Un vent de fronde médicale se lève. Dans une lettre ouverte adressée aux autorités administratives et politiques du Pays, dix oncologues, hématologues et professionnels de terrain du Centre hospitalier du CHPF sortent de leur réserve. Ils dénoncent avec force une proposition législative visant à transférer les activités d'oncologie vers l'Institut du cancer de Polynésie française (ICPF) et à remettre à plat l'installation du PET-scanner, un équipement attendu depuis deux décennies.

À partir de 8h, suivez les TrialsTahiti Pro Teahupo'o 2026 en direct depuis la passe de Hava'e. Les meilleurs surfeurs polynésiens sont en lice pour décrocher leur wildcard WSL.

Since the establishment of the European emissions trading system (EU ETS), industrial installations exposed to the risk of carbon leakage have received free emission allowances for part of their greenhouse gas emissions. The EU ETS Directive provides for this percentage to be progressively reduced over the years in such a way that the EU ETS still provides a carbon price signal for decarbonisation and protects against the risk of carbon leakage. The EU has adopted a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) to replace the existing system of free allocation. The CBAM aims to ensure that imported goods are subject to the same carbon costs as those produced within the EU. However, the CBAM is still being phased in, and it does not cover all sectors exposed to the risk of carbon leakage.The European Commission will propose a revision of the EU ETS in July 2026. The revision would re-define the role of the EU ETS post-2030, reinforcing it as an instrument that supports decarbonisation and industrial competitiveness. There are multiple issues at stake, but free allocation is expected to play a pivotal role in the discussion. Beforehand, the adoption of the Benchmark Regulation – the implementing act setting the revised values for free allocation of emission allowances – will establish the amount of free allocation to be granted in 2026-2030 to the sectors and subsectors in the EU ETS that are exposed to the genuine risk of carbon leakage. A broader revision of Directive 2003/87/EC on the EU ETS will begin afterwards, with a Commission proposal looking, among other things, at the role of carbon leakage in the EU ETS post-2030. This briefing provides an overview of the existing legislative framework and concepts related to free allocation in the existing EU ETS, and presents the views expressed by some Member States and stakeholders. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The SDGs are 17 interconnected and indivisible goals, each with a series of specific targets, agreed by the United Nations in 2015 and to be attained by 2030. Both developed and developing countries committed to the SDGs, which address the multiple causes and consequences of environmental depletion and social inequalities. The European Union has been a leader in drafting the SDGs; it is also a frontrunner in mainstreaming the SDGs in all its policies. This topical digest features the main EPRS publications linked to the SDGs that will be the focus of the 2026 United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), namely: 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), 9 (Industry Innovation and Infrastructure), 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), and 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). These and other analyses are available on the European Parliament's Think Tank pages. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Justice, Civil Liberties and Institutional Affairs at the request of the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), provides a legal assessment of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive (IPRED), with particular regard to the European Commission’s Follow-up Study on the Application of the Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Final report, March 2025, published 2026 [Follow-up Study]). Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains how the European Parliament contributes to the EU’s support for democracy around the world, including through election observation, parliamentary capacity-building, mediation, dialogue, support for human rights defenders and cooperation with partner parliaments. It also outlines the EU policy framework, financial instruments and external action tools that underpin this democracy support. Finally, it describes the role of the European Parliament in this area. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the history, procedure and future perspectives of the EU’s enlargement policy. Accession negotiations and chapters have been opened with Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and Türkiye. North Macedonia opened accession negotiations in 2022, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2024. Kosovo submitted its application for EU membership in 2022. In 2023, the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine and to grant candidate country status to Georgia (5.5.6 and 5.5.7). Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans – a region comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – and the accession process. It outlines the objectives of promoting stability, cooperation and economic development, the main instruments such as the Stabilisation and Association Process and pre-accession assistance, and the current status of each country’s progress towards EU membership. It also explains how the European Parliament contributes to the enlargement process through its consent powers, resolutions and parliamentary diplomacy. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the European Union’s relations with the United States and Canada, which are grounded in a long shared history. All three are members of the G7, an informal intergovernmental forum that brings together major advanced economies to discuss economic and political issues. In addressing complex global challenges, including trade tensions, the EU prioritises dialogue and cooperation with both the United States and Canada. Key areas of engagement include foreign policy, security and defence, and trade and economic policy. The EU is committed to maintaining and strengthening transatlantic relations while adapting them to evolving global challenges. This approach aims to ensure stability and resilience and to uphold the international rules-based order. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the European Union’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, a region of 33 countries linked to the EU by deep political, economic and cultural ties. It covers the main institutional frameworks for dialogue – from region-wide summits and parliamentary assemblies to bilateral agreements with individual countries – and describes the EU’s trade and cooperation agreements with sub-regions and individual states. It also sets out the European Parliament’s role in shaping and monitoring the bi-regional strategic partnership. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Antony Géros dément toute candidature aux sénatoriales pour lui et Richard Tuheiava. Après réécoute du discours d'Oscar Temaru, le président de l'assemblée affirme interpréter différemment l'annonce du président du parti, qui suggérait en fait seulement leur utilité face à Édouard Fritch et Lana Tetuanui, sans réelle annonce de candidature.

Catherine Chabaud la ministre déléguée chargée de la mer et de la pêche était l’invité du journal du mercredi 29 juin. Interrogée par Cybèle Plichart, elle a abordé les sujets de la réglementation des restrictions de pêche au fenua, mais aussi les énergies renouvelables, autant de sujets que la représentante du gouvernement souhaite prendre en tant qu’exemple pour le développement d’une stratégie globale pour les outremers.

This Briefing critically analyses the new EU Anti-Racism Strategy 2026-2030 (the Strategy) which was launched by the European Commission in January 2026. The Briefing situates the Strategy within the landscape of the existing EU anti-racism infrastructure including the primary and secondary legislation, case law, and other policy initiatives and efforts to combat racism, including the Strategy’s precursor, the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025 (the Plan). The Briefing shows that the EU’s anti-racism infrastructure, especially the Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, commonly known as the ‘Racial Equality Directive’, is robust in principle. Yet, it is underutilised and ultimately ineffective. The low rates of litigation under the Racial Equality Directive at the CJEU are evidence of its underutilisation. The high rates of existing levels of racism across EU Member States, such as recorded in successive FRA reports, evidence its ineffectiveness. It is against this backdrop that the Strategy, and previously the Plan, were adopted. The Plan was meant to be a ‘step up’ in the EU’s fight against racism. The immediate impetus for the adoption of the Plan came from the global Black Lives Matter protests following George Floyd’s death in the US. The Plan sought to address racism comprehensively and at all levels including individual, structural, and the EU’s internal – institutional – level. While the Plan covered much ground, it prioritised coverage and scale over precision and ambition. That is, the Plan lacked a precise normative framework of both racism and anti-racism; and at the same time lacked ambition by failing to identify benchmarks for improvement against which the impact of anti-racism measures could be tested. The Strategy which succeeds the Plan marks not only a semantic, but a more deliberate and determined, shift in the Commission’s approach to anti-racism. In particular, the Strategy is defined by three normative shifts: the adoption of an economic rationale for anti-racism; the shift in focus towards structural racism; and the centring of participation and partnerships in the fight against racism. These shifts are accompanied by a range of measures reinforcing the need to strengthen monitoring, enforcement, and implementation of law and policy against racism in the EU. Together, both the normative and operational aspects of the Strategy may be considered more ambitious than the Plan. Yet, the Strategy leaves significant gaps, both normatively and operationally. The success of the Strategy will depend not on how well it is executed but whether it is able to surmount the challenges posed by these gaps. These include: (i) the development of a working definition of structural racism which exceeds belief, ideology, and animus; (ii) the coordination of EU anti-racism measures across all forms of racism, all forms of discrimination, and all other issues facing the EU; (iii) the development of a common approach to intersectionality which defines and operationalises the concept at the same time; (iv) the development of a legal framework for addressing the alarming rise of xenophobia and xenophobic discrimination; (v) the prioritisation of the voices of racially disadvantaged individuals and groups; (vi) the adoption of the Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive; and (vii) the formulation of more ambitious and comprehensive programmatic approach to positive action measures for addressing racial disadvantage. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Ireland holds the Presidency of the Council of the EU as of 1 July 2026, following Cyprus and preceding Lithuania. Ireland’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, at 99.8 thousand PPS, represents 237 % of the EU’s total GDP per capita, while its gross national income (GNI), at 67 thousand PPS, is just two thirds of GDP. Ireland’s GDP decreased by 12.1 % in first quarter 2026. Ireland’s trade in services with the world is much more significant than its trade in goods. Ireland is in the top five EU Member States on research and innovation. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament known as the Oireachtas. The Irish Parliament consists of the President of Ireland (Head of State) and two Houses: Dáil Éireann (House of Representatives) and Seanad Éireann (the Senate). The President is directly elected but mainly has a ceremonial role. They can convene a meeting of either House of the Oireachtas in order to solve a dispute or address a national emergency, and can dissolve the Dáil to facilitate a general election (on the advice of the head of government who must have a majority in the Dáil). They can also refer a bill to the Supreme Court for a judgment on its compliance with the Constitution. This briefing is part of an EPRS series on national parliaments and EU affairs. It offers an overview of the way the EU Member States' national parliaments are structured and how they process, scrutinise and engage with EU legislation. It also refers to relevant publications by national parliaments. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This document provides background information for the Members participating in the mission to the 19th session of the Conference of States Parties to the CRPD, New York, from 9 to 11 June 2026. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Ireland assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1 July, and will stay in office until 31 December 2026. The country took over from Cyprus and will hand the baton to Lithuania. Ireland is the first member of a new presidency trio, along with Lithuania and Greece. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Un accident de la circulation d'une rare violence s'est produit ce mardi après-midi sur la commune de Mahaena, au PK 32. Une collision frontale entre un véhicule léger et un vélo électrique a coûté la vie à un homme d'un âge avancé. Le trafic a été fortement perturbé.

C’est le choc depuis la révélation d’une enquête ouverte à Toulon pour « traite d’êtres humains ». Une famille est accusée d’avoir assassiné deux militaires du Pacifique et d’avoir séquestré 7 autres personnes dans le sud de la France. Parmi les victimes, le légionnaire polynésien Mike Gineste. Sa voisine témoigne.

Air Tahiti pourra continuer d'assurer les dessertes inter-îles pendant encore un an, soit jusqu'au 30 juin 2027. Une prolongation des deux contrats de délégation de service public, qui devaient prendre fin le 30 juin et le 15 juillet, a été validée par le président du Pays.

Alors que les instances du Tāvini Huiraatira n'avaient encore rien arrêté, la traditionnelle commémoration du 29 juin a pris une tournure électorale inédite. En propulsant publiquement le tandem Antony Géros et Richard Tuheiava vers les sénatoriales de septembre, Oscar Temaru a bousculé son propre camp. Entre le rappel d'un bilan parisien clivant et le sentiment d'une manœuvre politique pour éloigner le président de l'assemblée des affaires locales après la rupture avec Moetai Brotherson, cette annonce sonne comme un pavé dans la mare indépendantiste.

Pour sa première apparition publique depuis son hospitalisation début juin pour insuffisance cardiaque, le leader historique du Tavini Huiraatira, Oscar Temaru, a livré un discours fleuve ce 29 juin 2026 à la stèle de Tavararo. Devant une audience clairsemée, le maire de Faa'a de 81 ans a retracé cinquante ans d'une existence marquée par la répression, la lutte antinucléaire et l'acharnement judiciaire, reliant directement ses bardeaux de santé aux combats politiques de sa vie.

Le journal Var-Matin publie une enquête saisissante sur une famille domiciliée à Fréjus puis à Toulon, qui a été mise en examen pour « traite d’êtres humains ». D’après le quotidien, cette famille ciblait de jeunes militaires français originaires de l’océan Pacifique. Deux d’entre eux, Jacques Pakeso et Mike Gineste, ont disparu en 2022 et en 2023.

In March 2013, the European Commission proposed to revise the air passenger rights framework, addressing both identified shortcomings and relevant rulings of the Court of Justice of the EU. After a lengthy legislative procedure, including blockage by the Council, the co-legislators reached agreement on 16 June 2026 following political conciliation. The agreement is due to be discussed at third reading during the July 2026 part-session. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This paper presents the aggregated results of a survey conducted among Members of the Monetary Policy Expert Panel (MPEP) ahead of the June 2026 Monetary Dialogue with ECB President Christine Lagarde. The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the survey respondents and should not be attributed to the European Parliament or its services. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing assesses the unexploited potential of Directive 2011/24/EU on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare over the period 2015-2026 and proposes targeted reforms. The analysis focuses on National Contact Points (NCP), prior authorisation, reimbursement, telemedicine, e-prescriptions, European Reference Networks (ERN) and patients’ rights. It finds that the Directive remains legally significant but underused: patient mobility is limited and does not endanger national healthcare systems, yet patients still face fragmented information, complex procedures for prior authorisation and reimbursement, weak interoperability, uneven ERN integration into the national healthcare systems and poor awareness of their rights under EU law. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Tous les groupes, excepté A Fano Ti'a, ont voté contre le report de crédits non engagés en 2025 sur le budget 2026. Le Tapura espère un «électrochoc», le président Brotherson parle de «sabotage». Invitée du journal, la députée Nicole Sanquer, représentante non inscrite à l'Assemblée et présidente du parti A Here ia Porinetia, livre son point de vue. Elle revient également sur la réforme du statut qu'elle porte au plan national.

Air Tahiti pourra continuer d'assurer les dessertes inter-îles pendant encore un an, soit jusqu'au 30 juin 2027. Une prolongation des deux contrats de délégation de service public, qui devaient prendre fin le 30 juin et le 15 juillet, a été validée par le président du Pays.

Deux ans après sa suppression du calendrier des jours fériés par le gouvernement, le 29 juin offre désormais le visage d'une Polynésie à deux vitesses. Entre commerces ouverts ou fermés, jeunes désintéressés et leaders politiques divisés, la célébration du statut de la Polynésie française a perdu de son éclat d'antan, basculant dans une sobre affaire de spécialistes.

Le secteur du bâtiment et travaux publics se porte bien. D’après l’Institut de la statistique de la Polynésie française (ISPF), l’activité du secteur de la construction a continué de croître en 2025 avec une hausse du chiffre d’affaires de 2,1 % sur un an, tirée par le redressement des investissements des entreprises et des ménages.

Cet accord dit de « Nakamal » prévoit que l’Australie apporte un soutien économique accru au Vanuatu, dont la Chine est le principal créancier. « Cela permet à l'Australie d'avoir la certitude qu'il n'y aura pas de base militaire étrangère », affirme le Premier ministre australien. Une signature qui intervient alors que la Nouvelle-Zélande alerte sur des incursions militaires chinoises « persistantes » en Océanie.

This paper analyses the European Union’s (EU) evolving engagement with the Sahel region, with particular attention to the Alliance of Sahelian States – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Drawing on interviews with EU officials and external experts, as well as academic and policy literature, this paper examines three interrelated dimensions. Firstly, it reviews the EU’s past approaches to the region since 2011, highlighting how shifting strategic logics, strong Member State influence and limited responsiveness to local political dynamics have shaped EU engagement. Secondly, it assesses the current political and security context in the Sahel. This is characterised by military rule, worsening jihadist violence and a strategic realignment towards non-Western partners, such as Russia, Türkiye and Gulf states, all aspects which influenced the partial rupture with the EU. Finally, it analyses the EU’s recently adopted renewed approach to the Sahel and the challenges of re-engaging in a volatile and competitive geopolitical environment. The paper concludes with policy options for a more pragmatic and differentiated EU engagement in the region, emphasising the need for flexible policies, connecting with the populations and lowered ambitions. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study examines cross-border cooperation arrangements for fisheries management in the Western Waters, with particular focus on the Iberian sardine and the Bay of Biscay anchovy fisheries. It analyses the development of the cooperation processes, the evolution of the management measures under the long-term management plans and the multi-level governance structures supporting joint decision-making. The findings highlight the critical role of scientific advice, active stakeholder participation and coordinated management measures in strengthening sustainable governance of shared fish stocks. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study investigates cross-border cooperation in Baltic Sea fisheries management under the common fisheries policy, with a particular focus on the Baltic Sea Fisheries Forum (BALTFISH) and the Baltic Sea Advisory Council (BSAC). The analysis shows that while cooperation functions well at a procedural level, it operates below its full potential. Unlocking this potential is essential for the recovery of Baltic Sea stocks and for delivering on the CFP objectives. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study investigates cross-border cooperation in Baltic Sea fisheries management under the common fisheries policy, with a particular focus on the Baltic Sea Fisheries Forum (BALTFISH) and the Baltic Sea Advisory Council (BSAC). The analysis shows that while cooperation functions well at a procedural level, it operates below its full potential. Unlocking this potential is essential for the recovery of Baltic Sea stocks and for delivering on the CFP objectives. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP