The campaign for the Democratic Senate candidate in Maine called the allegation “categorically false and politically motivated.”

The latest violence followed accusations by Qatar that Iran attacked a tanker ship in the Strait of Hormuz.

Elena Kagan and Amy Coney Barrett, a liberal and a conservative, are set to testify before a House subcommittee next Tuesday.

Potential candidates and their backers moved quickly to gain an edge in the contest over who would replace Graham Platner if he exits the key Senate race.

New and emerging plant pests can undermine EU food security and farm/forestry incomes through yield losses, trade disruption and costly control measures, while also causing major environmental impacts through biodiversity loss, landscape change and increased pressure to use pesticides. Using a comprehensive foresight methodology, this study examines how global trade and tourism, climate change and agricultural systems contribute to the introduction and spread of new and emerging plant pests, assesses current and future pest risks, as well as scientific and technological options for their prevention, detection, and management, and reviews existing EU mechanisms. The study develops four scenarios up to 2050 to explore how key uncertainties may shape pest risks and system responses. Based on these insights, it identifies policy options to strengthen prevention, preparedness, and response capacities, supporting future EU policymaking. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The claim, outlined in court papers, contends information shared with Iran could jeopardize the lives of pro-democracy protesters, religious minorities and LGTBQ people.

The Maine Democrat has faced an escalating string of scandals as he competes for a critical Senate seat that could determine control of the chamber.

This study examines the growing financialisation of housing in the EU, focusing on the role of institutional investors and corporate landlords in rental housing markets. It identifies two forms of speculation: valuation-driven business models centred on asset appreciation and landlord practices that undermine tenants’ rights and housing security. While the Commission’s European Affordable Housing Plan recognises these challenges, the study argues that more action and EU-level coordination are needed to address housing financialisation and support alternative, non-financialised housing models that ensure affordability. This document was prepared at the request of the Special Committee on the Housing Crisis in the European Union (HOUS). Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Spain's national recovery and resilience plan (NRRP) is the second largest (in absolute figures) financed by the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument and its main spending tool, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). Following the Spanish NRRP's October 2023 amendment, the original plan of 2021 (€69.5 billion in grants only) has undergone eighth revisions, and now amounts to €102.6 billion (or 8.2 % of national gross domestic product (GDP) in 2019). This total comprises a grant allocation of €79.8 billion (upwardly revised by roughly 15 % in June 2022); a loan allocation of €22.7 billion; the country's REPowerEU grant allocation of €2.6 billion; and a transfer of Spain's share from the Brexit Adjustment Reserve of €58 million to its NRRP. The last two revisions of the plan – approved by the Council in January and June 2026 – reflect efforts to simplify the NRRP, including a significant cut to the loan envelope of almost 73 %, falling from the €83.2 billion requested in October 2023 under the second revision. So far, €71.4 billion (or 69.6 % of the amended NRRP) have been received, which sits below the EU average of 74.3 %. The European Commission has disbursed these resources in the form of pre-financing and five grant and two loan instalments. The fifth payment request (grants and loans) is under assessment by the Commission. The amended plan focuses on the green transition, devoting 37 % of the resources to it, and fosters the digital transformation by committing 22.7 % of the funds (excluding REPowerEU) to digital projects. The European Parliament participates in interinstitutional forums for cooperation and discussion on its implementation and scrutinises the European Commission's work. This briefing is one in a series covering all EU Member States. Seventh edition. The first edition was written by Miroslava Kostova Karaboytcheva. The 'NGEU delivery' briefings are updated at key stages throughout the lifecycle of the plans. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

It took the EU 10 years after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty to adopt its first comprehensive security framework, the 2003 European Security Strategy, and further 13 years to update it through the 2016 EU Global Strategy. Since then, the security landscape has changed profoundly, marked by Russia's war against Ukraine, intensifying geopolitical competition, hybrid threats, cyber-attacks, economic coercion and growing pressures on Europe's resilience and defence industrial base. Against this backdrop, the EU is preparing a new security strategy, foreseen for Q3 2026. The strategy is expected to provide a long-term vision integrating defence, security, resilience, technological sovereignty, economic and supply-chain security and partnerships into a coherent framework to guide EU action in an increasingly contested world. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The unprecedented test of a nuclear-capable submarine-launched missile highlights Beijing’s growing force in the region.

The Democrat, who has withstood other scandals since launching his challenge to Sen. Susan Collins (R), is accused of sexual assault by a woman he previously dated.

The current proposal would extend the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) to aluminium and steel downstream products, consider measures to prevent circumvention and modify the methodology for calculating embedded emissions of electricity. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

As NATO leaders gather in Turkey, they are preparing for another summit shaped as much by managing President Donald Trump as by the alliance's security agenda.

The European Alliance of Cities and Regions for the Reconstruction of Ukraine brings together local and regional authorities at the centre of Ukraine's post-war recovery and reconstruction efforts. The Alliance operates according to the principles of decentralisation, local capacity-building, strengthened good governance, sustainable reform and coordinated efforts, topics that are highlighted in the opinions of the European Committee of the Regions, European Parliament, European Commission and expert community. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The Board of Peace (BoP) is a United States-led international organisation, initially endorsed by a UN Security Council Resolution in November 2025 as a transitional administration to oversee the redevelopment of Gaza. However, the BoP was subsequently established as a permanent international organisation with global peace-building aims under the lifelong chairmanship of Donald Trump, prompting legal and political controversy. The EU has refrained from joining the Board due to concerns over its compatibility with the UN Charter and international law. Among the EU Member States, Hungary and Bulgaria have joined the BoP as full founding members, with Bulgaria's status not confirmed. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

With an extra-budgetary financial ceiling of more than €17 billion for the period 2021-2027, made up of contributions from the EU Member States, the European Peace Facility (EPF) was created in March 2021 to provide assistance to EU partner countries' armed forces, and to finance the common costs of EU military operations and missions. Since 25 April 2025, the Council of the EU has mobilised the EPF for the armed forces of 15 partner countries, not comprising Ukraine, while the instrument continues to fund the common costs of the eight existing EU military operations and missions abroad, as well as the military component of a hybrid civilian–military initiative. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Partisanship around the country’s big anniversary has put Democrats in a bind: They want to criticize the president without appearing unpatriotic.

Since the establishment of the European emissions trading system (EU ETS), industrial installations exposed to the risk of carbon leakage have received free emission allowances for part of their greenhouse gas emissions. The EU ETS Directive provides for this percentage to be progressively reduced over the years in such a way that the EU ETS still provides a carbon price signal for decarbonisation and protects against the risk of carbon leakage. The EU has adopted a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) to replace the existing system of free allocation. The CBAM aims to ensure that imported goods are subject to the same carbon costs as those produced within the EU. However, the CBAM is still being phased in, and it does not cover all sectors exposed to the risk of carbon leakage.The European Commission will propose a revision of the EU ETS in July 2026. The revision would re-define the role of the EU ETS post-2030, reinforcing it as an instrument that supports decarbonisation and industrial competitiveness. There are multiple issues at stake, but free allocation is expected to play a pivotal role in the discussion. Beforehand, the adoption of the Benchmark Regulation – the implementing act setting the revised values for free allocation of emission allowances – will establish the amount of free allocation to be granted in 2026-2030 to the sectors and subsectors in the EU ETS that are exposed to the genuine risk of carbon leakage. A broader revision of Directive 2003/87/EC on the EU ETS will begin afterwards, with a Commission proposal looking, among other things, at the role of carbon leakage in the EU ETS post-2030. This briefing provides an overview of the existing legislative framework and concepts related to free allocation in the existing EU ETS, and presents the views expressed by some Member States and stakeholders. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The SDGs are 17 interconnected and indivisible goals, each with a series of specific targets, agreed by the United Nations in 2015 and to be attained by 2030. Both developed and developing countries committed to the SDGs, which address the multiple causes and consequences of environmental depletion and social inequalities. The European Union has been a leader in drafting the SDGs; it is also a frontrunner in mainstreaming the SDGs in all its policies. This topical digest features the main EPRS publications linked to the SDGs that will be the focus of the 2026 United Nations High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF), namely: 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), 9 (Industry Innovation and Infrastructure), 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities), and 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). These and other analyses are available on the European Parliament's Think Tank pages. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This briefing, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Justice, Civil Liberties and Institutional Affairs at the request of the Committee on Legal Affairs (JURI), provides a legal assessment of the Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Directive (IPRED), with particular regard to the European Commission’s Follow-up Study on the Application of the Directive on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (Final report, March 2025, published 2026 [Follow-up Study]). Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains how the European Parliament contributes to the EU’s support for democracy around the world, including through election observation, parliamentary capacity-building, mediation, dialogue, support for human rights defenders and cooperation with partner parliaments. It also outlines the EU policy framework, financial instruments and external action tools that underpin this democracy support. Finally, it describes the role of the European Parliament in this area. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the history, procedure and future perspectives of the EU’s enlargement policy. Accession negotiations and chapters have been opened with Albania, Montenegro, Serbia and Türkiye. North Macedonia opened accession negotiations in 2022, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2024. Kosovo submitted its application for EU membership in 2022. In 2023, the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Moldova and Ukraine and to grant candidate country status to Georgia (5.5.6 and 5.5.7). Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans – a region comprising Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – and the accession process. It outlines the objectives of promoting stability, cooperation and economic development, the main instruments such as the Stabilisation and Association Process and pre-accession assistance, and the current status of each country’s progress towards EU membership. It also explains how the European Parliament contributes to the enlargement process through its consent powers, resolutions and parliamentary diplomacy. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the European Union’s relations with the United States and Canada, which are grounded in a long shared history. All three are members of the G7, an informal intergovernmental forum that brings together major advanced economies to discuss economic and political issues. In addressing complex global challenges, including trade tensions, the EU prioritises dialogue and cooperation with both the United States and Canada. Key areas of engagement include foreign policy, security and defence, and trade and economic policy. The EU is committed to maintaining and strengthening transatlantic relations while adapting them to evolving global challenges. This approach aims to ensure stability and resilience and to uphold the international rules-based order. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This fact sheet explains the European Union’s relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, a region of 33 countries linked to the EU by deep political, economic and cultural ties. It covers the main institutional frameworks for dialogue – from region-wide summits and parliamentary assemblies to bilateral agreements with individual countries – and describes the EU’s trade and cooperation agreements with sub-regions and individual states. It also sets out the European Parliament’s role in shaping and monitoring the bi-regional strategic partnership. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Hybrid threats against the EU have increased significantly in both frequency and sophistication, creating complex challenges for European security, democratic institutions and societal resilience. Malicious state and non-state actors combine political, economic, cyber, information and military tools to exploit vulnerabilities, undermine public trust and destabilise societies, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict. The EU and its Member States have gradually transformed their understanding of hybrid threats into concrete policies, operational capabilities and coordinated response mechanisms. The EU approach combines preventive, protective and reactive measures, including intelligence cooperation, protection of critical infrastructure, sanctions regimes, resilience building and strategic communication. Recent incidents involving cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns and EU airspace violations have further accelerated the development of EU-level instruments designed to detect, deter and respond to these malign activities. As security challenges increasingly overlap across civilian and military domains, the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aim to ensure complementarity between the EU's regulatory and civilian tools and NATO's defence and military capabilities through improving coordination and enhancing situational awareness. The European Parliament emphasises that hybrid threats, mainly from Russia, China and Belarus, represent an escalating security challenge for the EU, and calls for a comprehensive EU response, stronger EU–NATO coordination, enhanced resilience and civil preparedness, targeted countermeasures, and closer cooperation with partner countries. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The president plans to fly to rural North Dakota to open Roosevelt’s library as aides tout comparisons between the two.

A sitting Democratic House member and a sitting senator both lost key races in the state.

This Briefing critically analyses the new EU Anti-Racism Strategy 2026-2030 (the Strategy) which was launched by the European Commission in January 2026. The Briefing situates the Strategy within the landscape of the existing EU anti-racism infrastructure including the primary and secondary legislation, case law, and other policy initiatives and efforts to combat racism, including the Strategy’s precursor, the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025 (the Plan). The Briefing shows that the EU’s anti-racism infrastructure, especially the Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, commonly known as the ‘Racial Equality Directive’, is robust in principle. Yet, it is underutilised and ultimately ineffective. The low rates of litigation under the Racial Equality Directive at the CJEU are evidence of its underutilisation. The high rates of existing levels of racism across EU Member States, such as recorded in successive FRA reports, evidence its ineffectiveness. It is against this backdrop that the Strategy, and previously the Plan, were adopted. The Plan was meant to be a ‘step up’ in the EU’s fight against racism. The immediate impetus for the adoption of the Plan came from the global Black Lives Matter protests following George Floyd’s death in the US. The Plan sought to address racism comprehensively and at all levels including individual, structural, and the EU’s internal – institutional – level. While the Plan covered much ground, it prioritised coverage and scale over precision and ambition. That is, the Plan lacked a precise normative framework of both racism and anti-racism; and at the same time lacked ambition by failing to identify benchmarks for improvement against which the impact of anti-racism measures could be tested. The Strategy which succeeds the Plan marks not only a semantic, but a more deliberate and determined, shift in the Commission’s approach to anti-racism. In particular, the Strategy is defined by three normative shifts: the adoption of an economic rationale for anti-racism; the shift in focus towards structural racism; and the centring of participation and partnerships in the fight against racism. These shifts are accompanied by a range of measures reinforcing the need to strengthen monitoring, enforcement, and implementation of law and policy against racism in the EU. Together, both the normative and operational aspects of the Strategy may be considered more ambitious than the Plan. Yet, the Strategy leaves significant gaps, both normatively and operationally. The success of the Strategy will depend not on how well it is executed but whether it is able to surmount the challenges posed by these gaps. These include: (i) the development of a working definition of structural racism which exceeds belief, ideology, and animus; (ii) the coordination of EU anti-racism measures across all forms of racism, all forms of discrimination, and all other issues facing the EU; (iii) the development of a common approach to intersectionality which defines and operationalises the concept at the same time; (iv) the development of a legal framework for addressing the alarming rise of xenophobia and xenophobic discrimination; (v) the prioritisation of the voices of racially disadvantaged individuals and groups; (vi) the adoption of the Horizontal Equal Treatment Directive; and (vii) the formulation of more ambitious and comprehensive programmatic approach to positive action measures for addressing racial disadvantage. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Ireland holds the Presidency of the Council of the EU as of 1 July 2026, following Cyprus and preceding Lithuania. Ireland’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, at 99.8 thousand PPS, represents 237 % of the EU’s total GDP per capita, while its gross national income (GNI), at 67 thousand PPS, is just two thirds of GDP. Ireland’s GDP decreased by 12.1 % in first quarter 2026. Ireland’s trade in services with the world is much more significant than its trade in goods. Ireland is in the top five EU Member States on research and innovation. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral parliament known as the Oireachtas. The Irish Parliament consists of the President of Ireland (Head of State) and two Houses: Dáil Éireann (House of Representatives) and Seanad Éireann (the Senate). The President is directly elected but mainly has a ceremonial role. They can convene a meeting of either House of the Oireachtas in order to solve a dispute or address a national emergency, and can dissolve the Dáil to facilitate a general election (on the advice of the head of government who must have a majority in the Dáil). They can also refer a bill to the Supreme Court for a judgment on its compliance with the Constitution. This briefing is part of an EPRS series on national parliaments and EU affairs. It offers an overview of the way the EU Member States' national parliaments are structured and how they process, scrutinise and engage with EU legislation. It also refers to relevant publications by national parliaments. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

This document provides background information for the Members participating in the mission to the 19th session of the Conference of States Parties to the CRPD, New York, from 9 to 11 June 2026. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Ireland assumed the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1 July, and will stay in office until 31 December 2026. The country took over from Cyprus and will hand the baton to Lithuania. Ireland is the first member of a new presidency trio, along with Lithuania and Greece. Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

The Supreme Court's ruling in the birthright citizenship case poses a political challenge for President Donald Trump.