The European Union supports the development of its most remote regions, known as the outermost regions: Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Réunion, Martinique, Mayotte and Saint-Martin (France), the Azores and Madeira (Portugal), and the Canary Islands (Spain). The purpose of this support is to compensate for the constraints arising from the geographical remoteness of these regions. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The European Union has established a common classification of territorial units for statistics, known as ‘NUTS’, in order to facilitate the collection, development and publication of harmonised regional statistics in the EU. This hierarchical system is also used for socioeconomic analyses of the regions and the framing of interventions in the context of EU cohesion policy. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

European groupings of territorial cooperation (EGTCs) were set up to facilitate cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation between Member States or their regional and local authorities. EGTCs enable these partners to implement joint projects, share expertise and improve coordination of spatial planning. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

REACT-EU is a programme to repair the social and economic damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, and to prepare for a green, digital and resilient recovery. REACT-EU seeks to mobilise an additional EUR 47.5 billion from the structural funds for the years 2021 and 2022, and to increase flexibility in cohesion policy spending. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The Just Transition Fund is a financial instrument within the Cohesion Policy, which seeks to provide support to territories facing serious socio-economic challenges arising from the transition towards climate neutrality. The Just Transition Fund will facilitate the implementation of the European Green Deal, which aims to make the EU climate-neutral by 2050. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This paper outlines the European Union’s institutional framework for defining and executing an active euro exchange rate policy, against the backdrop of a potential policy shift by the United States. It outlines the emerging US debate on linking exchange rate policy with trade and security objectives and provides a background on past currency interventions by US and other central banks such as the Plaza Accord. The final part opens a discussion over the functioning and limits of the EU’s legal framework and division of competences on the euro exchange rate policy, and discusses relevant policy implications. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The purpose of the EU PEACE PLUS programme is to support peace and reconciliation and to promote social, economic and regional stability and cooperation in Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The tables below show basic statistical data in several areas relating to the common fisheries policy (CFP), namely: the fishing fleet of the Member States in 2024 (Table I), the situation of employment in the fisheries (2021), aquaculture (2020) and fish processing (2021) sectors (Table II), the production, import and export of fisheries and aquaculture products in 2021 (Table III), the apparent and per capita consumption of fisheries and aquaculture products in 2021 (Table IV), and the prospective resource allocations of the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) from 2021 to 2027 (Table V). Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

In the EU context, financial instruments represent measures for financial support provided from the EU budget – in addition to traditional grants – to address one or more specific EU policy objectives. While these instruments can take various forms, they are largely grouped into equity investments, loans or guarantees, and can be used in combination with grants. In policymaking, financial instruments are of great value, as they produce a leverage effect that unlocks public and – most importantly – private resources beyond the initially invested capital. Financial instruments can be set up at different levels of governance. The Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument, worth up to €712 billion, was set up to help Member States emerge more resilient from the pandemic while fostering the green and digital transitions. It does so through its main spending tool – the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) –in the form of grants and loans. Moreover, NGEU combines loans and grants, which maximises the value added of this EU policy response focused on recovery and resilience. Through the individual national recovery plans that Member States needed to develop to tap into the RRF, NGEU can finance, among other projects, investment and reform measures creating national financial instruments. These measures address – to a varying extent – the country-specific recommendations that are relevant to financial instruments. The six selected reform measures range from strengthening capital markets in Slovenia to adopting laws allowing the use of guaranteed loans to improve energy efficiency in Greece. The 13 chosen investment measures, amounting to roughly €13.9 billion, include equity growth instruments for businesses in Bulgaria, financial instruments for digital innovation in Latvia, and guarantees for student loans in France. Eight Member States have not introduced financial instrument measures in their recovery plans, since this is not a requirement. Experts emphasise that the RRF has led to the uptake of some financial instruments, particularly regarding energy efficiency, which was deemed a positive trend. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Thanks to successive Treaty revisions, the European Parliament legislates on an equal footing with the Council. Today, a vast number of policies are decided under the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 294, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union − TFEU), previously known as co-decision. To adopt legislation, Parliament, representing European Union citizens, and the Council, representing the governments of the EU Member States, have to agree on an identical text. This requires time and negotiation. The complexity of the EU legislative process has sometimes been criticised as lengthy and subject to gridlock. To overcome this issue, the co-legislators have developed methods of informal contact to speed up the legislative process, while ensuring representativeness and oversight. One of the tools commonly used today are trilogue meetings, defined as 'informal tripartite meetings on legislative proposals between representatives of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission'. Due to the absence of any explicit reference in the Treaties, trilogue began in the early 1990s, on a very informal basis, and evolved over time. In the beginning, the institutions filled the legal void with an informal practice that became progressively formalised over time and resulted, inter alia, in successive modifications of Parliament's Rules of Procedure. These modifications were driven by the need to ensure that trilogue negotiations support the legislative process in Parliament efficiently, while remaining fully transparent and representative. Today, Parliament's Rules of Procedure define the key elements of trilogue: how to conduct negotiations, and how to ensure that both the committee(s) responsible and plenary are fully informed and can exercise their oversight role. Other elements, such as the number and frequency of meetings, and the practical conduct of the negotiations depend on the nature of the legislative file to be negotiated, and thus remain uncodified. This briefing updates a 2021 EPRS publication. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Since the start of Russia's full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union has provided Ukraine with financial, military and humanitarian support on an unprecedented level. To date, the support to Ukraine from 'Team Europe' – comprising the EU and its Member States – amounts to €143 billion. This support includes macro-financial assistance, financial support through the Ukraine Facility, humanitarian aid and military assistance from Member States and through the European Peace Facility, as well as support to EU Member States hosting Ukrainian refugees. The disbursement of EU payments under the Ukraine Facility is conditional on Ukraine implementing the Ukraine Plan, an ambitious plan for reform and investment drafted by Ukraine's government and endorsed by the EU. The European Commission and the Ukrainian government publish data on the progress of the reforms and on the disbursal of payments. Those data form the basis for a Ukraine Facility Dialogue, which ensures the democratic scrutiny of the EU's support to Ukraine. In addition to the Ukraine Facility, Regulation (EU) 2024/2773 provides for a €18.1 billion EU macro-financial assistance loan for Ukraine as part of a €45 billion G7 loan. Furthermore, a Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism was established, which uses extraordinary revenues originating from Russian sovereign assets immobilised in the G7 member states to repay loans and the associated interest costs. The rights, responsibilities and obligations provided for in the framework agreement under the Ukraine Facility, referred to in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2024/792, will apply to the macro-financial assistance loan in order to ensure seamless political and financial management of both. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for the confiscation of the immobilised Russian sovereign assets as such – instead of just using the extraordinary revenues – to finance further support for Ukraine and the country's reconstruction. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

When Donald Trump was elected President of the United States (US) for the second time in 2024, the world knew that tariffs would again be the US trade policy instrument of choice. Two months into his second term, the President announced universal tariffs on aluminium and steel; a month later, on cars and car parts; and on 2 April 2025, reciprocal tariffs ranging from 11 % to 50 % on imports from countries running a trade in goods deficit with the US, and universal tariffs of 10 % on imports from almost all other countries. As the US Congress is working on a long-term budget reconciliation bill, it is unclear whether the US import tariffs are meant as a permanent source of revenue to partly fund tax cuts, to be renewed and extended in that bill, and/or as 'incentives' for bilateral deals. While the latest tariffs may not even mark the last step, the responses to them fall into three categories: China has opted to retaliate; India and Israel have entered into negotiations to reach a deal with President Trump; and the EU has pursued a staged approach of targeted retaliation and openness to negotiation. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 19 March 2025, the European Commission unveiled its strategy for a savings and investments union with the goal of directing EU households' savings towards productive investments. This policy includes a review of existing EU pension legislation to increase participation in supplementary pensions and recommendations for auto-enrolment pension frameworks. The pan-European pension product (PEPP), introduced in 2019 through a regulation that became applicable in 2022, has only been registered in four Member States. Institutional investors have shown limited interest in this product, and improvements are likely to be the focus of the planned review. Some observers argue that the PEPP is too restrictive for investment product providers in terms of cost and value guarantees. The product may also compete with existing pension savings products. Some Member States suggest establishing an inter-governmental framework as a preliminary test for a cross-border product, with the possibility of developing a model at EU level in a later phase. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of Canada and Mexico compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. For 2024, the growth rate for Canada is expected to be at 1.3%, whereas Mexico is at 1.5%. The trend in inflation rates is continuing to decline, with estimates of 4.7% for Mexico and 2.6% for Canada. Overall trade relations between the EU, Canada, and Mexico have shown positive growth over the last two decades. Since 2020, both Canada and Mexico have seen a significant increase in imports and exports with the EU. Cumulatively, the EU member states are Canada's and Mexico's third largest trading partner in goods, representing 8% of their total trade. The other two main trading partners for Canada and Mexico are the US and China, which account for 63% and 9% of goods trade, respectively. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) comprises the ECB and the national central banks of all the EU Member States. The primary objective of the ESCB is to maintain price stability. In order to achieve this objective, the Governing Council of the ECB bases its decisions on an integrated analytical framework and implements both standard and non-standard monetary policy measures. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Academic freedom is widely recognised as a fundamental value of contemporary higher education and research, and is often presented as a prerequisite for well-functioning democratic societies. However, in recent years, major concerns have been expressed by various stakeholders about the state of academic freedom in the European Union. The European Parliament launched an annual EP Academic Freedom Monitor in 2022, to help improve the promotion and protection of academic freedom in the European Union. This report presents one of the two studies conducted in the 2024 edition. This study firstly provides an overview of the constitutional legal provisions of academic freedom across all EU Member States. Secondly, it provides an in-depth analysis of the legal protection of academic freedom in four EU Member Stats. Thirdly, it explores the Union's scope of action on academic freedom protection at EU level. On the basis of both studies, this report proposes EU-level policy options for possible legislative and non-legislative initiatives to support academic freedom in the EU. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Greece was among the first four EU Member States to submit its national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) in April 2021. Since then, Greece has modified its plan in December 2023, adding a REPowerEU chapter and expanding its loan programme, and in July and December 2024, introducing smaller targeted revisions. The Greek plan now envisages investment and reforms worth €35.9 billion, to be implemented up to 2026; €18.2 billion will be financed from non-repayable financial support (grants), while the loans amount to €17.7 billion. The plan corresponds to 4.8 % of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), and represents 19.6 % of Greece's gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019 (the RRF being 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). This is the fifth largest national allocation and the highest amount as a share of national GDP across the EU. The five-pillar Greek plan addresses the country's specific challenges, and also contributes to EU priorities such as the green transition and digital transformation, allocating 38.2 % and 21.6 % to the respective targets. Greece has so far received €18.2 billion (50.7 % of its total allocation) in the form of pre-financing (€4 billion), and four payments each for grants and loans. Another five disbursements for grants and loans (with the next one expected in spring 2025) are envisaged up to 2026 on fulfilment of the agreed milestones and targets, of which Greece has achieved 27 %. The European Parliament, which supported an EU recovery instrument from the start of the pandemic, is involved through a regular, structured dialogue with the European Commission and the Council, and is competent to scrutinise RRF implementation. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Third edition. The authors would like to thank Amalia Fumagalli, trainee in the Next Generation EU Monitoring Service, for her research assistance. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Following the United Kingdom's referendum on its European Union membership, in June 2016, and the UK's decision to leave the EU, a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) was signed between the EU and the UK, in 2020. The TCA, in force since 2021, provides the framework for relations between the EU and the UK. In 2025, the European Parliament will adopt – as it did in 2023 – a report on the implementation of the TCA, this time covering the period between January and December 2024. The report will follow the European Commission's presentation of its own implementation reports of 2024 and 2025. In August 2023, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) published a European Implementation Assessment (EIA) study on 'The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement two years on: Unpacking early evidence', analysing the early outcomes and benefits, risks and challenges in the TCA's implementation. The EIA supported the joint implementation report on the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement by the Committees on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and on International Trade (INTA) (2022/2188(INI)). Following the approval of the joint request from AFET and INTA to draft a second report evaluating the implementation of the EU-UK TCA (2024/2108(INI)), this briefing draws on and complements the findings of the EIA published in 2023. It provides an update of key developments, specifically on the work of the Partnership Council, the Trade Partnership Committee and specialised committees, EU-UK agri-food trade and a potential sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) agreement, the UK's possible accession to the PEM Convention, and mutual recognition of standards and qualifications. The briefing notes that, while the institutional structures established under the TCA are functioning and technical progress has been achieved, implementation remains uneven. Persistent tensions have been present in areas such as fisheries, SPS measures, rules of origin, labour mobility, and mutual recognition of qualifications. In the context of the upcoming review of the TCA in 2026, some committees have engaged in forward-looking discussions. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The European Union's relations with the world topped the agenda for the April 2025 plenary session, with several debates on statements by the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Kaja Kallas. These covered Russia's war crimes in Ukraine; safeguarding access to democratic media; the crackdown on democracy in Türkiye; the dramatic situation in Gaza; and targeted attacks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Members held a debate on the conclusions of the European Council meeting of 20 March 2025, and other debates on Council and Commission statements covered: the savings and investment union, recent legislative changes in Hungary, a European steel and metals action plan, and the new European internal security and preparedness union strategies. Members also heard statements on academic freedom; the European cultural compass; democratic pluralism and strengthened integrity, transparency and anti-corruption policies; the outcome of the recent COP16 biodiversity negotiations; post 2027 cohesion policy; an action plan on rare diseases; and health tourism. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Cooperation between countries to manage shared fish stocks is an international obligation. This is a particular challenge for the EU, which shares many of the fish stocks it exploits with third countries. If a third country does not cooperate in the management of a shared stock and decides unilaterally on its fishing opportunities, there is a risk of overfishing. The EU has adopted Regulation 1026/2012 to take measures against third countries that do not cooperate in the management of shared fish stocks. On 13 September 2024, the Commission presented a proposal to amend this regulation. The aim is to clarify the conditions under which a country is deemed to be non-cooperating, as well as the process before and after EU action. The updated regulation would give the EU a stronger tool to tackle unsustainable fishing practices. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The European Commission's ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, presented in March 2024, proposes to leverage over €800 billion in defence spending through national fiscal flexibility, a new €150 billion loan instrument (SAFE) for joint procurement, potential redirection of cohesion funds, and expanded European Investment Bank support. It also aims to mobilise private capital through the savings and investments union. ReArm Europe has sparked debate. While many welcome its ambition and the EU's growing role in defence, concerns remain about democratic oversight, defence market fragmentation, and economic sustainability. Alternative ideas, such as creating a new Rearmament Bank, or a Defence, Security and Resilience Bank, have gained traction. These could offer low-interest loans and risk guarantees to support European and allied defence investment. Experts caution that, while the ReArm Europe Plan is an important political signal, it must be followed by practical measures to ensure impact. They stress the need to pool procurement, prioritise European-made equipment, and build a more integrated defence industrial base. Others argue the plan should go further, including options for grant-based financing and more robust governance structures. The coming months will be crucial in determining whether ReArm Europe can deliver a truly coordinated and resilient European defence effort. During a March 2025 debate, the majority of political groups in the European Parliament voiced strong support for boosting Europe's defence, backing the ReArm Europe Plan while calling for a long-term strategy. Many urged enhanced strategic autonomy, secure access to resources, and continued aid to Ukraine. Concerns were raised over the sidelining of Parliament through use of Article 122 TFEU and the risk of over-reliance on emergency measures. Some warned that defence spending must not come at the expense of green, social, and R&D funding. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 18 March 2025, a law was adopted in Hungary restricting the freedom of assembly, by connecting it to a previous controversial law from 2021, which prohibited the public portrayal to children of 'divergence from self-identity corresponding to sex at birth, sex change or homosexuality'. Consequently, events such as Pride marches have been prohibited in the country. On 2 April 2025, Parliament will hold a debate on recent legislative changes introduced in Hungary, including this one, and their impact on fundamental rights. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This study introduces Members of the European Parliament to the different estimates of the level of error affecting EU expenditure in cohesion policy. It explains how the European Commission calculates the estimated ‘risk at payment’ and ‘risk at closure’, how the European Court of Auditors calculates the ‘estimated level of error’ and how the two methodologies differ. The conclusion provides guidance on interpreting the different estimates. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Based on its Treaties, the European Union (EU) has developed a multifaceted external action policy, and is seen as an important actor far beyond its borders. Through its institutions and Member States, the EU is active in international trade, humanitarian assistance, economic, financial, and technical and development cooperation, as well as through its common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and common security and defence policy (CSDP). Increasingly, the external dimension of internal EU policies has also grown, notably in the economic, climate, energy, migration and digital fields. The role of the European Parliament in the EU's external action has increased significantly since the 1990s, and especially after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). Although Parliament's powers remain relatively limited compared to other EU institutions involved in external action, especially with regard to CFSP and CSDP decision-making (which remain mostly intergovernmental), it nevertheless has considerable legislative, budgetary, agenda-setting and soft powers. Several of Parliament's powers cut across all policy areas. Notably, it proactively supports multilateralism and conducts extensive parliamentary diplomacy. Parliament contributes to policy framing through its debates, resolutions, recommendations, own-initiative reports and statements. It holds hearings, workshops, debates and organises missions. Members of the Parliament exercise scrutiny of the executive, by holding hearings of and posing questions to the European Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU's High Representative and the Council. Parliament co-legislates on financing the EU's external action and controls EU institutions' expenditure, including the EEAS, through the discharge procedure. The Parliament acts on an equal footing with the Council when adopting numerous acts in the fields of trade, development and humanitarian aid, and often external dimensions of internal policies. Since 2009, Parliament's consent to legally binding international agreements is mandated by the Treaties. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 11 February 2025, the European Commission adopted the first work programme (2025 CWP) of the von der Leyen II Commission. Building on the reports by Enrico Letta, Mario Draghi and Sauli Niinistö, and in line with the Commission President's political guidelines, the CWP places a strong emphasis on competitiveness, simplification and implementation, and preparedness. These will remain key horizontal priorities for the entire Commission mandate. In terms of structure, the CWP follows the seven headline ambitions put forward in the political guidelines and is accompanied by a communication on implementation and simplification. The work programme should be read in conjunction with two other recent Commission communications: the 'Competitiveness Compass' – itself a flagship initiative under the 2025 CWP, setting out a strategic long-term plan for rebooting Europe's competitiveness – and the communication on 'The road to the next multiannual financial framework' (MFF), which reflects on how to align the MFF with evolving needs and priorities. Annex I of the 2025 CWP puts forward 52 major new policy initiatives, over 40 % of which fall under the competitiveness headline ambition. Only 18 new initiatives are of a legislative nature, with a further one listed as 'legislative or non-legislative'. Fourteen of the legislative initiatives aim to revise existing legislation; 11 of these have a strong simplification dimension, and only nine are set to be supported by an impact assessment. The relatively low number of legislative files is not uncommon at the beginning of a new mandate, where (non-legislative) strategies, compasses, roadmaps and action plans lay out the new priorities. Several of them, such as the Competitiveness Compass and the Clean Industrial Deal, imply intense legislative activity in the years ahead. The annual plan of evaluations and fitness checks included in Annex II is a novelty – and a step towards increased transparency. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Este documento se integra en una serie de estudios que, desde una perspectiva de Derecho Comparado, tienen como objeto analizar el principio de protección del Medio Ambiente en diferentes ordenamientos jurídicos. Tras la explicación de la normativa y la jurisprudencia de aplicación, se examinan el contenido, los límites y la posible evolución de dicho concepto. El presente estudio tiene por objeto el caso de México. La protección del Medio Ambiente sano está consagrada en México a nivel constitucional como un auténtico derecho fundamental (artículo 4), a la vez que se contiene como un principio rector de la política pública, basado en el desarrollo integral y sustentable (artículo 25). Esta proyección bidimensional busca que el desarrollo nacional no sea en detrimento de la naturaleza. Fruto de los movimientos ambientalistas a nivel internacional de los años 70, el derecho a un Medio Ambiente sano, así como el principio rector como política pública de desarrollo integral y sustentable, han forjado progresivamente un amplio acervo normativo (a nivel nacional y en las treinta y dos entidades federativas), así como doctrinal y jurisprudencial, que reconoce al ambiente como merecedor de protección, tanto por su valor en sí mismo, como por la importancia que tiene para la vida humana y el desarrollo. Sin embargo, este derecho humano enfrenta actualmente múltiples desafíos en materia de acceso a la justicia y acceso a la información, así como retos impostergables derivados de la crisis climática, motivo por el cual se ve comprometido el efecto útil que puede tener el derecho al Medio Ambiente sano, tanto para las generaciones presentes como futuras. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Space holds promise for both economic prosperity and the attainment of strategic goals. The EU's future role in space is contingent on fast-changing geopolitical dynamics, which can range from peaceful cooperation to heightened competition or conflict among global powers. Given the importance of this subject, the European Commission has announced plans to propose an EU space act in the second quarter of 2025. This paper aims to describe the geopolitical context of space activities that affect the EU's current and future capabilities, with a specific focus on the use of space for security and defence and the response to space-related risks. Four distinct future scenarios present contextual conditions that may shape the EU's ambitions in space. The scenarios also highlight challenges and opportunities, while considering policy considerations for EU action. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This study, commissioned by the European Parliamentary Research Service at the request of the European Parliament's Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, examines the implementation and enforcement of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005, with particular focus on animal fitness for transport and data recording. It adopts a mixed-method approach, combining desk research, quantitative data analysis, and stakeholder consultations. The analysis indicates that key compliance challenges persist, especially in relation to journey conditions, documentation, and the transport of vulnerable animals such as unweaned calves and end-of-career animals. While some positive practices were observed, enforcement remains inconsistent, and notable shortcomings were identified, particularly concerning inspection procedures, documentation practices, and the assessment of animals' fitness for transport. The findings highlight the need for clearer regulatory definitions, improved coordination among authorities, and more harmonised inspection and data recording procedures. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Political decision-making frequently focuses on short-term impacts to satisfy current demands and ensure the electability of political representatives in office. Advocates of intergenerational fairness argue for a more balanced consideration of policy consequences, emphasising that long-term thinking is crucial to ensure that political choices made today do not negatively affect generations to come. There is a broad range of mechanisms that represent unborn future generations within contemporary spheres of influence such as courts, parliaments and citizen assemblies. Intergenerational fairness has recently secured itself a spot on the European Union's (EU) executive agenda with the inauguration of the post of Commissioner for Intergenerational Fairness, Youth, Culture and Sport, assigned to Glenn Micallef as part of the von der Leyen II College. His tasks for the present legislative term include developing a strategy for intergenerational fairness, to be published at the start of 2026, and institutionalising youth dialogues. The Commission's Joint Research Centre is presently organising stakeholder consultations on intergenerational fairness. Intergenerational fairness has risen to prominence in political discussions not only within the EU but also on an international scale. At the United Nations Summit of the Future in September 2024, delegates adopted a Declaration on the Rights of Future Generations. The phase-out of fossil fuels featured on the summit agenda, raising questions at the nexus of intergenerational fairness and climate change. Judicial institutions have addressed similar topics, with calls for intergenerational fairness being increasingly prominent in climate litigation. In light of these developments, this briefing will focus on mechanisms for implementing intergenerational fairness within the EU's institutional framework in the context of climate change. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The US Trump administration has set its sights on Ukraine's vast mineral resources, and proposed a deal: to secure a portion of Ukraine's rare earths in exchange for US support in the war against the Russian aggressor. Ukraine is a candidate for EU membership, and an earlier 2021 strategic partnership means the EU also has a stake in the future of Ukraine's mineral sector. This briefing analyses the US and EU positions, to shed light on the potential future of rare earth mining in Ukraine. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

During Parliament's April plenary session, a debate will address the planned European oceans pact. This initiative should serve as a model for sustainable ocean governance, and enhance the coherence of EU oceans policy. The European Commission intends to introduce the pact at the third UN Ocean Conference in June 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

During its April 2025 plenary session, the European Parliament is expected to adopt its position on a package of three proposals aimed at making safety assessments of chemicals faster, simpler and more transparent by optimising the work of EU agencies involved and creating a common data platform on chemicals. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The latest annual report from the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU external action to promote human rights and democracy covers 2023. It highlights a worsening environment marked by multiple crises and conflicts, growing social inequalities, and increasing pressure on multilateral governance and rules-based international cooperation. During its April plenary session, the European Parliament is due to vote on its own yearly resolution on human rights and democracy in the world, responding to the High Representative's report and recommending future EU action. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

With the geopolitical situation evolving rapidly in the first months of 2025, EU leaders had already convened three times in advance of their regular March meeting. Next to competitiveness – originally due to be the central focus point – the spring European Council meeting covered issues including Ukraine, the Middle East and European defence. On competitiveness, the EU-27 outlined precise directions to accelerate the EU's economic agenda, focusing on three priorities: cutting red tape, ensuring affordable energy and turning savings into investments. Following Hungary's renewed refusal to agree to conclusions on Ukraine, a separate statement, 'firmly supported by 26 Heads of State or Government', was published, emphasising the EU's commitment to provide further comprehensive support to Ukraine and to contribute to security guarantees. As European Council President António Costa intended, the meeting concluded in one day. It started with the customary speech by Parliament's President, Roberta Metsola, who told EU leaders that Europe had 'thrived on soft power' for decades, but with the global order now changing, 'Europe must position itself as a force to be reckoned with'. This requires 'getting serious about our security, our readiness and our competitiveness'. There was a working lunch with United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, and an exchange of views with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. In the afternoon, a Euro Summit in inclusive format took place in the presence of European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde and Eurogroup President Paschal Donohoe. Over dinner, EU leaders held a first discussion on the next long-term EU budget and own resources. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This briefing has been prepared for the public hearing with the Chair of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), Claudia Buch, scheduled for 27 March 2025 in the ECON Committee. The previous hearing took place on 18 November 2024. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP