This digest provides a collection of documents prepared by the academia, think tanks, other EU institutions and bodies, as well as stakeholders that can be useful for Members of the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets to stay informed about the debate concerning the next Multiannual Financial Framework, starting in 2028. The document is produced monthly by the Budgetary Support Unit of DG BUDG and the European . Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The 2027 annual EU budget will be the last one under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), which covers the period from 2021 to 2027. The European Parliament is contributing to the preparation of next year's budget through a set of guidelines, and the Commission will adopt the draft 2027 budget in early summer. The draft guidelines, as adopted by the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) on 5 March 2026, express Parliament's commitment to deliver for people, the economy and the planet. Parliament is due to vote on its guidelines during its March I plenary session. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This EPRS paper analyses how the European Commission is delivering on the policy agenda set by its President, Ursula von der Leyen, and her College of Commissioners since taking office in December 2024. It provides an initial assessment of the delivery of the agenda's seven priorities as of spring 2026. The von der Leyen II Commission has set seven priorities – different from the six priorities of her first mandate. It has so far announced close to 400 initiatives. Half of these initiatives fall under the first priority, on prosperity and competitiveness; one in eight under the second, on defence and security; and one in 10 under the third, on social fairness. The remaining initiatives fall under the other four priorities. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing provides an overview of the economic, financial, and monetary implications of US tariffs for the EU over the past year, as of the cut-off date of 25 February 2026. Given the high level of uncertainty, the analysis presented assumes a continued implementation of the EU-US framework agreement. The briefing and the analysis presented were prepared prior to the recent U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on Iran, and therefore do not take into account any subsequent market volatility or change in the underlying assumptions. This briefing updates a previous one. The first part of the briefing outlines recent developments, including the EU-US trade deal, the 20 February 2026 US Supreme Court ruling on the legality of the imposed tariffs by the US President, and the EU’s countermeasure toolkit. The second part analyses the impact on the EU economy across sectors and Member States, financial markets and monetary policy challenges. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Portugal is set to receive €21.9 billion in grants and loans from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the EU response to the crisis triggered by the COVID 19 pandemic. This amount corresponds to 2.9 % of the entire RRF, or 10.2 % of Portugal's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP), and includes RRF grants (€15.5 billion), RRF loans (€5.6 billion), REPowerEU grants (€0.7 billion) and Portugal's share (€0.1 billion) from the Brexit Adjustment Reserve. This is the result of the latest revision of Portugal's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP), approved in December 2025, which reduced the loan allocation by €0.3 billion. The plan has a strong focus on the country's social, economic and environmental resilience, with measures targeting culture, housing, health, broad social responses, and forest and water management. According to European Commission estimates, Portugal's plan is set to produce direct effects on value added of around €17 billion. Other Member States' NRRPs are expected to add another €2 billion in indirect spillover effects. Measures relating to climate transition, including those on industry decarbonisation and energy efficiency of buildings, account for 37.3 % of the allocation. The contribution to digital objectives represents 22.8 % of the allocation (excluding the REPowerEU chapter), with measures and reforms aimed at public administration and finances, education and businesses. Portugal has so far received €14.9 billion of RRF resources (68.1 % of the plan) in the form of pre-financing and eight grant and loan payments. The total disbursements sit below the EU average of 68.6 %. The European Parliament has been a major supporter of creating a common EU recovery instrument, and takes part in interinstitutional settings to cooperate, discuss and scrutinise implementation of the Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fifth edition. The first two editions were written by Henrique Morgado Simões. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. The author would like to thank Ana Luisa Melo Almeida, policy analyst in the Next Generation EU Monitoring Service, for her research assistance. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The EU has made closing the gender gap in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) a priority in its education, research and employment policies. This answers to legal requirements to pursue gender equality through any EU action, as well as to practical imperatives to address a shortage of specialists that limits the EU's ability to compete in the global technological race. Moreover, existing data show that many young women today have strong maths and science skills but are still largely absent from careers in engineering and information and communications technology (ICT). Research shows that the under-representation of women in STEM has many causes, including: unwelcoming work environments in STEM jobs, family caring responsibilities, and social norms that discourage girls from pursuing these fields. Tackling these issues requires a combined approach including: challenging rigid gender stereotypes, using gender-sensitive teaching methods in schools, encouraging girls to choose STEM careers, and removing barriers to employment. The EU pursues gender equality as a cross-cutting priority in various policies that cover STEM, and has adopted specific initiatives to promote women in STEM. In education, it uses a range of measures to support women at all levels, from schools to universities. In research, EU funding now depends on programmes promoting gender equality. In employment, EU laws help remove obstacles that might put women off STEM careers. The EU also funds projects that support women's innovation, entrepreneurship, networking and mentoring. The European Parliament strongly backs these efforts, and has called for wider action by the EU and its Member States. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

New digital technologies are a mixed blessing for women's rights and representation in the information sphere in general, and in the democratic debate in particular. Innovative digital tools often promise to make public debates more inclusive, for women too. In practice, recent AI-enabled technology – including deepfake tools – appears to facilitate an increasingly hostile information environment for women, with repercussions for their democratic participation both online and offline. At the same time, the ongoing global wave of autocratisation goes hand in hand with a backlash against women's rights and gender equality. Authoritarian regimes have strategic reasons for suppressing women, and often use gendered disinformation to undermine women opposition leaders, as well as to erode confidence in democratic values and rights. In the European Union, equality between men and women is a fundamental right and a founding value enshrined in the Treaties. Over the past decades, the EU has worked to increase gender equality at home, and used its global influence to support women's rights abroad. At the same time, its evolving digital regulatory framework aims to make the digital space safe for all, including by protecting the rights of women online. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

On 16 July 2025, the European Commission adopted its proposal for the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF), which was completed on 3 September with the adoption of a second package. The own resources part of the proposal is intended to equip the EU with a diversified revenue stream and sufficient means for delivering on EU priorities, as well as for the repayment of the debt created by Next Generation EU. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

In February 2026, two and a half years after the European Commission's proposal, trilogues started on a new regulation on the production and marketing of plant reproductive material (PRM). The proposal, put forward on 5 July 2023, would replace 10 of the 12 PRM directives that currently lay down the rules for seeds, tubers, cuttings, seedlings and young plants. It would introduce sustainability requirements for registering new varieties of agricultural plants, vegetables and fruits intended for professional users, while PRM intended for amateur gardeners and conservation organisations – such as seed banks – would be exempt from many of the requirements. There would be less stringent conditions for registering conservation varieties, and the exchange of seed in kind between farmers would be allowed in small quantities. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

At a time of geopolitical instability, merit-based enlargement is seen as one of the EU's strongest foreign-policy and geopolitical tools and a key driver of long-term security, peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. A plenary debate on Parliament's report on the EU's enlargement strategy is due to be held in March 2026. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

During the March I part-session, Parliament will vote to conclude its first reading on legislation to amend the Package Travel Directive. The proposed amendments reflect a deal struck in interinstitutional negotiations in December 2025. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Access to affordable, sustainable and good-quality housing has become one of the EU's most pressing problems. While housing remains a competence of Member States, regions and cities, the EU has started developing a response to support their action. The European Commission outlined its approach in its December 2025 affordable housing plan. The European Parliament is putting forward its recommendations on funding, permitting and construction sector issues, in an own-initiative report to be voted during the March I plenary session. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

During the March I plenary session, the European Parliament is set to vote on a new interinstitutional agreement on its relations with the European Commission. The new framework agreement would reinforce Parliament's position, in particular with regard to its scrutiny powers, including in the area of international agreements. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has laid bare the challenges facing the EU's defence industry as it tries to meet increased demand and ramp up production in the wake of a fundamentally changed security environment in Europe. The EU's defence industry comprises a number of large multinational companies, mid-caps and a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. It faces a multitude of challenges, such as decades of under-investment, fragmentation, insufficient critical raw material and semiconductor supplies, and a lack of manufacturing capacity. The EU and its Member States have taken several steps to reinforce the European defence industry, especially since the start of Russia's war against Ukraine. Member States have boosted their defence budgets, with their combined total estimated to have reached €381 billion in 2025. The European Defence Fund is investing in research and capability development projects and has achieved very positive results so far. Permanent structured cooperation provides the legal framework and binding commitments for progress in collaborative defence. The EU has also broken taboos by agreeing on a joint defence procurement instrument and an initiative to build up ammunition production. These form part of a three-track proposal to support Ukraine's needs for ammunition (deliver ammunition from existing stocks, jointly procure from industry and support the ramping up of production). In March 2024, the European Commission proposed the first-ever European defence industrial strategy, and the defence industry programme to implement it was formally adopted in December 2025. In 2025, the EU also put forward the white paper for European defence readiness 2030, the ReArm Europe plan (including the SAFE instrument), the defence omnibus packages, and the European defence industry transformation roadmap. Additionally, the European Peace Facility, best known for facilitating lethal weapon supply to Ukraine, is being used to procure defence materiel from the EU's defence industry, further boosting its capacity. The European Chips Act and Critical Raw Materials Act are also expected to benefit the European defence industry by ensuring it has the necessary supplies to tackle the substantially increased demand for its products. These signals have led the industry to take the first steps to increase production capacity. This updates a previous edition, published in 2024. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Under the EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the core of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument, Malta is set to receive a total contribution of €328.2 million, corresponding to 2.3 % of its 2019 gross domestic product (GDP) – less than the average for the EU overall (the RRF equals 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). However, while in nominal terms Malta has the second smallest allocation, it ranks higher in terms of RRF grants per capita. The total financial contribution reflects several revisions of Malta's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP). The July 2023 amendment, which added a new REPowerEU chapter, included an additional grant allocation of €30 million and the transfer of part of Malta's allocation under the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to its plan (€40 million). In the latest amendment of 12 December 2025, the resources devoted to the energy-focused REPowerEU chapter were adjusted from €69.9 million to €74.5 million following the addition of an investment relating to the renovation and greening of private sector buildings. This adjustment reflects a reallocation of resources within the plan and does not increase its overall financial envelope. To date, Malta has received pre-financing (including REPowerEU) and three regular payments. The total disbursements stand at €215 million, or 65.5 % of its allocation (the EU average is 68.4 %). So far, 58.9 % of all milestones and targets have been fulfilled, compared with the EU average of 51 %. The Maltese NRRP takes account of the Council's 2019 and 2020 country-specific recommendations, and aligns with both national economic and investment plans and funding under EU cohesion policy programmes for the 2021-2027 period. The plan's overall objective is to contribute to sustainable, equitable, green and digital recovery, embracing major common EU challenges. The amended plan has a stronger focus on the green transition, devoting 62 % of the funds to it (up from 53.8 % in the original plan, yet down seven percentage points from the latest revision), making Malta's NRRP one of the greenest; 26.9 % of the amended plan, or 34.8 % (excluding the REPowerEU chapter), will contribute to the digital target. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on the implementation of the RRF and scrutinises the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Seventh edition. Earlier versions were written by Velina Lilyanova. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Food contact materials (FCMs) include all materials that come into physical contact with food during its production, processing, packaging and storage. They contain thousands of chemicals, some of which can migrate into food, especially at high temperatures, during long contact times or with certain food types. Scientific evidence shows that such migration is common and may contribute to human exposure to hazardous substances, including endocrine disruptors, carcinogens and reproductive toxicants. Well-known examples include phthalates, bisphenols and PFAS, which remain authorised in some applications despite links to adverse health effects. Current risk assessments often consider substances individually and may underestimate combined or cumulative exposure. The EU's core legislation is Regulation (EC) 1935/2004, which sets out general safety and labelling rules, supported by the Good Manufacturing Practice Regulation (EC) 2023/2006. However, only four material types – plastics, ceramics, regenerated cellulose film and active/intelligent materials – are subject to fully harmonised EU rules. The remaining materials (paper, inks, coatings, rubber, metal, etc.) rely mostly on national rules, leading to regulatory fragmentation, uneven safety standards and unclear requirements for industry. In addition, existing rules focus largely on known intentionally added substances, while non intentionally added substances (NIAS), impurities and degradation products remain insufficiently addressed. A 2022 Commission evaluation found the framework only partially effective, with gaps in enforcement, control of NIAS and harmonisation. The Commission has recently reiterated its commitment to further harmonising EU legislation on FCMs. The European Parliament has pushed for stronger rules, contributing to recent EU wide bans on BPA and PFAS in food packaging. Citizens and stakeholders broadly support a comprehensive revision establishing clearer standards, harmonised testing and stronger consumer protection. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Despite strong political commitments to gender equality at EU and national level, women still remain politically under-represented at all levels of political power. In the European Parliament, as well as in national parliaments, governments and local assemblies, their share most often is under the symbolic 40 % mark. Moreover, after successive electoral cycles in which women's share in representative assemblies had increased, this trend has slowed down or come to a halt. Progress has also been uneven among Member States, with women remaining markedly under-represented in some Member States. Gender-balanced political representation is not only important for women and female politicians but also for political parties themselves and the rest of society. It increases trust in the political system and strengthens economic and political governance. The EU has committed to achieving gender balance in political representation and participation in the EU; however, except for the European elections, its powers in the area remain limited mainly to soft action. It can support the specific actions to be taken by the EU institutions, national governments, political parties, civil society and the media, by issuing recommendations, facilitating the exchange of good practice or funding projects. There is substantial evidence of the obstacles to women's political participation and the means to overcome it. This picture is nevertheless not static, as new challenges emerge, particularly from mounting opposition to gender equality, as well as from digital technologies, most recently artificial intelligence, which can both empower women and discourage them. This updates a March 2024 briefing by Ionel Zamfir. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Petition 0445/2025 on the closure of a nuclear power plant in Almaraz, Spain Petition 0819/2024 and Petition 1334/2024 concerning the environmental damage to Cabañeros National Park resulting from the ban on the hunting of ungulates Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study was prepared at the request of the European Parliament’s Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). It analyses the European Commission’s Digital Omnibus package proposals published on 19 November 2025, distinguishing administrative simplification from more substantive recalibration of safeguards across data, privacy, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence areas. The study highlights key areas of controversy (legal certainty, enforcement capacity, and impacts on rights) and sets out areas for consideration for parliamentary scrutiny. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study was prepared at the request of the European Parliament’s Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). It analyses the European Commission’s Digital Omnibus package proposals published on 19 November 2025, distinguishing administrative simplification from more substantive recalibration of safeguards across data, privacy, cybersecurity and artificial intelligence areas. The study highlights key areas of controversy (legal certainty, enforcement capacity, and impacts on rights) and sets out areas for consideration for parliamentary scrutiny. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Academic freedom is widely recognised as a fundamental value of contemporary higher education and research, and as a prerequisite for well-functioning democratic societies. However, in recent years, major concerns have been expressed by various stakeholders about the state of academic freedom in the European Union. The European Parliament annual Academic Freedom Monitor aims to improve the promotion and protection of academic freedom in the European Union. The 2025 edition is organised in two parts. The first part consists of an update of existing measures of academic freedom in all EU Member States, an updated overview of public debate and studies of the state of academic freedom in four selected EU Member States, and an examination of the EU's state of academic freedom in a global context. The second part contains a thematic analysis of the potential impact of selected trends in academic freedom within the EU, namely political polarisation, recent developments in the US higher education and research system, the commercialisation of academia, and foreign interference. Furthermore, EU-level policy options are proposed for possible legislative and non-legislative initiatives to enhance the support for academic freedom in the EU Member States. ITRE, CULT, EUDS, AFET EEAS EC: DG RTD, DG EAC Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This paper assesses the ECB’s monetary policy stance and communication amid declining inflation, persistent uncertainty, and renewed external risks. It documents how trade-policy shocks and global spillovers affect inflation surprises, highlights substantial cross-country inflation heterogeneity within the euro area, and shows that common shocks generate uneven national responses. Using a novel multi-agent LLM framework, it evaluates ECB communication, revealing strengths during active policy adjustments but gaps in addressing inflation dispersion and uncertainty communication. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 26 February 2026. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Rare diseases, which are defined as conditions that affect fewer than 1 in 2 000 individuals, affect around 36 million people in the European Union. Despite existing measures at the EU, national, regional and local levels, there remain significant gaps in research and knowledge as well as variations in access and treatment. This study investigates possible measures that could be taken at EU level to address these challenges. It finds significant European added value in harmonising coordination and access across the 27 Member States, mainly in terms of improved diagnostic tools and availability of medical treatment, better health outcomes, particularly lower infant mortality, and improved well-being of family members and caregivers. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

In December 2025, the European Commission published a communication entitled Strengthening EU economic security as a follow-up to its 2023 economic security strategy. Economic developments – whether related to trade, investment or industry – are increasingly viewed through the lens of security. From a foresight perspective, this development can be analysed as the result of three overlapping and partly reinforcing trends. The first is the weakening of a value-based approach to the economy, as exemplified by fair trade agreements and the EU Green Deal. The second is the rise of geo-economics, which places the interests of countries and regional blocks at the forefront, increasing the need for mitigating policies such as economic security. The third is the growing interaction between defence policy and economic policy, with military security influencing economic decisions and the defence sector growing in importance in the EU economy. This briefing argues that these combined trends are transforming the EU's economic policy and economy, and that the growing prominence of security as a guiding principle of economic and trade policies is bringing the question of EU strategic autonomy back to the centre of EU policy. Although the increasing importance of economic and defence security appears to be mutually reinforcing, with both trends potentially enhancing EU strategic autonomy, synergy between them is not a given. The raw materials and finances needed to reinforce the EU defence industrial base require a strong and open economy. However, concerns about foreign influence require economic decoupling from certain countries (e.g. Russia) and de-risking from others (e.g. China). Moreover, the EU faces unexpectedly difficult choices in its relations with the United States (US), where its dependence on US support in defence and security reduces its capacity to act independently as an economic player and rule-maker. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This paper examines the persistent upward bias in euro area households’ inflation perceptions and expectations, even when realized inflation is near the ECB’s target. It discusses behavioural and informational drivers of this bias, its implications for consumption, wage setting, and monetary policy transmission, and the challenges it poses for ECB communication and credibility. The study concludes that improved monitoring and household-oriented communication are essential. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 26 February 2026. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This study, undertaken by Ecocentric, evaluates Malta’s implementation of EU Directive 2002/49/EC on the assessment and management of environmental noise. It evaluates the reasons for the several complaints about noise pollution in Malta and provides suggestions to overcome these. The study has been commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee of Petitions and managed by the Policy Department for Citizens, Equality and Culture. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The European Investment Bank (EIB), part of the European Investment Bank Group (EIB Group) - which also includes the European Investment Fund, plays a central role in advancing the European Union’s investment agenda, combining substantial financing capacity with close strategic alignment to EU policy objectives. In 2025, the EIB Group achieved record levels of financing (EUR 100 billion of new financing), with particularly strong performance in climate action, energy security and economic, social and territorial cohesion. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Makis Keravnos, Minister for Finance of Cyprus, is participating in the ECON Committee in his capacity of President of the ECOFIN Council during the Cyprus Presidency (January - June 2026). According to Article 121 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, “Member States shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern and shall coordinate them within the Council”. This document provides an overview of the Cyprus Presidency's priorities in ECON matters, including the Council’s work relating to the implementation of the European Semester for economic coordination, the application of the Recovery and Resilience Facility and other policy streams relevant to the EU single market, notably progress on the Savings and Investments Union. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The EU’s Eastern Partnership policy, established in 2009, links the EU with six post-Soviet states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The policy supports political, social and economic reforms in these countries to strengthen democracy and good governance, energy security, environmental protection and economic and social development. Moldova and Ukraine have made the most progress, having been granted EU candidate country status in 2022. This was followed by the European Council’s decision on 14 December 2023 to open accession negotiations with them. On 24 and 25 June 2024 the EU held the first Intergovernmental Conference at ministerial level to officially open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, but the formal opening of negotiating clusters is still pending as of January 2026. Belarus, by contrast, remains under authoritarian rule and faces EU sanctions for human rights violations and support for Russia’s war against Ukraine. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This paper analyses divergences between actual, perceived and expected inflation in the euro area over the 2020-25 period. It identifies substantial inertia in both inflation perceptions and expectations, leading to cyclical biases over the inflation cycle. The analysis shows that expectations are more stable and more closely associated with economic decision-relevant beliefs than perceptions. These dynamics are linked to wage adjustment patterns and the distributional effects of inflation, while trust in the ECB remained broadly stable throughout the period. This document was provided by the Economic Governance and EMU Scrutiny Unit at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) ahead of the Monetary Dialogue with the ECB President on 26 February 2026. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin has been President of the Russian Federation since 31 December 1999, except for a brief four-year interlude from 2008 to 2012 during which he held the office of prime minister but effectively maintained his political authority. During Putin's 26-year rule, Russia has been at war, overtly or covertly, for 21 years. Putin's first term coincided with the launching of the Second Chechen War, intended to be brief but which lasted for 10 violent years. In 2014, during Putin's third term, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea, and the initially covert support to the separatist forces in eastern Ukraine gradually became overt, leading up to the full-scale invasion of February 2022. Overlapping with these two armed conflicts, the Russo-Georgian War took place in 2008, and since 2015 Russia has deployed military forces in Syria. Russian paramilitary groups have also expanded operations in Africa. The transformation of Russia over these 26 years has been fundamental. A series of indicators can help measure its economic evolution, the surge in military expenditure, its demographic decline, the worsening of various freedom and governance rankings, and growing inequality. In a shift towards the east, China has become, by far, Russia's main trading partner, providing it with a crucial economic and diplomatic lifeline since 2022. Putin, now 73 years old, was proclaimed President of the Russian Federation for his fifth term in 2024, after obtaining over 88 % of the votes in what was broadly seen as yet another ritual electoral performance. In line with the constitutional reforms introduced in 2020, he can remain in power until 2036. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Minors — under the age of 18 — may migrate in many different ways, through family reunification, moving in the hope of finding a better life, or through forced and traumatic migration caused by conflict, poverty or climate change. Overall, the number of minors in migration has been rising globally since the turn of the century. In 2020, there were an estimated 35.5 million international migrant minors globally, the largest number ever recorded. This is equivalent to around 1 in 66 minors worldwide living outside their country of birth. This infographic focuses exclusively on forced and irregular movements of migrant minors to the European Union. Eurostat figures show that, on 1 January 2024 around 7.5 million minors in the EU were not citizens of their country of residence. However, age assessment of migrants remains a critical challenge, as a significant number arrive without reliable identification documents to verify their claimed age. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The EU’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean are multifaceted and conducted at different levels. Guided by the New Agenda for Relations between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean, the EU seeks to strengthen and modernise the bi-regional strategic partnership. The EU interacts with the entire region through summits with the heads of state and government and through parliamentary diplomacy, while agreements and political dialogue bind the EU and the Caribbean, Central America, the Andean Community, Mercosur and individual countries. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP