priority in various policies that cover STEM, and has adopted specific initiatives to promote women in STEM. In education, it uses a range of measures to support women at all levels, from schools to universities. In research, EU funding now depends on programmes promoting gender equality. In employment, EU laws help remove obstacles that might put women off STEM careers. The EU also funds projects that support women's innovation, entrepreneurship, networking and mentoring. The European Parliament strongly backs these efforts, and has called for wider action by the EU and its Member States. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

New digital technologies are a mixed blessing for women's rights and representation in the information sphere in general, and in the democratic debate in particular. Innovative digital tools often promise to make public debates more inclusive, for women too. In practice, recent AI-enabled technology – including deepfake tools – appears to facilitate an increasingly hostile information environment for women, with repercussions for their democratic participation both online and offline. At the same time, the ongoing global wave of autocratisation goes hand in hand with a backlash against women's rights and gender equality. Authoritarian regimes have strategic reasons for suppressing women, and often use gendered disinformation to undermine women opposition leaders, as well as to erode confidence in democratic values and rights. In the European Union, equality between men and women is a fundamental right and a founding value enshrined in the Treaties. Over the past decades, the EU has worked to increase gender equality at home, and used its global influence to support women's rights abroad. At the same time, its evolving digital regulatory framework aims to make the digital space safe for all, including by protecting the rights of women online. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On 16 July 2025, the European Commission adopted its proposal for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), which was completed on 3 September with the adoption of a second package. The own resources part of the proposal is intended to equip the EU with a diversified revenue stream and sufficient means for delivering on EU priorities, as well as for the repayment of the debt created by Next Generation EU. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

In February 2026, two and a half years after the European Commission's proposal, trilogues started on a new regulation on the production and marketing of plant reproductive material (PRM). The proposal, put forward on 5 July 2023, would replace 10 of the 12 PRM directives that currently lay down the rules for seeds, tubers, cuttings, seedlings and young plants. It would introduce sustainability requirements for registering new varieties of agricultural plants, vegetables and fruits intended for professional users, while PRM intended for amateur gardeners and conservation organisations – such as seed banks – would be exempt from many of the requirements. There would be less stringent conditions for registering conservation varieties, and the exchange of seed in kind between farmers would be allowed in small quantities. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

At a time of geopolitical instability, merit-based enlargement is seen as one of the EU's strongest foreign-policy and geopolitical tools and a key driver of long-term security, peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. A plenary debate on Parliament's report on the EU's enlargement strategy is due to be held in March 2026. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

During the March I part-session, Parliament will vote to conclude its first reading on legislation to amend the Package Travel Directive. The proposed amendments reflect a deal struck in interinstitutional negotiations in December 2025. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Access to affordable, sustainable and good-quality housing has become one of the EU's most pressing problems. While housing remains a competence of Member States, regions and cities, the EU has started developing a response to support their action. The European Commission outlined its approach in its December 2025 affordable housing plan. The European Parliament is putting forward its recommendations on funding, permitting and construction sector issues, in an own-initiative report to be voted during the March I plenary session. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

During the March I plenary session, the European Parliament is set to vote on a new interinstitutional agreement on its relations with the European Commission. The new framework agreement would reinforce Parliament's position, in particular with regard to its scrutiny powers, including in the area of international agreements. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has laid bare the challenges facing the EU's defence industry as it tries to meet increased demand and ramp up production in the wake of a fundamentally changed security environment in Europe. The EU's defence industry comprises a number of large multinational companies, mid-caps and a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. It faces a multitude of challenges, such as decades of under-investment, fragmentation, insufficient critical raw material and semiconductor supplies, and a lack of manufacturing capacity. The EU and its Member States have taken several steps to reinforce the European defence industry, especially since the start of Russia's war against Ukraine. Member States have boosted their defence budgets, with their combined total estimated to have reached €381 billion in 2025. The European Defence Fund is investing in research and capability development projects and has achieved very positive results so far. Permanent structured cooperation provides the legal framework and binding commitments for progress in collaborative defence. The EU has also broken taboos by agreeing on a joint defence procurement instrument and an initiative to build up ammunition production. These form part of a three-track proposal to support Ukraine's needs for ammunition (deliver ammunition from existing stocks, jointly procure from industry and support the ramping up of production). In March 2024, the European Commission proposed the first-ever European defence industrial strategy, and the defence industry programme to implement it was formally adopted in December 2025. In 2025, the EU also put forward the white paper for European defence readiness 2030, the ReArm Europe plan (including the SAFE instrument), the defence omnibus packages, and the European defence industry transformation roadmap. Additionally, the European Peace Facility, best known for facilitating lethal weapon supply to Ukraine, is being used to procure defence materiel from the EU's defence industry, further boosting its capacity. The European Chips Act and Critical Raw Materials Act are also expected to benefit the European defence industry by ensuring it has the necessary supplies to tackle the substantially increased demand for its products. These signals have led the industry to take the first steps to increase production capacity. This updates a previous edition, published in 2024. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Under the EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the core of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument, Malta is set to receive a total contribution of €328.2 million, corresponding to 2.3 % of its 2019 gross domestic product (GDP) – less than the average for the EU overall (the RRF equals 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). However, while in nominal terms Malta has the second smallest allocation, it ranks higher in terms of RRF grants per capita. The total financial contribution reflects several revisions of Malta's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP). The July 2023 amendment, which added a new REPowerEU chapter, included an additional grant allocation of €30 million and the transfer of part of Malta's allocation under the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to its plan (€40 million). In the latest amendment of 12 December 2025, the resources devoted to the energy-focused REPowerEU chapter were adjusted from €69.9 million to €74.5 million following the addition of an investment relating to the renovation and greening of private sector buildings. This adjustment reflects a reallocation of resources within the plan and does not increase its overall financial envelope. To date, Malta has received pre-financing (including REPowerEU) and three regular payments. The total disbursements stand at €215 million, or 65.5 % of its allocation (the EU average is 68.4 %). So far, 58.9 % of all milestones and targets have been fulfilled, compared with the EU average of 51 %. The Maltese NRRP takes account of the Council's 2019 and 2020 country-specific recommendations, and aligns with both national economic and investment plans and funding under EU cohesion policy programmes for the 2021-2027 period. The plan's overall objective is to contribute to sustainable, equitable, green and digital recovery, embracing major common EU challenges. The amended plan has a stronger focus on the green transition, devoting 62 % of the funds to it (up from 53.8 % in the original plan, yet down seven percentage points from the latest revision), making Malta's NRRP one of the greenest; 26.9 % of the amended plan, or 34.8 % (excluding the REPowerEU chapter), will contribute to the digital target. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on the implementation of the RRF and scrutinises the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Seventh edition. Earlier versions were written by Velina Lilyanova. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Food contact materials (FCMs) include all materials that come into physical contact with food during its production, processing, packaging and storage. They contain thousands of chemicals, some of which can migrate into food, especially at high temperatures, during long contact times or with certain food types. Scientific evidence shows that such migration is common and may contribute to human exposure to hazardous substances, including endocrine disruptors, carcinogens and reproductive toxicants. Well-known examples include phthalates, bisphenols and PFAS, which remain authorised in some applications despite links to adverse health effects. Current risk assessments often consider substances individually and may underestimate combined or cumulative exposure. The EU's core legislation is Regulation (EC) 1935/2004, which sets out general safety and labelling rules, supported by the Good Manufacturing Practice Regulation (EC) 2023/2006. However, only four material types – plastics, ceramics, regenerated cellulose film and active/intelligent materials – are subject to fully harmonised EU rules. The remaining materials (paper, inks, coatings, rubber, metal, etc.) rely mostly on national rules, leading to regulatory fragmentation, uneven safety standards and unclear requirements for industry. In addition, existing rules focus largely on known intentionally added substances, while non intentionally added substances (NIAS), impurities and degradation products remain insufficiently addressed. A 2022 Commission evaluation found the framework only partially effective, with gaps in enforcement, control of NIAS and harmonisation. The Commission has recently reiterated its commitment to further harmonising EU legislation on FCMs. The European Parliament has pushed for stronger rules, contributing to recent EU wide bans on BPA and PFAS in food packaging. Citizens and stakeholders broadly support a comprehensive revision establishing clearer standards, harmonised testing and stronger consumer protection. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Despite strong political commitments to gender equality at EU and national level, women still remain politically under-represented at all levels of political power. In the European Parliament, as well as in national parliaments, governments and local assemblies, their share most often is under the symbolic 40 % mark. Moreover, after successive electoral cycles in which women's share in representative assemblies had increased, this trend has slowed down or come to a halt. Progress has also been uneven among Member States, with women remaining markedly under-represented in some Member States. Gender-balanced political representation is not only important for women and female politicians but also for political parties themselves and the rest of society. It increases trust in the political system and strengthens economic and political governance. The EU has committed to achieving gender balance in political representation and participation in the EU; however, except for the European elections, its powers in the area remain limited mainly to soft action. It can support the specific actions to be taken by the EU institutions, national governments, political parties, civil society and the media, by issuing recommendations, facilitating the exchange of good practice or funding projects. There is substantial evidence of the obstacles to women's political participation and the means to overcome it. This picture is nevertheless not static, as new challenges emerge, particularly from mounting opposition to gender equality, as well as from digital technologies, most recently artificial intelligence, which can both empower women and discourage them. This updates a March 2024 briefing by Ionel Zamfir. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Petition 0445/2025 on the closure of a nuclear power plant in Almaraz, Spain Petition 0819/2024 and Petition 1334/2024 concerning the environmental damage to Cabañeros National Park resulting from the ban on the hunting of ungulates Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study was prepared at the request of the European Parliament’s Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). It analyses the European Commission’s Digital Omnibus package proposals published on 19 November 2025, distinguishing administrative simplification from more substantive recalibration of safeguards across data, privacy, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence areas. The study highlights key areas of controversy (legal certainty, enforcement capacity, and impacts on rights) and sets out areas for consideration for parliamentary scrutiny. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study was prepared at the request of the European Parliament’s Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). It analyses the European Commission’s Digital Omnibus package proposals published on 19 November 2025, distinguishing administrative simplification from more substantive recalibration of safeguards across data, privacy, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence areas. The study highlights key areas of controversy (legal certainty, enforcement capacity, and impacts on rights) and sets out areas for consideration for parliamentary scrutiny. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Academic freedom is widely recognised as a fundamental value of contemporary higher education and research, and as a prerequisite for well-functioning democratic societies. However, in recent years, major concerns have been expressed by various stakeholders about the state of academic freedom in the European Union. The European Parliament annual Academic Freedom Monitor aims to improve the promotion and protection of academic freedom in the European Union. The 2025 edition is organised in two parts. The first part consists of an update of existing measures of academic freedom in all EU Member States, an updated overview of public debate and studies of the state of academic freedom in four selected EU Member States, and an examination of the EU's state of academic freedom in a global context. The second part contains a thematic analysis of the potential impact of selected trends in academic freedom within the EU, namely political polarisation, recent developments in the US higher education and research system, the commercialisation of academia, and foreign interference. Furthermore, EU-level policy options are proposed for possible legislative and non-legislative initiatives to enhance the support for academic freedom in the EU Member States. ITRE, CULT, EUDS, AFET EEAS EC: DG RTD, DG EAC Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP