This study examines how structural labour market inequalities affect women’s mental health in the EU. It highlights the gender pay and pension gaps and new forms of work as drivers of poorer well-being among women. The study identifies fragmented policy responses and recommends coordinated, gender-responsive action across labour, health and gender equality domains. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Portugal is set to receive €22.2 billion in grants and loans from the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the EU response to the crisis triggered by the COVID 19 pandemic. This amount corresponds to 3.1 % of the entire RRF, or 10.4 % of Portugal's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP), and includes RRF grants (€15.5 billion), RRF loans (€5.9 billion), REPowerEU grants (€0.7 billion) and Portugal's share (€0.1 billion) from the Brexit Adjustment Reserve. The Council approved the latest revision of Portugal's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) in May 2025. The plan has a strong focus on the country's social, economic and environmental resilience, with measures targeting culture, housing, health, broad social responses, and forest and water management. Measures relating to climate transition, including those on industry decarbonisation and energy efficiency of buildings, account for 39.1 % of the allocation. The contribution to digital objectives represents 21.7 % of the allocation, with measures and reforms aimed at public administration and finances, education and businesses. Portugal has so far received €12.7 billion of RRF resources (57.3 % of the plan), which the European Commission disbursed in the form of pre-financing and six grant and loan instalments. Portugal's seventh payment request is being assessed. In the context of the 2025 European Semester, the Council has recommended that Portugal accelerate implementation of its plan. The European Parliament has been a major supporter of creating a common EU recovery instrument, and takes part in interinstitutional settings to cooperate, discuss and scrutinise implementation of the Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fourth edition. The first two editions were written by Henrique Morgado Simões. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. The author would like to thank Amalia Fumagalli, trainee in the Next Generation EU Monitoring Service, for her research assistance. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The gender pay gap persists globally and in the European Union, and progress in reducing it is slow. To accelerate the realisation of the principle of 'equal pay for work of equal value', the United Nations marked the first International Day for Equal Pay on 18 September 2020. This year marks its sixth edition. This is an update of an 'At a glance' note from September 2022. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This infographic provides insight into the economic performance of the United States (US) compared with the European Union (EU) and examines the trade dynamics between them. In 2024, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate for the US was recorded at 2.8%, while the EU experienced a growth rate of 1.1%. Both inflation rates remain stable and show a declining trend compared to the years following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the start of the war in Ukraine. The inflation rate in the US was slightly higher than that in the EU. Trade between the US and the EU continues to grow, except for EU imports of goods from the US, which have been in a declining phase since 2022. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The highlight of the September 2025 session was the debate on the State of the Union, following Ursula von der Leyen's first address under her current mandate as President of the European Commission. Another important debate took place to express Parliament's solidarity with Poland following Russia's deliberate violation of Polish airspace, added to the agenda in reaction to drone attacks the previous day. Maia Sandu, President of the Republic of Moldova addressed Parliament in a formal sitting. On external policy, Members debated: EU action to ensure security guarantees and a just peace for Ukraine; the situation in Gaza; strengthening Moldova's resilience against Russian hybrid threats and malign interference; the violence against protesters in Serbia; and the situation in Colombia following recent terrorist attacks. Among other debates were: implementation of the recent EU-United States trade deal; the need for a strong European Democracy Shield to enhance democracy, protect the EU from foreign interference and hybrid threats, and protect electoral processes in the EU; serious threats to aviation and maritime transport from global navigation satellite system interference; the rule of law and management of EU funds in Slovakia; and the devastating wildfires in southern Europe and summer of heatwaves in the EU. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The Delegated Act on low-carbon hydrogen establishes a harmonised, transparent framework, defining fuels in a technology-open way. It is essential for a functioning hydrogen market but does not create demand or financial incentives. Achieving emissions reduction targets will hinge on robust methane emissions measurement and reporting. Costs will remain above unabated hydrogen, shaped mainly by natural gas and electricity prices. This in-depth analysis was provided by the Policy Department for Transformation, Innovation and Health at the request of the ITRE Committee. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Although euthanasia and assisted dying remain highly controversial in large parts of the globe, an increasing number of countries have legislation on it in place or are considering doing so. This is due to changing attitudes, advancements in medical technology and an ageing population. Several EU countries are at the forefront of these legal changes; at the same time, each of them has come up with its own solutions for addressing challenges such as how to avoid abuse. Neither EU law nor the European Convention on Human Rights contain provisions precluding EU countries from legislating on euthanasia. In response to questions from Members of the European Parliament, the European Commission has made it clear the EU is not competent to deal with the issue in any way. Four EU countries – Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – have legislation in force that allows euthanasia to be administered by a physician. Germany, Italy and Austria allow assisted suicide only. The Netherlands and Belgium, the two EU countries that were the first to allow euthanasia, have seen an increasing number of people apply for euthanasia over the years, with studies showing no sign of the legislation leading to any abuse. In addition, several EU countries are working on legislation on euthanasia or assisted dying. These include: Ireland, France, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia. The Portuguese parliament adopted relevant legislation back in 2023; however, owing to vetoes by the Portuguese president and rulings by the country's constitutional court, it has still not entered into force. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The Data Act aims to create value from data generated by connected products and services, by introducing data-sharing obligations. The principles enshrined in the Act have received general approval, but concerns have been expressed about the clarity of certain definitions, the sharing of commercially sensitive data and its regulatory complexity. Most provisions of the Data Act will apply from 12 September 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Surveys show that discrimination based on characteristics such as sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation persists across the European Union (EU). The concept of multiple discrimination recognises that, in their daily lives, people may experience discrimination on more than one of these grounds. It encompasses cases where each type of discrimination can be proven and addressed distinctly (cumulative discrimination) and cases where two or more grounds interact to create a unique form of discrimination that cannot be understood by considering each ground in isolation (intersectional discrimination). Recognising and addressing these forms of multiple discrimination is an important aspect of combating discrimination through legal and policy tools, since victims face exacerbated disadvantages but are afforded uneven protection due to gaps in current legislation. Current national legislation and/or case law on multiple discrimination provides varying degrees of recognition and protection to victims. Most Member States recognise multiple discrimination implicitly, but few have introduced specific provisions. Only two have so far given full recognition in law to intersectional discrimination as distinct from cumulative discrimination. While the Treaties give the EU competence to introduce legislation to combat discrimination, the protection afforded by current EU equality directives remains incomplete. A proposed 'horizontal anti-discrimination directive' that could define the concept of discrimination on multiple grounds has stalled. However, progress has been made with the adoption of the Directive on Pay Transparency, which recognises intersectional discrimination explicitly in relation to sex discrimination in employment. Implementation of this directive will provide a useful testing ground. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Drawing on previously untapped archival sources, this study explores the European Parliament's positions on the fundamental changes in the Soviet Union between March 1985 and December 1991. The study demonstrates how the European Parliament's initiatives, including relations with Soviet representatives, advanced Parliament's foreign policy goals at the end of the Cold War. These goals included promoting European Community positions through political pressure and informal negotiations, fighting for human rights in the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist bloc, opposing the occupation of the Baltic States and encouraging democratic changes inside the Soviet Union, particularly the transformation of its parliamentary body. Members of the European Parliament prioritised supporting the democratic transition in Central and Eastern European countries, liberated from communist rule and the collapsing Soviet empire. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This document is part of a series of Comparative Law studies that analyze the principle of environmental protection in different legal orders around the world. After a brief historic introduction and a presentation of applicable legislation and case law, the content, limits and possible evolution of this principle are examined. The subject of this study is Canada’s federal legal system. While a “principle of environmental protection” does not appear in the text of Canada’s constitutional documents, a large number of laws at the federal, provincial and territorial levels have as their purpose the protection of the environment, and the importance of this objective has been judicially recognized. The legal framework of environmental protection has been shaped by the constraints that federalism imposes on each level of government — especially on the federal Parliament; these constraints influence both the form and the content of environmental legislation. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Ireland's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) has the fourth smallest allocation in absolute figures under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Following the European Commission's 2022 update of national allocations, the initial €989 million allocation was adjusted to €914.4 million in grants, to be disbursed in five instalments. In 2024, Ireland introduced in its plan a new REPowerEU chapter to accelerate the green transition; this, once approved by the Council, brought Ireland's new total to €1 153.8 million in grants. The latest update due to objective circumstances was approved in July 2025. Ireland has received two payments worth €439.3 million. Relative to the size of its economy, Ireland's RRF grants are not large: around 0.3 % of the country's 2019 gross domestic product (GDP), while the total RRF amounts to 5.2 % of 2019 EU 27 GDP. Given also that spending is spread over the years up to 2026, the RRF is not expected to have a significant direct impact on Ireland's key macroeconomic indicators. The Commission estimates that it could increase Ireland's GDP by 0.1 % by 2026. А more significant indirect impact is expected from the overall boost to the EU economy and the associated cross-border spillover effects. The plan's overall objective is to contribute to a sustainable, equitable, green and digital recovery. It complements the government's broader domestic efforts under the economic recovery plan, underpinned by the national development plan (NDP) of €165 billion, for 2021 to 2030. Although the RRF allocation amounts to less than 1 % of the total NDP investment, the plan's 19 investments and 10 reforms focus on strategic EU priorities. The Irish NRRP allocates 50.2 % of funding to climate-related measures (boosted by REPowerEU) and, excluding REPowerEU, 34.2 % to digital measures. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on the implementation of the RRF, and scrutinises the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Fifth edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Malta's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) had an initial value of €344.9 million, while its amended plan is worth €336.3 million. Under the EU's Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), at the core of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) instrument, Malta's RRF grant allocation decreased from €316.4 million to €258.3 million. In April 2023, Malta submitted a request to amend its NRRP, to which it added a new REPowerEU chapter with an additional grant allocation of €30 million. It also requested to transfer a portion of its share of the Brexit Adjustment Reserve to its plan (€40 million). With these funds, and cutting some measures, the overall EU financial contribution to the amended plan amounts to €328.2 million in grants, with the rest to be covered by national means. A 2025 revision of the plan did not affect the total allocation. While in nominal terms, Malta has the second smallest allocation, it ranks higher in terms of RRF grants per capita. The value of Malta's grants under the RRF equals about 2.3 % of its 2019 gross domestic product (GDP), less than the average for the EU overall (the RRF equals 5.2 % of EU-27 GDP in 2019). So far, Malta has received pre-financing (including REPowerEU) and three regular payments. The total disbursements stand at €215 million, or 65.5 % of its allocation (the EU average is 55.6 %). The plan takes account of the Council's 2019 and 2020 country-specific recommendations, and aligns with both national economic and investment plans and funding under EU cohesion policy programmes for the 2021-2027 period. The plan's overall objective is to contribute to sustainable, equitable, green and digital recovery, embracing major common EU challenges. The amended plan has a stronger focus on the green transition, devoting 68.8 % of the funds to it (up from 53.8 % in the original plan), making Malta's NRRP one of the greenest; 26.2 % of the amended plan (excluding the REPowerEU chapter), or 20.6 % (including the chapter), will contribute to the digital target. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on the implementation of the RRF, and scrutinises the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Sixth edition. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Military mobility, defined as the capacity of armed forces to swiftly move troops and equipment across the European Union (EU), is a crucial but long-overlooked aspect of European defence. After decades of underinvestment and unresolved obstacles, there is a need to intensify coordinated and integrated efforts at EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Member State level to increase resources and address physical, legislative, and regulatory barriers that continue to cause delays and disruptions for military forces. Failure to act would leave armed forces unprepared in the face of threats, and undermine the security of citizens. Ultimately, this could jeopardise the EU's ability to demonstrate credible deterrence and achieve defence readiness. Upcoming initiatives at EU level represent an opportunity to finally adopt a comprehensive approach to military mobility. Clear added value could be provided by not only increasing targeted investment in dual-use infrastructure and reducing regulatory burdens, but also addressing issues in related security and defence domains that clearly impact military mobility decisions, including investment in cybersecurity, logistics hubs, stockpiling and transport innovation to enhance the security and resilience of military networks. For current ambitious defence initiatives, allocating sufficient budgetary resources is essential. This briefing looks within and beyond the current framework and explores the potential impact of additional investment of between €75 billion and €100 billion until 2035 to improve the current state of infrastructure. Our analysis finds that the added value associated with a larger amount of funds invested collectively leads to benefits which are almost three times higher (€21 billion additional GDP per year in 2035) than when Member States invest separately and in an uncoordinated way. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 16 July 2025, the European Commission proposed a revision to the Tobacco Taxation Directive, alongside modifications to the general Excise Duty Directive. The aim is to restore the effectiveness of EU-wide minimum tax rates on tobacco products and extend their scope to cover new product types. The initiative aims to support the EU's goal of a tobacco-free generation by 2040, recognising taxation as a key tool in reducing tobacco use. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Ukraine submitted its application for EU membership on 28 February 2022 and began accession negotiations in 2024. The Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) adopted its report on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Ukraine on 15 July 2025. A debate and vote on the report are due to be held in plenary in September 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

This briefing provides an overview of the global implementation of the Basel III framework. We provide a global overview using information from the Basel Committee and then look in more detail at the progress in the EU, US and UK. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

During the September 2025 plenary session, MEPs are due to pose questions to the European Commission regarding the taxation of large digital platforms, and the state-of-play in discussions on this topic at international level. In particular, the Commission will be asked whether it would consider a unilateral digital tax at EU level in the absence of an agreement at international level. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Following several turbulent years for EU agriculture, including widespread farmer protests, the European Commission has proposed new rules for the common agricultural policy (CAP) to apply from 2028. During the September plenary session, Parliament is due to vote on an own-initiative report that, contrary to the Commission's proposal, suggests the CAP budget be increased and kept separate from that of other policies. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Housing has become a high-priority policy issue. The European Parliament's Committee on Regional Development (REGI) report makes several recommendations on how to better use cohesion policy funds in housing and suggests future policy priorities for housing and housing affordability. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Despite dedicated EU support measures, regions affected by the transition to a climate-neutral economy continue to face major social and economic challenges. A failure to address these issues adequately risks exacerbating regional disparities and increasing economic inactivity in these regions. In September, Parliament is due to vote on an own-initiative report on the role of cohesion policy in supporting the just transition. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Executive Vice-President Fitto and Commissioner Dombrovskis are invited to the 20th Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD), scheduled for 8 September 2025. The RRD is the mechanism by which the European Parliament exercises democratic oversight over the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) according to the RRF Regulation. The previous RRD took place on 16 June 2025. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The forthcoming United Nations Climate Change Conference – COP30 – to be held in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025, is a decisive moment in international climate action. By September 2025, countries have to submit the third round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC 3.0) that will determine whether the targets of the Paris Agreement remain within reach. NDCs are countries' climate plans, setting national greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets and means of implementation. Parties to the Paris Agreement must update them every five years to ensure progress towards the agreement's temperature target. The updated NDCs cover a timeframe up to 2035 and must align with the outcomes of the first global stocktake and with Parties' long-term GHG emissions reduction objectives. Analysis by the United Nations Environment Programme shows that current efforts would lead to global warming of between 2.6 and 3.1 °C by 2100. Therefore, NDCs should demonstrate increased ambition, backed by concrete measures to deliver on the targets. Those major economies that have already submitted NDCs 3.0 (Brazil, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States) have set higher targets for 2035 compared with 2030. However, these pledges would already take up about 36 % of the remaining post-2030 carbon budget for 1.5 °C, while these Parties represent only 19.2 % of global emissions. The EU needs to submit its collective NDC 3.0 in September 2025, informed by the legislative proposal for amending the European Climate Law with a climate target for 2040. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The EU's outermost regions (ORs) are characterised by a unique combination of challenges relating to environment, geography and remoteness that impact their agricultural development. To address these challenges, the EU provides specialised support, enabling these regions to enhance their food self-sufficiency, promote local economic growth, and develop more resilient rural communities. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 19 August 2025, the European Council held a video-conference to discuss the latest developments on Ukraine following the 15 August summit in Alaska between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the meetings in Washington DC on 18 August between Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and several European leaders. The EU leaders' informal video-conference took place back-to-back with a virtual meeting of the 'Coalition of the Willing', which focused on accelerating 'practical work' to provide Ukraine with 'NATO Article 5-like security guarantees'. The EU Heads of State or Government discussed the EU's concrete contributions towards 'a just and sustainable peace' with three core dimensions: increasing pressure on Russia with further sanctions; strengthening Ukraine's military capacities, notably by unlocking the European Peace Facility; and progressing the enlargement process. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

the European Climate Law (Article 4, paragraph 3) requires the EU to set a Union-wide climate target for 2040, with a view to achieving climate neutrality by 2050. The European Commission adopted its communication on the topic in February 2024, to start the dialogue on a 2040 target. It was accompanied by an impact assessment recommending an 'at least' net 90 % emissions reduction target for 2040, compared with 1990 levels. Although, according to the text of the Climate Law, a legislative proposal should have been proposed by mid-2024 at the latest, various issues led the Commission to delay its proposal, initially to a timeline of the first quarter of 2025, and ultimately to 2 July 2025. The 2040 climate target will inform the post-2030 policy framework and give the mandate for the Commission to further develop its decarbonisation agenda, as initiated with the Clean Industrial Deal (CID). Furthermore, the Commission intends to align the EU's nationally determined contribution (NDC) for 2035 under the Paris Agreement, due in September 2025, with the agreed 2040 target. The EU NDC for 2035 does not require European Parliament approval. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The impact assessment provides a qualitative and quantitative analysis to underpin the revision of the roadworthiness package. It explains the analytical methods used and acknowledges the limitations and uncertainties of the available data and findings. While it clearly identifies the problems and their drivers, further quantification of their scale would have benefited the problem description. Furthermore, even though the IA presents a sufficient range of policy options, they are partially cumulative and therefore not entirely distinct alternatives. The IA duly assesses the main economic, social and environmental impacts of the options, but further explanations of certain methodological choices (e.g. the calculation of administrative costs for citizens) would have strengthened the analysis. The justification of the choice of the preferred option could have been more robust, as it scored highest on the coherence criterion, while other options performed better in terms of effectiveness and efficiency. In this context, information on the views of stakeholder groups on the options would have been helpful. Overall, the stakeholder consultation shows some shortcomings. For instance, stakeholders were not consulted on all policy measures – such as citizens on the testing of older vehicles – and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), despite being significantly affected, do not appear to have been sufficiently targeted. Finally, it appears that the proposals are mostly in line with the preferred option of the IA. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 28 June 2023, the Commission tabled a package of proposals to strengthen the payment services framework which would address the issues raised by the review of the (revised) Payment Services Directive (PSD2) – the core EU legislative act of the framework. The main issues highlighted are: a) the risk of fraud and lack of confidence in payment services; b) shortcomings in open banking; c) inconsistent application across Member States; d) an uneven playing field between banks and non-bank payment service providers. The package consists of a proposal for a revision of PSD2 – thus PSD3 – and a proposal for a new regulation enhancing supervisory consistency in the EU – which would cover large sections of PSD2. PSD3 would encompass electronic money services, repealing the governing directive. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

The cost of banking regulation and the supervisory framework for banks feature prominently in the debate over EU competitiveness. The strong regulation and supervision implemented after the great financial crisis are generally considered a positive for the EU economy, but in the context of the notion of simplification, a discussion is ongoing whether cost reduction is possible without deregulation. To support parliamentary scrutiny of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), this briefing analyses: - the interaction of simplicity and deregulation; - the ongoing simplification efforts of the ECB / SSM and the European Commission; and - the demands of stakeholders for simplification. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

3D printing, a technology only a few decades old, has progressed in quality and affordability. It has moved from the realm of industrial prototype, through cutting-edge design and technology, to finally end up in the homes of hobbyists and enthusiasts. This welcome and useful process has delivered new and affordable solutions to a range of subjects and fields, and has changed the shape of manufacturing from large factories to small bespoke businesses. However, this innovation has also developed a darker side and has been adopted by those with criminal intent, including for the manufacture of firearms. While converted or backstreet guns are not a new phenomenon, the advent of 3D printing has extended the range of people able to obtain a firearm to include those with no practical skills or tools or indeed any criminal connections. In the space of little over a decade, the concept of homemade guns using 3D printing techniques has evolved from a simple yet effective one-shot pistol to a semi-automatic hybrid rifle. These firearms have made their way into the hands of criminals and extremists with menacing intent. They have also featured in high-profile shootings with fatal consequences. It is important to acknowledge that this nascent method of firearm production is developing at a rapid speed. Authorities and law enforcement agencies are recognising the growing threat that these firearms pose, and are adapting their understanding, approach and expertise. In addition, legislators around the world are beginning to adapt their laws to address this emerging threat. In the EU, possession of a 3D-printed firearm is an offence, but not possession of, publicity for or distribution of digital blueprints or hard copies. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Political parties are foundational to liberal democracy, serving as intermediaries between public opinion and governance. All European Union (EU) Member States uphold the freedom of association, enabling citizens (and sometimes even EU mobile citizens) to engage politically through political parties. Many Member States enshrine fair political party competition as a cornerstone of democracy. However, history, such as Hitler's rise in Weimar Germany, illustrates how extremists can exploit political parties to abuse power and subvert democracies. To address the concerns of democracies being undermined through democratic processes, scholars have suggested measures that would allow democracies to defend themselves. Among the most significant, and also the most controversial, is the possibility of banning a political party. Such an extreme decision aims to strike a balance between protecting party pluralism and democracy. The precise moment at which democracy should intervene to protect itself has long been a subject of debate and contention. Nowadays, all EU Member States, at least theoretically, consider that banning a political party is a last resort measure against extremism, recognising its potential to safeguard liberal democracy. Notably, these bans can also affect EU democracy by influencing national electoral laws, which in turn affect European Parliament elections. National regulations on political parties can therefore have broader implications for EU-wide politics, highlighting the interconnectedness between Member States' legal orders and the EU's democratic framework. This briefing examines the theoretical and legal foundations of party bans, their implementation in EU Member States, and international recommendations concerning this measure. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a process allowing complaints to be settled out of court with the assistance of an impartial dispute resolution body. Through ADR, consumers can settle a complaint against a trader for breach of contract, outside court procedures, assisted by impartial, neutral dispute mediation, arbitration or conciliation. Since 2013, the share of e commerce in the EU economy has increased significantly, up from 2 % to 4 % of EU gross domestic product (GDP), increasing the relevance of ADR for consumers. Each year, approximately 300 000 eligible disputes between consumers and traders are examined by ADR entities, with resolution rates between 17 % and 100 % across the Member States. On 17 October 2023, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a directive amending several directives pertaining to consumer rights and ADR. The proposal pursues three objectives, to: adapt the ADR legislative framework to digital markets; facilitate the use of ADR in cross-border disputes; and simplify ADR procedures. In the European Parliament, the file was referred to the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). On 26 June 2025, the co-legislators reached a political agreement. This agreement was approved by Coreper on 16 July 2025. Pending confirmation by the IMCO Committee, work is ongoing to finalise the text of the act before the Council closes its first reading. Fourth edition, based on an earlier edition by Clément Evroux. The 'EU Legislation in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the legislative procedure. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On 17 January 2025, the European Commission announced the conclusion of additional negotiations on a modernised trade pillar of a broader update of the 1997 EU-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Co-operation Agreement ('the Global Agreement') to take into account Mexico's recent energy sector reforms. A first agreement in principle was reached on 21 April 2018, which in turn was complemented by an agreement on 28 April 2020 on the scope of the reciprocal opening of public procurement markets. The trade pillar of the Global Agreement was the first trade liberalisation agreement the EU concluded with a Latin American country. It has contributed to a significant increase in EU Mexico trade in services and industrial goods. However, it has become outdated, as both parties have entered into a wide range of preferential trade agreements with other partners with state-of-the-art provisions reflecting new developments in trade and investment policies. Removing non-tariff barriers to trade, and liberalising trade in agricultural goods would allow the EU and Mexico to enhance their competitive edge in each other's markets. After the modernised Global Agreement's legal review and translation into all official languages, the European Commission will submit to the Council proposals for Council decisions on its signature and conclusion. These will set out the agreement's legal architecture and its ratification pathway. Third edition. The 'International Agreements in Progress' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the process, from initial discussions through to ratification. The previous edition was published in October 2020. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Term limits restrict the number of terms an individual may serve in a given office and mainly aim to prevent a person from holding an office indefinitely. They most commonly apply to heads of state, heads of government or ministers, but in a very few instances are applied to members of parliament too. The debate around term limits is not new, but it has recently re-emerged as part of a broader reflection on democratic accountability, representative legitimacy, and the erosion of public trust in political institutions. In many democratic systems, the repeated re-election of the same individuals is increasingly perceived as a form of political entrenchment, fuelling concerns about declining responsiveness to citizens' concerns and reduced space for policy innovation. Within this context, term limits are often advanced as a mechanism for political renewal, aimed at broadening access to office and limiting the consolidation of personal power. There are arguments both in favour of and against the introduction of term limits in parliamentary life. The debate involves balancing the benefits of democratic renewal and the potential drawbacks of losing experienced members of parliament. Ultimately, the decision of whether or not to introduce them depends on several considerations, including, but not limited to, the country's specific circumstances, the role of parliament and its accountability. This briefing looks at term limits of parliamentary mandates – not to be confused with the principles of ineligibility and incompatibility. It explores legal proposals, party statutes, and political rhetoric across the European Union and reveals a fragmented landscape in which term limits are simultaneously seen as tools of modernisation and as a potential constraint on electors' choice. Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP